The Transcendental Element in the Absent Presence. by Martin, Maggie Burnaman
Louisiana State University
LSU Digital Commons
LSU Historical Dissertations and Theses Graduate School
1995
The Transcendental Element in the Absent
Presence.
Maggie Burnaman Martin
Louisiana State University and Agricultural & Mechanical College
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.lsu.edu/gradschool_disstheses
This Dissertation is brought to you for free and open access by the Graduate School at LSU Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in
LSU Historical Dissertations and Theses by an authorized administrator of LSU Digital Commons. For more information, please contact
gradetd@lsu.edu.
Recommended Citation
Martin, Maggie Burnaman, "The Transcendental Element in the Absent Presence." (1995). LSU Historical Dissertations and Theses.
5969.
https://digitalcommons.lsu.edu/gradschool_disstheses/5969
INFORMATION TO USERS
This manuscript has been reproduced from the microfilm master. UMI 
films the text directly from the original or copy submitted. Thus, some 
thesis and dissertation copies are in typewriter face, while others may 
be from any type of computer printer.
Hie quality of this reproduction is dependent upon the quality of the 
copy submitted. Broken or indistinct print, colored or poor quality 
illustrations and photographs, print bleedthrough, substandard margins, 
and improper alignment can adversely affect reproduction.
In the unlikely, event that the author did not send UMI a complete 
manuscript and there are missing pages, these will be noted. Also, if 
unauthorized copyright material had to be removed, a note wifi indicate 
the deletion.
Oversize materials (e.g., maps, drawings, charts) are reproduced by 
sectioning the original, beginning at the upper left-hand comer and 
continuing from left to right in equal sections with small overlaps. Each 
original is also photographed in one exposure and is included in 
reduced form at the back of the book.
Photographs included in the original manuscript have been reproduced 
xerographically in this copy. Higher quality 6” x 9" black and white 
photographic prints are available for any photographs or illustrations 
appearing in this copy for an additional charge. Contact UMI directly 
to order.
A Bell & Howell Information Company 
300 North Zeeb Road. Ann Arbor, Ml 48106-1346 USA 
313/761-4700 800/521-0600

THE TRANSCENDENTAL ELEMENT 
IN THE 
ABSENT PRESENCE
A Dissertation
Submitted to the Graduate Faculty of the 
Louisiana State University and the 
Agricultural and Mechanical College 
in partial fulfillment of the 
requirements for the degree of 
Doctor of Philosophy
in
The Department of English
By
Maggie Martin
B.A., Sam Houston State University, 1969 
M.A., Louisiana State University, 1971
May 1995
UMI Number: 9538749
OMI Microform 9538749 
Copyright 1995, by DMI Company. All rights reserved.
This microform edition is protected against unauthorized 
copying under Title 17, United States Code.
UMI
300 North Zeeb Road - 
Ann Arbor, MI 48103
Table of Contents
Abbreviations ...................................... iii
Abstract.................................................xi
Chapter
1 Introduction ................................  1
2 Is It or Is It Not? The Transcendental
Element in the Absent Presence ............. 17
3 The Absent Presence In Christian Theology. . 71
4 The Absent Presence in Sidney's Astrophi1
and Stella................................132
5 The Absent Presence in Shakespeare's Sonnets 191
6 Emily Dickinson's Absent Presence and Some
Concluding Remarks .........................  249
N o t e s ..................................................319
Works C o n s u l t e d ....................................... 326
Vita ............  344
ii
Abbreviations
The following abbreviations have been used in the text for 
works cited more than once.
AA Bakhtin, M.M. Art and Answerability; Early
Philosophical Essays. Ed. Michael Holquist and 
Vadim Liapunov. Trans. Vadim Liapunov. Austin: 
University of Texas Press, 1990.
"ACL" McKeon, Richard. "Aristotle's Conception of 
Language and the Arts of Language." 176-213. 
Critics and Criticism: Ancient and Modern.
Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1952.
"AF" Wimsatt, W.K., Jr. and Monroe C. Beardsley. "The 
Affective Fallacy." 21-39. The Verbal Icon: 
Studies in the Meaning of Poetry. Lexington:
University of Kentucky Press, 1954.
A:FHD Jaeger, Warner. Aristotle: Fundamentals of the
History of His Development. Trans. Richard
Robinson. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1934.
A:HP Dillon, John. Introduction. Alcinous: The
Handbook of Platonism. Oxford: Clarendon Press,
1993.
APA MaMahon, Robert. Augustine's Prayerful Ascent:
An Essay on the Literary Form of the Confessions.
Athens: University of Georgia Press, 1989.
APG Kennedy, George. The Art of Persuasion in Greece.
Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1963.
AR Iser, Wolfgang. An Act of Reading: A Theory of
Aesthetic Response. Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins
University Press, 1978.
"AS:RR" Roche, Thomas. "Astrophil and Stella: A Radical
Reading." 185-226. Sir Philip Sidney: An
Anthology of Modern Criticism. Oxford: Clarendon
Press, 1987.
"AT" Klemm, David. "The Autonomous Text, the
Hermeneutical Self, and Divine Rhetoric." 3-26. 
Hermeneutics, the Bible, and Literary Criticism.
Ed. Ann Loades and Michael McLain. New York:
St. Martin's Press, 1992.
iii
"BDED"
BMCS
BP
BR
”BS"
»CCC"
"CD"
Cl
CJ
Cp
Der
Dis
Borges, Jorge Luis. “Borges Discusses Emily 
Dickinson." Interview with Professor James 
Wright. 5-32. Boraes the Poet. Ed. Carlos 
Cortinez. Fayetteville: University of Arkansas
Press, 1986.
Bennett, Paula. "'By a Mouth That Cannot speak': 
Spectral Presence in Emily Dickinson's Letters." 
Emilv Dickinson Journal 1:2 (1992): 76-99.
Nancy, Jean-Luc. The Birth to Presence. Stanford 
Stanford University Press, 1993.
Tillich, Paul. Biblical Religion and __the__Search 
for Ultimate Reality. Chicago: University of
Chicago Press, 1955.
Kristeva, Julia. Black Sun: Depresssion and
Melancholia. Trans. Leon S. Roudiez. New York: 
Columbia University Press, 1989.
Hazard, Mary E. "Absent-Presence and Present- 
Absence. Cross-Couple Convention in Elizabethan 
Culture." Texas Studies in Literature and 
Language 20 (1987): 1-27.
McFayden, A.I. "The Call to Discipleship: 
Reflections on Bonhoeffer's Theme 50 Years Later." 
Scottish Journal of Theology 43 (1990): 461-483.
Ricoeur, Paul. The Conflict of Interpretations: 
Essavs in Hermeneutics. Ed. Don Ihde. Evanston: 
Northwestern University Press, 1974.
Kant, Immanuel. Critigue of Judgement. Trans. 
James Creed Meredith. Oxford: Clarendon Press,
1911.
Holland, L. Virginia. Counterpoint: Kenneth
Burke and Aristotle's Theories of Rhetoric. New 
York: Philosophical Library, 1959.
Norris, Christopher. Derrida. Cambridge:
Harvard University Press, 1987.
Derrida, Jacques. Dissemination. Trans. Barbara 
Johnson. Chicago: University of Chicago Press,
1981.
D:MI Porter, David. Dickinson; The Modern Idiom. 
Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1981.
DP Sidney, Sir Philip. The Defense of Poesy (1595).
605-624. Ed. Hyder E. Rollins and Hershel Baker. 
Boston: D.C. Heath & Co., 1966.
DO Barth, Karl. Dogmatics in Outline. New York:
Harper & Brothers, 1959.
DW New, Elisa. "Difficult Writing, Difficult God:
Emily Dickinson's Poems Beyond Circumference."
Religion and Literature 18:3 (1986): 1-27.
EBH Mould, Elmer W.K. Essentials of Bible History.
New York: The Ronald Press Co., 1939.
"EDC" Gribben, Laura. "Emily Dickinson's Circumference:
Figuring a Blind Spot in the Romantic Tradition." 
The Emilv Dickinson Journal 2:1 (1993): 1-21.
"EDCS" Stonum, Gary Lee. "Emily Dickinson's Calculated
Sublime." 101-129. The American Sublime. Edited 
and Introduction by Mary Arensberg. New York: 
State University of New York Press, 1989.
Enc Gorgias. Encomium of Helen. 283-88. Aristotle's
On Rhetoric. Trans. George A. Kennedy. New York: 
Oxford University Press, 1991.
EPSC Waller, Gary. English Poetry of the Sixteenth
Century. London: Longman Pub., 1986.
"ESS" Barber, C.L. "An Essay on Shakespeare's Sonnets."
Shakespeare's Sonnets. Ed. Harold Bloom. New 
York: Chelsea House Pub., 1987.
"FMT" Burke, Kenneth. "Four Master Tropes." 503-517.
A Grammar of Motives. Berkeley: University of
California Press, 1969.
GM Burke, Kenneth. A Grammar of Motives. Berkeley:
University of California Press. 1969.
Gor Plato. Gorgias. Trans. W.C. Helmbold. New York:
Macmillan Pub. Co., 1952.
GM Burke, Kenneth. A Grammar of Motives. Berkeley:
University of California Press, 1969.
v
GR Burke, Kenneth. A Rhetoric of Motives. Berkeley:
University of California Press, 1969.
HCT
IL
IW
LA
LED
"LRAW"
MC
MED
Tillich, Paul. A History of Christian Thought.
Ed. Carl E. Braaten. New York: Harper and Row,
1968.
Wimsatt, W.K., Jr. and Monroe C. Beardsley. "The 
Intentional Fallacy." 3-18. The Verbal Icon: 
Studies in the Meaning of Poetry. Lexington: 
University of Kentucky Press, 1954.
Ferry, Anne. The "Inward" Language: Sonnets of
Wyatt. Sidney. Shakespeare. Donne. Chicago: 
University of Chicago Press, 1983.
Ong, Walter J., S.J. Interfaces of the Word: 
Studies.in the Evolution of Consciousness and 
Culture. Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1977.
Kher, Inder Nath. The Landscape of Absence: Emily
Dickinson's Poetry. New Haven: Twayne Pub., Inc,
1971.
Sewall, Richard. The Life of Emily Dickinson.
2 vols. New York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux,
1974.
Levi, Albert William. "Love, Rhetoric, and the 
Aristocratic Way." Philosophy and Rhetoric 17 
(1984): 189-208.
Weiser, David M. Mind in Character: Shakespeare's
Speaker in the Sonnets. Columbia: University of
Missouri Press, 1987.
Shurr, William H. The Marriage of Emily Dickinson: 
A Study of the Fascicles. Lexington: University
Press of Kentucky, 1983.
MF Knight, G. Wilson. The Mutual Flame.
Methuen & Co., Ltd., 1955.
London:
"MLNA" Crosman, Robert. "Making Love Out of Nothing at 
All." Shakespeare Quarterly. 41 (1990):
255-70.
"NCMR"
MM
i»MP«»
NE
NS
OA
OL
"OL"
PE
PED
Ph
Frei, Hans W. Narrative' in Christian and Modern 
Reading.** 149-163. Theology and Dialogue Essavs 
in Conversation with George Lindbeck. Ed. Bruce D. 
Marshall. Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame
Press, 1990.
Chambers, Ross. Meaning and Meaningfulness:
Studies in the Analysis and Interpretation of 
Texts. Lexington: KY: French Forum, Pub., 1979.
Loughlin, Gerard. "Making it Plain: Austin Farrer
and the Inspiration of Scripture." 96-112. 
Hermeneutics, the Bible and Literary Criticism.
Ed. Ann Loades and Michael McLain. New York:
St. Martin's Press, 1992.
Aristotle. Nicomachean Ethics. Trans. Martin 
Ostwald. Indianapolis: The Bobbs-Merrill Co.,
Inc. 1962.
Aristotle. Natural Science. 3-62. Aristotle: 
Natural Science. Psychology, and The Nicomachean 
Ethics. Trans, and ed. Philip Wheelwright.
New York: The Odyssey Press, 1935.
Ricoeur, Paul. Oneself as Another. Trans.
Kathleen Blarney. Chicago: University of Chicago
Press, 1992.
Ong, Walter J., S.J. Oralitv and Literacy: The
Technologizing of the Word. London: Methuen Pub.,
1982.
Saussure, Ferdinand de. "The Object of 
Linguistics." 151-68. Contemporary Literary 
Criticism. Ed. Robert Con Davis and Ronald 
Schleifer. New York: Longman Pub., 1989.
Mills-Courts, Karen. Poetry as Epitaph: 
Representation and Poetic Language. Baton Rouge: 
Louisiana State University Press, 1990.
Farr, Judith. The Passion of Emily Dickinson. 
Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1992.
Plato. Phaedrus. Trans. R. Hackforth, F.B.A. 
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990.
vii
PH Gadamer, Hans-Georg. Philosophical Hermeneutics.
Trans, and ed. David E. Linge. Berkeley: 
University of California Press, 1976.
PPh Burger, Ronna. Plato's Phaedrus; A Defense of a
Philosophic Art of Writing. Tuscaloosa:
University of Alabama Press, 1980.
PL Chew, Samuel. The Pilgrimage of Life. New Haven:
Yale University Press, 1962.
PM Heninger, S.K., Jr. Sidney and Spenser: The Poet
as Maker. University Park: Penn State University
Press, 1989.
"PSPS" Spencer, Theodore. "The Poetry of Sir Philip
Sidney." 31-59. Essential Articles for the Study 
of Sir Philip Sidney. Ed. Arthur F. Kinney. 
Hamden, CT: Archon Books, 1986.
PT Grube, G.M.A. Plato's Thought. Introduction by
Donald J. Zeyl. London: The Athlone Press, 1980.
PW Ong, Walter J., S.J. The Presence of the Word:
Some Prolegomena for Cultural and Religious 
History. New York: Simon and Schuster, 1967.
Rep Plato. The Republic. Trans. G.M.A. Grube.
Indianapolis: Hackett Pub., Co., 1974.
"RKB" Warnock, Tilly. "Reading Kenneth Burke: Ways In,
Ways Out, Ways Roundabout." College English. 48 
(1986): 62-65.
RM Burke, Kenneth. A Rhetoric of Motives. Berkeley:
University of California Press, 1969.
RMTF Levao, Ronald. Renaissance Minds and Their
Fictions: Cusanus. Sidney. Shakespeare. Berkeley:
University of California Press, 1985.
RNT Mack, Burton L. Rhetoric and the New Testament.
Minneapolis: Fortress Press, 1990.
RP Steiner, George. Real Presences: Is there
anything in what we say? London: Faber and Faber,
1989.
RR Burke, Kenneth. A Rhetoric of Religion: Studies
in Loaoiogv. Berkeley: University of California
Press, 1970.
SL Eberwein, Jane Donahue. Dickinson: Strategies of
Limitation. Amherst: The University of
Massachusetts Press, 1985.
"SASSS" Hamilton, A.C. "Sidney's Astrophil and Stella as 
a Sonnet Sequence." 193-221. Essential Articles 
for the Study of Sir Philip Sidney.
SD Schneidau, Herbert. Sacred Discontent: The Bible
and Western Tradition. Baton Rouge: Louisiana
State University Press, 1976.
SP:CI Kalstone, David. Sidney's Poetry: Contexts and
Interpretations. Cambridge: Harvard University 
Press, 1965.
SPE Fineman, Joel. Shakespeare's Perjured Eye: The
Invention of Poetic Subjectivity in the Sonnets. 
Berkeley: University of California Press, 1986.
"SPEDL" Bennett, Paula. "'By a Mouth That Cannot Speak':
Spectral Presence in Emily Dickinson's Letters." 
Emilv Dickinson Journal 1:2 (1992): 76-99.
SPS Kimbrough, Robert. Sir Philip Sidney. New York:
Twayne Pub., Inc., 1971.
SR Kroner, Richard. Speculation and Revelation in the
Age of Christian Philosophy. Philadelphia: The
Westminster Press, 1992.
SS Booth, Stephen. Editor. Shakespeare's Sonnets.
New Haven: Yale University Press, 1977.
SSS Wilson, Katharine M. Shakespeare's Sugared
Sonnets. New York: Harper & Row Pub., 1974.
TCP Jenkyns, Richard. Three Classical Poets: Sappho,
Catullus, and Juvenal. Cambridge: Harvard
University Press, 1982.
TP Altizer, Thomas J.J. Total Presence: The Language
of Jesus and the Language of Today. New York: The
Seabury Press, 1980.
TTL
UC
"VBBC"
"WA"
WS
Smith, Hallett. The Tension in the Lvrer Poetry 
in Shakespeare's Sonnets. San Marino, California: 
Huntington Library, 1981.
Juhasz, Suzanne. The Undiscovered Continent;
Emilv Dickinson and the Space of the Mind. 
Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1983.
Fletcher, Angus. "Volume and Body in Burke's 
Criticism, or Stalled in the Right Place." ISO- 
175. Representing Kenneth Burke. Ed. Hayden 
White and Margaret Brose. Baltimore: John
Hopkins University, 1982.
Ong, Walter, S.J. "The Writer's Audience is Always 
a Fiction." 82-99. Contemporary Literary 
Criticism. Ed. Robert Con Davis and Ronald 
Schleifer. New York: Longman Pub., 1989.
Hall, Ronald. Word and Spirit: A Kierkeoaardian
Critique of the Modern Aae. Bloomington: Indiana
University Press, 1993.
Zondervan Pictorial Bible Dictionary. Ed. Merrill
C. Tenney. Grand Rapids, Michigan: Zondervan
Pub. Co.
x
Abstract
•'The Transcendental Element in the Absent Presence" 
analyzes the absent presence, the rhetorical and literary 
states of being there in the mind of the perceiving 
individual, though not there physically. It seeks to 
answer: What does the term "absent presence" mean? Is
there a difference between rhetorical and literary absent 
presences? If so, how is each manifest through the reading 
process? And, what sustains these absent presences?
Evidenced through selected works of Plato, Aristotle, 
New Testament writers, Sidney, Shakespeare, and Dickinson, 
the study argues for the intellectually, spiritually, or 
aesthetically transcendent quality of the absent presence. 
Any encounter between reader, text, and writer affirms a 
dialogic "other," a rhetorically recognizable presence, 
albeit absent, that operates from both sides of the text, 
from both the writer's composition and the reader's 
reading.
Literary absent presences, emanating from the 
rhetorical text, additionally influence both writer and 
reader. This is especially evident in the poetry of 
writers whose personae are poet-lovers lamenting their 
departed beloveds. Through a kind of aesthetic 
transcendence, these poets transform the absence of the
beloved into a viable absent presence, a textual presence 
which is subsequently controlled by the artist to "speak11 
to the reader.
Success is determined by the degree of love which 
dominates the exchange. Whether reacting to eros or agape, 
cupiditas or caritas, the poet-lover and reader reflect 
that which dominates their response to the significant 
rhetorical or literary "other." The consequence is either 
negative or positive; the perceptor (poet-lover or reader) 
languishes in personal or interpretive frustration, or she 
soars in aesthetic or hermeneutic fulfillment as she comes 
to greater understanding of self, world, and other.
An implicit premise is that these rhetorical and 
literary operations are an integral part of any textual 
experience— both the writer's composing and the reader's 
reading. They are subtle textual energies that 
significantly contribute to understanding— that instant of 
intellectual, spiritual, or aesthetic fusion between writer 
and reader.
xii
Chapter 1 
Introduction
The topic for this study is the plurality of absent 
presences that operate rhetorically and literarily through 
a reading experience. The absent presence, as a rhetorical 
term, assumes duality, functioning from either side of the 
text— writer to reader and reader to writer. The absent 
presence, as a literary term, likewise assumes duality, 
working between writer/persona and reader/persona. For the 
purposes of this study, the term, though metaphorical by 
implication, is more than metaphor; it describes the 
rhetorical relationships between writer/reader and 
reader/writer and the aesthetic relationships between poet- 
lover/beloved and reader/persona. Though not there 
physically to the other, each absence is there in the mind 
of the individual. It becomes an absent presence.
My thesis is that absent presences, both rhetoric and 
aesthetic, dominate any textual experience involving 
Western literature; they are implicit in both the writing 
of a text and the reading of a text. But since I could not 
take, since I do not assume, that all Western literature is 
my province of study, I had to find a way to limit the 
focus— for my research and for my future reader. 
Capitalizing on the conventional view that Western
1
2civilization has two major roots, classical and Hebraic, I 
begin at the most rudimentary level; specifically, I seek 
an explanation of the origin of the term in the culture 
that is ours. As a result, the second and third chapters 
return to the source of Western thought: to germane texts
of Plato and Aristotle and to the Bible, primarily the New 
Testament, which becomes my link between the rhetorical and 
the literary operations of the absent presence.
In its literary context, the term absent presence is 
especially relevant to poetically rendered relationships 
between a poet-lover and a beloved. As a common 
denominator in the sonnet-sequence of Sir Philip Sidney, 
the sonnets of William Shakespeare, and the fascicle poetry 
of Emily Dickinson, these dominant literary absent 
presences can best be understood in relation to their 
rhetorical correlate. I will thus argue that the literary 
absent presence is a direct consequence of the rhetorical 
absent presence that operates within the triangular 
framework of writer/text/reader.
The purpose of this dissertation study, then, is to 
explore the concept of the absent presence. I will attempt 
to answer several critical questions: What does the term
"absent presence" mean? Is there a difference between a 
rhetorical and a literary absent presence? If so, how is 
each manifest through the reading process? And, what is 
the force that sustains these absent presences?
3This study will not be a history of the idea of the 
absent presence. Rather, it will be severely limited in 
scope, beginning with a chapter that explains why the 
rhetorical term came into being, moving to a chapter that 
suggests how the literary version came into being, and 
developing through three chapters that provide examples of 
how the rhetorical and literary aspects of the term 
conflate in the texts of the poet-lovers of Sidney, 
Shakespeare, and Dickinson.
Critical thought that influenced this study is varied. 
Although I am not a proponent of deconstruction, I realize 
that Derrida's poetics have permanently altered the 
theoretical landscape. His analysis that language abounds 
with absences, what he refers to as a gap, a slippage, or a 
lack, stimulates my own discussion of what the absent 
presence seeks to accomplish within and through a text.
Since I will focus on those rhetorical and literary 
absences that result from the printed word, my approach is 
hermeneutic. Essentially I conclude that the term 
"hermeneutic circle," which originates with Martin 
Heidegger in Being and Time and is amplified by Paul 
Ricoeur in The Conflict of Interpretations, inaccurately 
describes understanding that comes through recurring 
reading experiences. Circle implicitly denotes closure, 
implying definitive readings of a text. Since I argue that 
interpretations are as numerous as the individuals who
4bring their various experiences to the reading table, I 
offer "hermeneutic spiral" as a term that better explains 
an open system of interpretation which allows for a 
multiplicity of, and successive, readings by a given 
reader.
Several theorists and their works will undergird my 
development. Even when I do not refer specifically to Ong, 
Ricoeur, Steiner, and Hall, their discussions, especially 
those concerning textual transcendence, guide my work. 
Referring frequently to the writings of Walter J. Ong, 
primarily to his two texts The Presence of the Word and 
Interfaces of the Word, I will credit the onset of the 
absent presence to the emergence of the written word.
The written word is that which allows transcendence, a 
term that I use interchangeably with understanding. My 
source for this synonymizing of terms is Ricoeur's The 
Conflict of Interpretations: "to understand, for a finite 
being, is to be transported to another life" (C£ 5). 
Developing my thesis along intellectual lines with regard 
to Greek writers, spiritual lines with respect to New 
Testament writers, and aesthetic lines with attention to 
poet-lovers, I, too, argue that each rational being who 
processes thoughts is temporarily, for the duration of the 
text, "transported" into the life of the other.
Steiner takes up the idea of transcendence in Real 
Presences; Is there anything in what we say? His text
5attempts to explain the literary transcendence that occurs 
when a reader willfully and willingly engages the text of 
another. He contends "that in the art-act and its 
reception, that there is in the experience of meaningful 
form, a presumption of presence" (EE 214). Whether fully 
cognizant, as perhaps is the writer who envisions the kind 
of audience who might read his text, or unaware of the 
operations, as generally are most readers who pick up that 
same text, an absent, yet discernible, presence emanates 
from either side of all written communication. Though 
neither individual is corporeally present to the other, 
both writer and reader can recognize the effects of the 
other. These effects are indisputably real as they are 
manifest through the intellect, the experiences, and the 
emotions of the other.
If any literary text is to make meaning, it requires a 
meeting point of identity between writer and reader. It 
must overcome difference. But a text by itself, that which 
Ross Chambers calls "deferred communication" (JOT 137), 
cannot accomplish correspondence between writer and reader; 
it demands participation from each individual on opposite 
sides of the text. The writer must make the first overture 
to overcome difference by putting his words to paper; the 
reader can be no less active. So as to glean even an 
instant of hermeneutic fusion with the writer, she must 
participate fully in the textual activity.
6I will develop my argument from the assumption that a 
kind of intellectual, spiritual, or aesthetic transcendence 
occurs each time that a reader gleans understanding from a 
text. Such an encounter between reader, text, and writer 
admits to a dialogic "other," to a recognizable presence 
that aids the reader in the hermeneutic possibilities of 
the text. This presence operates from both sides of the 
text, from both the writer's composition and the reader's 
reading.
The "deferred communication," which is the written 
aesthetic text, relies on the reader to interpret the 
discourse offered by the absent writer, termed by Chambers, 
as the "enunciator." Chambers describes this rhetorical 
process as that which gives "texts their social function, 
enabling them to pursue their existence as 'literature' by 
effecting their on-going meaningfulness" (£121 137).
The texts of Burke and Hall will support my exposition 
of this "ongoing meaningfulness" of printed texts. 
Frequently I will refer to Burke. His extensive corpus, 
which explores the complex roles of language, both oral and 
written in modern society, helps to shape my understanding 
of absent presences as pervasive elements in written 
communication.
But it is Hall's Word and Spirit that can bring 
written language, and the attending transcendence, clearly 
into focus. As Hall begins his book, relying heavily on
7’’our modern prophet” Kierkegaard in order to understand
spirit, he clearly states his thesis:
What I want to explore, with Kierkegaard’s help, 
is the particular character of this modern 
spiritlessness, the peculiar twists of the 
modern resistance to, and ultimate denial of, 
spirit, I will make the case that Kierkegaard 
also wants to make, namely, that the denial of 
spirit in the modern age is ironically dependent 
on the impact of Christianity.
(K£ 4)
Proceeding in the first chapter of his text, Hall gives a 
convincing explanation of how "the advent of Christianity 
radically changed human consciousness" (J£S 5), how it moved 
rational man from a "psychic" (intellectual and static) to 
a "pneumatic" (spiritual and dynamic) way of thinking. It 
is this pneumatic "world-picture" (JJS 6) that allows a 
reader to transcend self; it is that which enables her to 
visualize past, present, and future. And it is 
accomplished through speech, most notably written speech, 
which is the literary text.
An implied trait in any literary work, be it a lengthy 
treatise on rhetoric, an inspired guide on spirituality, or 
an organized collection of brief poems, is that it 
continues to provide meaning each time a reader takes a 
text into herself. In any rhetorical interchange, she 
becomes an essential player. In effect, she completes the 
rhetorical experience when she interprets the words of the 
writer. And when she interprets the words of the other 
through her experiences, when she slants them through her
8own perceptions, they begin to make meaning for her as she
relates to self, world, and Other.
The role of the reader, then, is crucial both to the 
rhetorical and the literary processes. She must be a 
willing, a kind of loving, participant who submits her 
intellectual and emotional self to the text offered by the
writer. As she does, she can hope to achieve at least
momentary hermeneutic fusion with the absent author. This 
fusion, I will argue, is the direct result of love. As 
that which seeks to overcome difference, love is necessary 
for a successful rhetorical union between text, writer, and 
reader. Love is that which allows intellectual, spiritual, 
emotional, or aesthetic fusion between writer and reader; 
it is that which enables transcendence.
To support the premise that love is implicit in a 
rhetorical exchange, I will note the manner of love that 
selected writers incorporate in their methods of rhetoric 
so as to overcome the difference that separates writer and 
reader. Plato/Socrates depends upon eros to bring a like- 
minded interlocutor into shared understanding; God relies 
upon agape to close the separation between Creator and 
creation; and the poets Sidney, Shakespeare, and Dickinson 
vacillate between cupiditas and caritas in their searches 
to reconcile poet-lover and beloved. As my argument 
examines how the dominant literary absent presence of a 
text operates in conjunction with the rhetorical absent
9presences, love will be a pervasive assumption. It will be 
the singularly significant element that links each selected 
writer to his or her audience.
Adhering to the Socratic practice of defining terms 
early in a dialogic exercise, I will fully define the term 
"absent presence" in the second chapter. Then, because of 
their impact on all of Western literature, I will focus on 
selected writings of Plato and Aristotle, specifically on 
those that explore principles and practices of rhetoric. I 
will posit that the very act of writing those principles 
and practices on paper for future readers to digest bespoke 
the existence of a rhetorical absent presence.
Before Plato, and with the exclusion of drama, the 
most respected communication was oral— the physical 
presence of both speaker and listener joined in dialectic 
relationship through the spoken word. In his Phaedrus and 
The Republic. Plato defends the spoken word, as practiced 
by his mentor Socrates, against those who would tarnish 
dialectic exchange through the practice of putting words to 
paper. Rooted in Plato's defense of the spoken word, 
however, was a problem that would not go away: How could
he preserve the words of his beloved mentor Socrates 
without putting those cherished words to paper? This 
inescapable irony is that which set the rhetorical stage 
for the emergence of the absent presence.
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Aristotle, along with his rhetorical triangle, only 
exacerbated the irony, but his methodology began to provide 
the means whereby readers might begin to accept, if not 
fully understand, the invasion of an absent presence into a 
rhetorical exchange. Aristotle's On Rhetoric heralded an 
"acceptable" written treatise of ideas, precisely the ideas 
of rhetoric, of the correct means of communicating and 
sharing knowledge. In his book, Aristotle describes the 
rhetorical triangle between logos (text), ethos (writer), 
and pathos (reader). Inherent in this triangle is the idea 
of absence— absence of the reader during the time of the 
author's writing of the text and absence of the writer 
during the time of the reader's reading of the text.
Because his On Rhetoric is the earliest discussion of that 
which occurs when two individuals, the writer and the 
reader, communicate through a text, his work sets the stage 
for literary endeavors; and key players on that literary 
stage are rhetorical absent presences operating from either 
side of the text.
The third chapter, which looks to Christian theology, 
continues the discussion of rhetorical absent presences, 
but it argues that an additional absent presence, a 
literary one that operates between persona and beloved of 
the text, emerges in the writings of the New Testament. 
Jesus, who is the Word, is both character in and text of 
God's communication with humanity. A kind of
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transcendental act occurs between the believing reader who 
communicates with God through his Holy Spirit, understood 
as the paraclete of Jesus Christ.
In the final three chapters, as I provide literary 
examples of absent presences, I will focus on selected 
poetry of Sidney, Shakespeare, and Dickinson that 
especially reveals an absent "other.11 Observing as each 
poet explores the creative tension arising from the 
relationship between poet-lover and beloved, I will note 
that love is the force which impels the aesthetic endeavor. 
Although the love may have been spurned or thwarted, it 
nevertheless is the essential element in the verbal 
rendering of that relationship between poet-lover and 
absent beloved. As each writer creates a persona who is in 
emotional conflict with a beloved, each professes the 
tangible quality of love— even when the source of that 
love, the beloved, is physically absent.
Julia Kristeva's book Black Sun helps to explain the 
means whereby the poet-lover refines personal depression 
and melancholia into verbal art:
By means of a leap into the orphic world of 
artifice (of sublimation), the saturnine poet, 
out of the traumatic experience and object of 
mourning, remembers only a gloomy or passional 
tone. He thus comes close, through the very 
components of language, to the lost Thing. His 
discourse identifies with it, absorbs it, 
modifies it, transforms it: he takes Eurydice
out of the melancholy hell and gives her back a 
new existence in his text/song.
(BS 160)
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The poet-lovers of Sidney, Shakespeare, and Dickinson 
follow the pattern described by Kristeva: skillful in
their professions, they successfully transform personal 
disappointment in love into works of art. Gifted with a 
bit of "magic" (akin to that of the mysterious Orpheus), 
the poet-lovers offer their texts to readers. Through 
rhetorical identification, readers can share the poet- 
lover 's gloomy experience with an absent beloved. Then, 
like Eurydice who learned to cope in a life without her 
husband Orpheus, Kristeva suggests that readers, too, might 
find solace, perhaps even a song, in the poet-lover's 
language which depicts the beloved poetically transformed 
into an absent presence. Although poetry may be a "fragile 
filter," according to Kristeva, it is the "basic, 
fundamental sieve that will sift . . . sorrow and joy into 
language" (fiS 161).
Why is it necessary to "sift . . . sorrow and joy into 
language"? The answer, in highly reductive terms, is to 
provide meaning for that which seems meaningless. To 
paraphrase Kristeva, individuals can become dysfunctional 
if they fail to ascribe meaning to those experiences that 
are shrouded in sorrow and disappointment. In a worst-case 
scenario, they can succumb to a melancholic depression that 
robs them of their ability to translate and metamorphose 
their own gloomy experiences (Bg 39-43). Poetic art is not 
simply a thought in isolation; it becomes literary
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identification between poet and reader. As long as the 
poet-lover translates and metamorphoses personal experience 
and as long as the reader can share through her equally 
personal interpretation of that experience, meaning is 
effected for each on opposite sides of the text.
Kristeva's psychological insights, which will underpin the 
development of chapters 4, 5, and 6, provide the rationale 
for understanding the transformation of an absence into an 
absent presence: creation of an absent presence makes the
absence sufficiently meaningful.
Sidney, the first literary writer in my study who 
sustains a persona who is poet-lover, addresses a complex 
view of love. After describing Astrophil's unmistakably 
erotic love for Stella, a passionate love that is not to be 
consummated, Sidney refines Astrophil's physical love to 
its more acceptable aesthetic level. At the end of the 
sonnet sequence, Astrophil's masks are removed, and he is 
left with self-knowledge, with an incisively painful self- 
knowledge that may somehow redeem him from his failure in 
love. Sidney offers the aesthetic word as the means 
whereby his persona Astrophil might begin to probe the 
chasm of his own being. As he does, readers share in his 
search for epistemological clues that might help him (and 
those who share his experiences through the written word) 
understand a personal existence that began in hope but 
ended in disappointment.
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Shakespeare views love in a different context, but he, 
too, creates a poet-lover who transforms the absence of his 
beloved Fair Friend into a productive absent presence. 
Boldly, Shakespeare's poet-lover likens his artistic 
ability to the creative powers of God. Claiming his 
ability to eternize his beloved Fair Friend, Will, who is 
poet-lover, likewise eternizes himself through the poetry 
that he leaves to his readers. Through this written word, 
the poet-lover firmly establishes his own dominant presence 
in the poetic text. For his persona Will, love is a 
rational and necessary requisite for all that is good. It 
is that which forgives indiscretions, transforms 
relationships, and perpetuates both beloved and poet-lover; 
it is also that which motivates intellectual and meaningful 
correspondence between writer/reader and reader/writer.
Shakespeare exposes lust, the counter side of love, as 
he writes of Will's relationship with the Dark Lady. This 
relationship is void of meaning; it has no redeeming value 
to the poet-lover. It inhibits his artistic ability and 
confounds his emotional self. In contrast to the 
meaningful absent presence of the Fair Friend, the Dark 
Lady (though erotically fulfilling) is a meaningless 
presence in his professional life. Positing the negative 
against the positive, the poet-lover describes his lust for 
the Dark Lady as that which is counter-productive to love. 
As Will rather graphically depicts that which is
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not love, Shakespeare further defines the force that yields 
a literary text.
Dickinson, refusing to adhere to boundaries of either 
religion or literary tradition, explores painful 
ramifications of love. Especially in the fascicles, she 
focuses on love in absence of the beloved. But her poetry 
depicts more than the absent presence of the beloved; hers 
is a poetry of absence. In syntax, subject, and signature 
slash (which implies omissions and absences), she 
demands participation from her reader. To comprehend such 
a complex canon, Dickinson's reader cannot be passive. 
Rather, she must be proactive, bringing her own 
experiences, her own intellect, and her own creativity to 
the rhetorical experience.
Selected poems in Dickinson's fascicles continue the 
tradition of Sidney's Astroohil and Stella and 
Shakespeare's Sonnets. All depict a poet-lover who learns 
to create and then, like Eurydice, learns to cope with the 
absent presence of a beloved who has departed. These 
absent presences are not static on the printed page; 
rather, they continue to alter and shape the literary 
experiences of modern readers. The legacy is vital, but it 
is one about which most readers are generally unaware. As 
a rule, readers simply take the rhetorical and literary 
operations for granted, not realizing (perhaps not even 
caring about) the mental and aesthetic processes that
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compel a reader to pick up a text, that enable her to read, 
and that subsequently allow her to comprehend the ideas set 
forth by authors whom she never personally encountered in a 
dialectic exchange. My study may cause such readers to 
consider, as the sophist Gorgias propounded in the fifth 
century B.C., that there is indeed a bit of "magic" in the 
reading process. Neither hocus-pocus nor sleight-of-hand, 
this "magic" describes that intellectual, spiritual, 
emotional, or aesthetic something that accompanies a 
successful reading experience. It is what Dickinson refers 
to as that "spectral power" which leads to understanding of 
a text.
Something viable happens when one reads. A reader may 
be unable to describe or specify exactly what as she 
recognizes that her intellectual, spiritual, or emotional 
self has been altered through the reading experience. 
Whether elucidating ideas of rhetoric, sharing messages of 
spirituality, or telling tales of a poet-lover and an 
absent beloved, the absent presence of the writer offers 
new insights, additional information, opposing views, or 
comforting affirmation of personal experiences. For a 
brief interlude, the reader is "magically," through the 
words of another, transported into a meaningful, perhaps 
even a different, realm of understanding.
Chapter 2
Is It or Is It Not? The Transcendental Element
in the 
Absent Presence
Viewed from the perspective of theoretical analysis, 
the concept of the absent presence is a relatively modern 
critical term, emerging significantly in the twentieth 
century as a valid subject for rhetorical inquiry. In this 
chapter, I will attempt to define the term, to separate it 
into its two categories (the rhetorical and the literary), 
and to highlight critical stages of its development. I 
will also argue that the roots of the term absent presence 
are found in the rhetorical writings of Plato and 
Aristotle. Since my purpose is to highlight a singular 
element in the complex philosophies of Plato and Aristotle, 
this chapter will, in no way, provide an exhaustive study 
of any of the texts of these progenitors of Western 
thought; rather, it will explore selected texts as a point 
of departure for a discussion of the absent presence.
Is the term absent presence an oxymoron or a paradox?
I propose that it is analogous to both but synonymous with 
neither. Like an oxymoron, the term is incongruous; like a 
paradox, it posits a truth from contradictory elements.
But unlike either the oxymoron or the paradox, both which 
unite two disparate elements, the seemingly contradictory
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terms, absent and present, share the same etymological root 
in both the Latin and the Greek languages. Since my study 
begins with writings of Greek philosophers, the Greek 
rendering seems appropriate.
Translating the Greek verb demeo, which means to be at 
home, the Greek language adds prefixes to distinguish the 
quality of being: ek-demeo, or "absent," literally means
"out of being at home",* en-demeo, or "present," literally 
means "in being at home." Rather than suggesting 
contradictory locations, the separate forms of the verb 
suggest different states of "being at home." The 
importance is that each word denotes a specific relation to 
being "at home."
When applying this'explanation to rhetoric and the 
reading experience, the question arises: "What does home
have to do with the reading process?" I would suggest that 
home is that spiritual/intellectual/emotional self, which 
comprises human thought. If so, then the absent presence 
refers to that which is not at home in the physical sense, 
but is very much at home in the spiritual, intellectual, 
and emotional sense. It is that which, for whatever 
reasons, refuses to dislodge itself from the thoughts of an 
individual. Certainly it involves memory; but more than 
memory, which tends to be notoriously tricky, it becomes a 
dynamic action in the mind of the individual.
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Such a statement sends my discussion of the absent 
presence into an immediate, but brief, detour. Any 
reference to that which occurs in the mind suggests 
philosophy, a potentially dangerous and imprecise realm.
Because it is comprised of ideas, which can be as varied as
the individuals who have them, philosophy has been, as a 
whole, an inexact and nebulous discipline. However, a 
study of rhetoric cannot be separated from philosophy. The 
symbols used by humanity, what we refer to as language, are 
the mental capacity that enables an individual to begin to
understand who he is in relation to his world and his
creator.
Anthony J. Cascardi addresses the relation between 
language and philosophy and the roles they play in any 
study of rhetoric. In his article, "The Place of Language 
in Philosophy; or, The Uses of Rhetoric," he argues;
Since its beginnings, philosophy in the 
Western tradition has taken for itself a number 
of first questions: the fact that there is
anything at all, and that there is nothing, for 
instance; that man is a thinking thing, capable 
of reflection and self-guidance; that he does not 
live alone but has the existence of others with 
which to contend. Just how it is that 
philosophizing begins— whether in amazement or in 
reflective thought or in response to social or 
political needs— is probably undeterminable; the 
prospect of establishing the first question of 
philosophy may be impossible. What is 
nonetheless certain is that the practice of 
philosophy as we know it is inseparable from the 
use of language.
(217)
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If philosophy is "inseparable from the use of language," 
and if a language of symbols is the medium through which an 
individual processes his thoughts, then rhetoric, which 
encompasses all of language— words, sentences, complete 
discourses, and the diverse styles through which they are 
uttered or written— is that which, as Cascardi suggests, 
renders the individual "capable of reflection and self­
guidance." It is that which makes him realize that he has 
a point of beginning, perhaps even a creator, and "that he 
does not live alone but has the existence of others with 
which to contend." It is that which validates his being.
This theoretical knowledge is embodied in, and can be 
expressed through, various forms of rhetoric. In this and 
subsequent chapters, I will argue that these various forms 
of rhetoric— the dialectic discourses of Plato and 
Aristotle, the spiritual treatise of the writers of the New 
Testament, and the aesthetic poetry of Sir Philip Sidney, 
William Shakespeare, and Emily Dickinson— are critically 
linked: they each approach the philosophical musings of
self in relation to world (primarily to the others in it) 
and the self in relation to creator (or Other). Since that 
which is "other" cannot be fully present to the mind that 
muses, it becomes an absent presence. Though not there 
physically, it definitely is there in the mind of the 
individual. It is not physically at home in the mind.
That is, it is not present, but it nevertheless is home,
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exercising its power and leaving its tracks, in the mind.
It heralds an absent presence.
Writers selected for this study use the journey trope 
as the allegorical method to depict the means through which 
the individual comes to terms with an absent presence. 
Subtly different in its depiction, the trope is either 
intellectual, spiritual, or psychic. Plato and Aristotle 
embark upon a dialectic journey toward the Ideal or the 
Good; writers of the New Testament launch the spiritual 
journey that will return them and their readers to God; and 
Sidney, Shakespeare, and Dickinson offer personae who 
initially flounder, but ultimately survive to varying 
degrees, the psychological musings of self, world, and 
other.
Samuel C. Chew's text The Pilgrimage of Life quite 
thoroughly explores the journey trope in verbal and visual 
imagery. Discussing symbols used by "the painter, the 
sculptor, the engraver, the tapestry weaver, the designer 
of pageantry, the poet, and the writer of imaginative 
prose,” Chew limits his focus to English and Continental 
models that represent a journey of the mind or spirit 
(xxiii, xxii). Although he does not extend his analysis to 
the writings of Plato and Aristotle, they can be included 
in the same analysis if we accept that their philosophical 
musings did indeed seek to understand self in relation to 
world and Other. In the words of Lucy Chew, who penned the
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Preface to her husband's posthumously published text, they, 
too, ponder "man's journey through life from cradle to 
grave" (£L vi)- Their dialectic discourses, not unlike 
those texts of the writers of the New Testament and the 
poets of sixteenth and nineteenth centuries, imply a 
seemingly intrinsic need of the individual to find where he 
is, and where he ultimately will go, in the life that is 
his. For Plato, it is to True Being. In The Republicf 
Plato likens the journey to that of a cave-dweller who 
slowly works his way up to light, to supreme knowledge (Rep 
514a).
Aristotle does not ostensibly offer the journey motif 
as explanation for the individual's movement toward 
knowledge. However, he does emphasize action, suggesting a 
logical progression toward something that is better than 
the present state. For Aristotle, that successive motion 
is to take him to his potential, to move him to that which 
is the best of himself. Aristotle describes the process in 
Natural Science (or Physics). As each individual actively 
participates m  the drama of his own life, he is 
continually "Coming to be" or "Coming into existence" (NS 
12, 13):
For in every case there is something already 
present, out of which the resultant thing is 
born; as animals and plants come from seed.
'Coming into existence' takes place in several 
ways: (1) by change of shape, as a bronze
statue; (2) by accretion, as things that grow;
(3) by subduction, as a Hermes chiselled from a
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block of marble; (4) by combination, as a house; 
and (5) by 'qualitative alteration' (alliosis), 
where the material itself assumes different 
properties. In all of these cases it is evident 
that the process of coming into existence 
presupposes a substratum already existing.
(HS 13)
Seeking to explain the meaning of his term "coming to be," 
Aristotle provides five dramatistic examples of differing 
ways that individuals may achieve completeness of self.
The terms "change of shape," "accretion," "subduction," 
"combination," and "qualitative alteration" suggest 
modifications that will alter the original for the better, 
modifications that will make the original more meaningful, 
more useful, or more aesthetically beautiful. Implicitly 
incorporating the idea of flux in his theory of being, 
Aristotle suggests that change, which attends the human 
condition, at least theoretically, progressively improves 
the self. It is only through change that the individual 
hopes to realize the potential which was present in the 
"seed" of his rational being.
Philip Wheelwright's introduction to Natural Science. 
Psychology, and The Nicomachean Ethics offers a clear and 
succinct explanation of the fluctuating individual as 
envisioned by Aristotle. Positing that Aristotle offers a 
theory which avoids both "the pure relativism of 
Heracleitus [sic]" and "the metaphysical extravagance of 
the Platonic theory of archetypes" (NS xxx), Wheelwright 
elucidates the specifics which notably separate Aristotle's
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theory of being from those previously espoused by
Heraclitus and Plato:
In short, man as a moral agent is not entirely 
determined by external conditions. He has within 
himself— or perhaps better, he is within 
himself— a power (dynamis) to become reasonable, 
i.e. to follow reason. His actualization of this 
power is precisely the effort of 'moral choice' 
(proairesis), which gives rise to 'moral action'
(praxis). It is as an unmoved mover, then, that
the soul performs, and is responsible for, moral 
action. Man has the power to steer his own 
course.
The goal at which he aims is his happiness 
(eudaimonia), real or imagined.
(NS xxxix)
To further paraphrase Aristotle: man is a rational being
who determines his life's choices and is responsible for
his personal actions within a society. A presumption of 
morality which engenders happiness underscores Aristotle's 
view of the individual within the state or community. 
Aristotle's theory of being is thus overtly ambitious, and 
implicitly energetic. Wheelwright reminds us that 
Aristotle's word energeia is that which describes the 
dynamic "process of achieving such fulfillment" (HS xxxiv). 
As this study develops, energeia will be a significantly 
recurring term, referring to the poetically empowered word 
which seeks to achieve its hermeneutic potential.
Considering the term in relation to his process of 
becoming, I suggest that Aristotle's theory of being 
assumes journey-like characteristics. The terms "coming to 
be" and "coming into existence" suggest a linear movement
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from one state to a different, more advanced, state. In
Counterpoint: Kenneth Burke and Aristotle's Theories of
Rhetoric. L. Virginia Holland comments on this intellectual
journey as a movement toward one's highest good:
All life processes and the art of living itself 
thus become an actualizing of the potential, or 
of the latent possibilities of development which 
a thing has. Man has a specific function which 
distinguishes him from other species and makes 
him what he is.
fCot 77-78)
She correctly recognizes that this function which 
distinguishes man from other animals is the soul.
I would add that the soul (and I use a previously 
discussed term) is the intellectual "home" for rational 
faculties. These complex faculties are comprised of the 
organic and the spiritual. Organic operations of the mind 
can be explained at least in part by scientists, but 
spiritual qualities of the soul continue to baffle 
philosophers and theologians. A singular point of 
agreement might be that the intellectual soul is that which 
enables the individual to translate experience and musings 
into metaphorical language. As the individual moves 
through life, he metaphorically filters one experience 
through another so as to achieve understanding. As he 
progresses in that journey, his reservoir of experience 
builds and propels him toward that which presumably will 
provide personal fulfillment.
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The journey trope becomes more prominent in the 
biblical text. The Old Testament plots humanity's 
spiritual journey away from God, while the New Testament 
provides a prescription for individuals to return to him in 
Paradise. Poets Sidney, Shakespeare, and Dickinson all 
continue the journey trope, offering the poet-lover as the 
one seeking to conciliate the self who has been abandoned 
by the beloved. Whether philosopher, Christian, or poet- 
lover, language is that which allows internal dialogue with 
Other. It is that which bridges the chasm between the 
individual and the absent presence.
Critical to the development of my analysis are the 
thoughts of Walter Ong who argues in several of his texts 
that written, not oral, language is that which initiates 
the relationship between the individual (the reader) and an 
absent presence. In his book Interfaces of the Word: 
Studies in the Evolution of Consciousness and Culture. Ong 
argues
that although oratory was tens of thousands of 
years old [before Plato and Aristotle], the kind 
of thinking about oratory you have in Aristotle's 
Art of Rhetoric had never been done before 
writing. The human mind had never gone through 
this series of maneuvers, never traced this kind 
of trajectory of thought. But once you had 
produced, with the help of writing, treatises 
such as Art of Rhetoric and of Plato's Republic, 
this kind of thinking and expression would ring 
in your ears.
(IW 87)
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How does writing, which is unspoken, "ring" in the ears of 
its receptor? Speaking metaphorically, Ong describes the 
habitation of an absent presence in the mind of a reader.
It becomes a discernible, an unmistakable, yet physically 
absent, presence which guides and shapes the rhetorical 
process between writer and reader. It becomes a rhetorical 
absent presence.
Now that I have defined the term absent presence and 
have provided at least a cursory explanation of why it came 
into being, my discussion will explore the earliest 
beginnings of the rhetorical element. Plato and Aristotle, 
though perhaps through no willful design of their own, can 
be called the creators of the absent presence.
Although Plato and Aristotle may not have particularly 
addressed the issue of the absent presence, which 
ultimately emanates from the logos, the evolution of this 
concept necessarily begins with their philosophies, which 
are, in many ways, reactive developments to the rhetorical 
practices that preceded them. It is important to remember 
that Greek philosophy often opposed itself to rhetoric, 
especially to the sophists who were disparaged as "bearers 
of eloquence." In an attempt to defend and to establish 
the usefulness of rhetoric, Plato and Aristotle, 
respectively, sought to turn it into something respectable. 
As progenitors of contemporary rhetoric, they provide the
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rationale from which the image of the absent presence will 
develop. And that rationale is rhetoric.
As a metamorphic offspring of classical rhetoric, the 
process does not occur quickly. Quite the contrary. It 
requires centuries of verbal and linguistic adaptations to 
shape its modern meaning. Its nucleus can be traced to 
Greek rhetorical philosophy, to the writings of Plato. As 
he attempts to define rhetoric and determine its worth in 
society, Plato offers his Phaedrus as a response to 
Gorgias's earlier work, Encomium on Helen. A compendium to 
sophistic views, the Encomium focuses on logos, the spoken 
word. But more than simple utterance, Gorgias submits that 
logos has almost unlimited power over the individual.
Plato likewise views logos in its Greek context. More 
than speech or language or the individual words that 
comprise the two, logos encompasses reasoning, 
understanding, and reckoning or calculating. Viewing logos 
as a subtle master of the individual, Gorgias and Plato 
attempt to explain its power through the materiality of the 
word as it penetrates the materiality of the soul. In the 
Encomium. Gorgias describes the word organically, as a
physical entity that makes its way into the body (the soul
o
of the listener) through the ear. After entering the 
soul, logos then elicits visible responses, which are 
evident through discernible bodily reactions: the heart
races, the face flushes, the blood rises, or the palms
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sweat. To explain how these emotional reactions are the 
direct result of verbal constructs, Gorgias relates the 
mythological account of Paris's rape of Helen of Troy.
Paris (logos) penetrates Helen (the feminized listener), 
who is unable to resist his compelling erogenous force. 
Because the material word generates desire in the listener, 
the listener in turn responds erotically, awakening in kind 
to passion and love.
In his defense of the Greek beauty, Gorgias argues
that Helen is overpowered by forces stronger than she. Not
the least of these is logos:
The power of speech has the same effect on the 
condition of the soul as the application of drugs 
[pharmaka] to the state of bodies; for just as 
different drugs dispel different fluids from the 
body, and some-bring an end to disease but others 
to life, so also some speeches cause pain, some 
pleasure, some fear; some instill courage, some 
drug and bewitch the soul with a kind of evil 
persuasion.
(Enc 14.1-7)
Logos is a "powerful lord," one that can effect a tangible 
emotional response in his listener. According to Gorgias, 
logos has the power of seduction. Comparing it to the 
effects of drugs or magic, he says that logos can sedate or 
cure the spirit or it can cast a spell over the soul of the 
listener.
Plato addresses this same issue in his Phaedrus. 
According to Ronna Burger, in Plato's Phaedrus. Plato's 
version of the passion effected by eros is even more
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intense than that described by Gorgias. Analyzing the
spiritual journey of the soul toward True Being, Form, and
Beauty (2h 251a-252b), Burger says that, when in presence
of the beloved who commands his powerful words,
the lover is overcome with shuddering, sweat, and 
burning heat. The stream of the beautiful, which 
flows from the beloved, enters the lover through 
his eyes and warms him, watering the passages of 
his wings, allowing the hard and choked ducts to 
become soft so that the wings can grow from 
roots all over the soul (251b). Erotic passion 
is marked by the intense mingling of pain, from 
the pricking and throbbing in the roots of the 
wings, with temporary pleasure, from the sight of 
the beautiful one, warming and moistening the 
passages (251c).
(EEh 61)
Why such graphic emphasis on eroticism? What is its 
relation to logos and rhetoric? The answer lies in 5th- 
century Greek pederastic practices, which will be discussed 
later in greater detail. Basically, though, eroticism is 
validation to the listener that the words he hears are from 
the god that he should follow; it affirms to the individual 
that the words espoused by his beloved are worthy of his 
life's allegiance. Burger explains: "Through his
attraction to a particular beloved, the lover discovers the 
god he must follow in accordance with his own nature" (PPh 
63). The god, the supreme beloved, is found in the logos, 
which is uttered by his earthly representative, the learned 
philosopher.
Descriptions of the erotic power of logos, similar in 
their effects but different in their partnering, are found
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in the accounts of Gorgias and Plato. Presumably offered 
as more than metaphor, each writer describes the 
implications of eros in metaphorical terms, something that 
Kenneth Burke suggests is an integral part of all language 
— the everyday as well as the artistic. According to 
Burke, metaphor, quite simply, is "a device for seeing 
something in terms of something else. It brings out the 
thisness of a that, or the thatness of a this" ("Four 
Master Tropes" 503). Since Gorgias depicts the power of 
logos (the "thisness") in terms of "that" sexual mastery 
(rape) and vice versa, and Plato relates the effects of 
eros (the "thisness") to those of drugs or magic ("that), 
Burke explains what Gorgias and Plato were doing through 
their explanations of the logos:
Language develops by metaphorical extension, 
in borrowing words from the realm of the 
corporeal, visible, tangible and applying them by 
analogy to the realm of the incorporeal, 
invisible, intangible; then in the course of 
time, the original corporeal reference is 
forgotten, and only the incorporeal, metaphorical 
extension survives.
("FMT" 506)
Both Gorgias and Plato were attempting to explain what 
happens when one takes the words of another into himself. 
Gorgias describes that activity like a rape, a violently 
tactile experience. Applying Burke's analysis to Paris's 
rape of Helen, the physical act becomes subsumed by its 
metaphorical representation, which verbally becomes more
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"real" than its reality. Burke thus makes a tremendous 
leap of linguistic application.
The comments of Ronald L. Hall may further elucidate
how logos effects its own reality in the mind of a reader.
In his book Word and Spiritf which contemplates what it
means to be human, fully human, Hall begins the development
of his thesis with the Greek activity in which the
intellectual and the spiritual coalesce through the logos:
we might say that because logos represents the 
very heart of the real, namely, eternal form and 
order, that it comes to stand, for the Greeks, 
as the very essence of the cosmos. . . .
More and more logos was uprooted from the 
lively dynamic act of speaking— and hence from 
the embodied speaker— and came to stand for the 
eternal and fixed order of the cosmos.
(WS 21)
If, for the Greeks, logos is that which is real, that which
is the "essence of the cosmos," then words and speaking are
the primary means whereby one might approach that which is
real. Language for the Greeks (and for all humanity) is
that faculty enabling them to "see." Hall warns us that
this sight is
an abstracted structure of vision and not the 
concrete activity of seeing something. The 
latter is hardly static; rather, because it is an 
essentially embodied activity, it pulsates with a 
dynamic orienting motility, with the dynamic 
kinesthetic intentionalities of my posture, 
focus, attention, and so forth.
(WS 22).
The "concrete," the "dynamic," the "kinesthetic" all 
suggest the organic, that which is the essence of life.
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And what describes the essence of life better than a 
graphic reenactment of the passionate coupling of lover and 
beloved? This seems to be what Gorgias through the rape of 
Helen (Encomium) and Plato through the myth of the soul 
(Phaedrus 251a-252b) attempt to do: existentialize the
power of logos upon the intellect.
To better understand the import of these premises 
offered by Hall and Burke, we need to look at a question 
Burke poses in The Rhetoric of Religion: "But isn't there
still a notable difference between thinking of something 
when it is present and thinking of it when it is absent?" 
(148-49) Burke seems to have already answered this 
question in his earlier text, A Grammar of Motives. In it, 
he plays grammatically with the word "transcend" and its 
derivations: transcendence, transcendent, transcendental.
As he comments on moral transcendence in the philosophy of 
Immanuel Kant, Burke leads us to, and through, his own 
ideas that help to explain his view of what happens in the 
absent presence:
For according to our account, the world as we 
experience it is but a world of appearances. The 
objects of experience, we have said, derive their 
appearance from the nature of our minds (as all 
colors will seem like shades of but one color if 
we observe them through colored glasses). But if 
they are appearances, what are they appearances 
of? Our desynonymizing here will lead us to the 
answer. The empirical realm is the realm of 
appearances. The transcendental is the realm 
that gives things the nature they seem to have in 
the empirical realm. The transcendent realm will 
be the realm of things as they are 'in
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themselves,' not as empirically conditioned by 
the conditions of the transcendental.
(£M 192-93)
Burke's movement up the rhetorical ladder of a 
morphological analysis of the word "transcend" echoes the 
ascending philosophy of True Being, which obliquely refers 
to Plato's doctrine of Forms (Republic. Books VI and VII).
In Plato's doctrine, the philosopher can reflect the 
"eye of the soul" (Republic 508.d.4) of True Being only 
when he forsakes all other pursuits. For Plato, this eye 
is spiritual and supernatural, the source of ultimate 
truth. The individual approaches this truth, which 
ultimately becomes present in the philosopher though absent 
in the world of reality, through a kind of transcendental 
movement, which Plato describes in the parable of the 
prisoners in the cave. In his notes, Hackforth equates the 
movement of the prisoners from shadows to sunlight with the 
journey of the dialectician in his search for philosophic 
knowledge: "the goal of the dialectician's upward path is 
the cognition of the Form of the Good conceived as the 
source of all being and knowledge" (£h 135). And, 
according to Plato, part of that cognition enables the 
philosopher to discern the only appropriate and worthy 
rhetorical endeavors, those that preserve knowledge and 
perpetuate justice in the republic.
True to his "Platonic" reputation, Plato often 
prescribes a noble and purist form of rhetoric. In his
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search for truth that can be found in True Being, Plato 
suggests that he at least recognizes a variable, one which 
he does not adequately address, in the discursive process. 
While talking to Gorgias and trying to determine the right 
and wrong uses of discourse, Socrates wonders what "this 
power of rhetoric can be. When I examine its vast 
proportions, it seems to me little short of supernatural"
(Goraias 456.5-7). Is Plato admitting to a bit of magic in 
the rhetorical experience? Is this reference to the 
supernatural simply to be discounted as Socratic irony, or 
does it hint at a broadening of the scope of rhetoric— a 
broadening that might include Burke's argument for 
transcendence? Plato's "supernatural" at least implies a 
transcendent movement that views rhetoric as operating 
beyond the confines of the spoken word. And undulating 
within that movement will be another presence, what will 
become known as the absent presence. Although not 
specifically addressed by Plato, the concept emerges 
slowly, but perceptibly, in his rhetorical treatises.
Presumably perfecting a flawed model, Plato frames his 
rhetoric according to the accepted pederastic conventions 
within his Greek society, but he does significantly alter 
those conventions. In "Love, Rhetoric, and the 
Aristocratic Way of Life," Albert William Levi cautions us 
to view this practice from Plato's point of view:
36
The Platonically approved love is . . . frankly 
homosexual, but it is not 'wicked,' for it seeks 
commerce with a soul and not a body, and its 
abiding concern is service to the other in 
pursuit of intellectual excellence and wisdom.
The Platonic ideal, whatever its degradation in 
actuality, is essentially a 'pedagogical' love 
between an older man and a younger.
("LRAW" 197)
In Greek society, patronage and pederasty provided accepted 
methods of instruction for young aristocrats. The young 
male, learning from the older male teacher, comes to 
understanding through the spoken word (speech) which, 
according to Plato, is the primary vehicle for rhetoric,
for that communication which leads to knowledge.
In "Eros," a chapter from Plato's Thought. G.M.A.
Grube attempts to explain the Socratic slant of pederasty,
a slant which differentiates it from the homoerotic
pederasty practiced by other Greeks. Especially in the
Socratic dialogues, male-to-male relationships are not
necessarily physical, hence homoerotic, unions between a
young and an older man; but they are highly erotic in that
each individual intellectually stimulates the other to
greater, eminently fulfilling, knowledge. Grube writes;
Socrates loved young men and, instead of the
satisfaction of physical intercourse, he sought
to make his many friends into better men, he 
loved their souls even better than their bodies.
(PT 90)
Though ostensibly sexual, pederasty, as envisioned by 
Socrates, becomes that ideal relationship through which
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"mutual love" allows a "joint search for supreme truth" (PT 
96).
According to Grube, although it may be rooted in
eroticism, such a relationship most clearly succeeds when
it is asexual. Only then can the two parties focus upon a
sharing of knowledge:
Teaching always remained to him a communion 
between master and pupil, research always a 
common quest between friends. He knew that man
cannot stand alone, that he needs sympathy from,
and interchange of ideas with, congenial minds. 
And here the homosexual habits of his 
contemporaries may have helped him to dissociate 
Eros from all physical contacts.
(P£ 115-16)
In this passage, Grube surmises that Plato, ascribing to
the views of his mentor Socrates, took that which he most
admired about the homosexual relationship, "sympathy from, 
and interchange of ideas with, congenial minds," and 
conflated it with an asexual eros. The result is his 
personal view of pederasty. In the words of Grube, it "is 
the Platonic love, the love of truth and beauty quickened 
by mutual affection" (£T 117). Ideally, knowledge, rather 
than sexual gratification, results from the process of 
dialectic, from the give-and-take, the question-and-answer 
format of dialogue.
In the Phaedrus, as he regales the spoken word as the 
stimulus, even the requisite, for knowledge, Socrates 
inversely discounts the written word as a distant step­
child of discourse:
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You know, Phaedrus, that's the strange thing 
about writing, which makes it truly analogous to 
painting. The painter's products stand before us 
as though they were alive: but if you question
them, they maintain a most majestic silence. It 
is the same with written words: they seem to
talk to you as though they were intelligent, but 
if you ask them anything about what they say, 
from a desire to be instructed, they go on 
telling you just the same thing for ever.
(£il 275d.4—10)
As he equates dialectic with a quest for truth and written 
prose or poetry with an exercise in imitation, Plato 
severely limits the boundaries of rhetoric, arguing that 
the physical presence of the audience is required in order 
to achieve the correct communication of the speaker's 
knowledge, intention, and meaning. Christopher Norris, in 
analyzing Plato's myth of the invention of writing and its 
dubious acceptance by Egyptian King Thamus, adds that 
Socrates strongly condemns the written word. Because 
Socrates is Plato's ideal mentor, "the master in a scene of 
instruction" (Per 34), he cannot commit his own thoughts to 
writing. That becomes the task of his interlocutor, Plato, 
who must necessarily sully his hands with the written word.
Much of the focus in Ronna Burger's Plato's Phaedrus 
is this vexing problem that plagues Plato in his text that 
extols the love of discourse: if Plato follows his own
advice and does not write the words of his beloved 
Socrates, that knowledge will be lost; if he dares to go 
against his advice so as to preserve that knowledge, he 
begins an irreversible movement away from the presence of
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his mentor. The consequence of such a movement is the
emergence of an absent presence. Although Burger does not
refer specifically to this absent presence, she alludes to
that interplay between a reader and an absent writer. In
the introduction to her text, Burger comments:
The transmission of knowledge through the art of 
writing, which makes it unnecessary for every 
thinker to begin with a tabula rasa, promises at 
the same time to free human memory from the task 
of preserving communal opinion over time, while 
creating, through its independent product, the 
possibility of that distance from the authority 
of tradition necessary for the activity of 
thinking.
(£P& 2)
For Plato, the dilemma in reading is manifest primarily 
through the processing of thoughts: communally versus
independently. As an outspoken proponent of the dialogic 
process, he understandably hesitates to sacrifice the 
intimate mentor/interlocutor relationship. Centuries of 
unquestioned practice provided him with intellectual 
security, albeit a false security for one on the threshold 
of a rapidly changing world. His concern was valid: the
speaker who put his words to paper would be threatened by a 
potential, if not certain, loss of power. Unlike a 
hierarchically driven dialogue, in which an interlocutor 
willingly frees his own thoughts so as to become like- 
minded with his learned mentor, any reading activity allows 
the reader to activate his own memory, to consider his own 
opinions, and to ponder his own thoughts. Though guided by
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the absent presence of the writer, any conclusions made 
from the text are those of the reader.
Using the term "imitation" rather than absent 
presence, Burger discusses the relationship between a 
reader and an absent writer. Describing the intellectual 
tension that leads to knowledge, she writes:
The dialogue between Theuth and Thamuz is a 
model in miniature of every Platonic dialogue, 
whose fundamental perplexity is always determined 
by the tension between the living word and its 
written imitation: the products of the Platonic
art of writing represent Socratic conversation as 
the paradigm of the philosophic enterprise 
without ever acknowledging the deed of their 
creator. While Platonic love of wisdom presents 
itself as nothing but the imitation of Socratic 
love of wisdom, the very act of imitation 
indicates the essential separation between them.
fPPh 2)
As a writer puts words to paper, those of another or those 
of his own, separation from that living, spoken word 
begins. An absence erupts. Plato cannot be faulted for 
failing to resolve this issue in the Phaedrus. As 
knowledgeable as he was, he was still a novice concerning 
the manifestations of the written word. Theorists who 
would expound the complexities of that intellectual process 
had yet to emerge. Not the least of those theorists is 
Jacques Derrida.
Derrida does not ignore Plato's role as amanuensis for 
Socrates's dialogues. Also pointing to the myth of Theuth, 
Derrida exposes the rhetorical conundrum that helps to 
define his theory of deconstruction: meaning is
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transferred imperfectly through the written word. Slippage
necessarily results when the reader relies upon the absent
presence, in this case Plato himself, for understanding a
text. Including the cicada story that appears earlier in
the dialogue, Derrida comments in Dissemination:
Both myths follow upon the same question [the 
status of writing], and they are only separated 
by a short space, just enough time for a detour. 
The first [the myth of the cicada], of course, 
does not answer the question,* on the contrary, it 
leaves it hanging, marks time for a rest, and 
makes us wait for the reprise that will lead us 
to the second.
fDis 68)
Like the first myth, the second also detours the
listener/reader. The myth of Theuth, in conjunction with
Socrates's speech against the written word (275d), leads
the reader to believe that the philosopher condemns
writing. Then, in one of his final admonitions to
Phaedrus, Socrates mentions writing alongside speaking:
The conditions to be fulfilled are these: first
you must know the truth about the subject that 
you speak or write about: that is to say, you
must be able to isolate it in definition, and 
having so defined it you must next understand how 
to divide it into kinds; until you reach the 
limit of division.
(Ph, 277b.4-8)
Plato here includes the written medium as a seemingly 
acceptable mode of rhetoric. And by the end of the 
dialogue, Plato moves even closer to acceptance of the 
written word. In the final stages of the discourse, he 
asks for the criteria that shape a good logos, whether oral
42
or written. The implication is that criteria do exist for 
constructing written texts that might satisfy even Plato.
For Plato, as he apparently wants us to understand him
through his persona Socrates, "Writing is a dangerous gift
because it substitutes mere inscriptions— alien, arbitrary,
lifeless signs— for the authentic living presence of spoken
language" (Norris, Per 30). Positing himself as the
philosopher/dialectician who seeks ultimate truth through
verbal interplay with a willing, like-minded interlocutor,
Socrates necessarily defends speech as the only legitimate
word. To give unequivocal credence to the written word in
the closing chapters of the Phaedrus would result in
radically undermining its rhetorical premise, which is to
redefine and reformulate oratory that has fallen into ill
repute through the mouths of the sophists. Nevertheless,
because his dialogue exists as a written text, because it
is, Derrida argues that
Only a blind or grossly insensitive reading could 
indeed have spread the rumor that Plato was 
simply condemning the writer's activity. Nothing 
here is of a single piece and the Phaedrus also, 
in its own writing, plays at saving writing—  
which also means causing it to be lost— as the 
best, the noblest game.
(Dis 67)
Like all other aspects of Western thought, the written word 
is inherently comprised of polarities, of binary opposites: 
saved/lost, life/death, presence/absence. As such, it is
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Western civilization's "noblest game," enticing its reader, 
sometimes with the allure of Paris, to play along.
Norris's argument that Plato sees writing as a 
"dangerous gift" further supports Derrida's view of 
opposing elements within a given text. Writing is a gift, 
presumably something desired, but it poses a danger to the 
reader, a danger of misinterpretation. In Plato's 
Republic, the text that outlines the creation of his 
perfect republic, Plato details some of the dangers of 
poetry, the written text that is spoken through the 
generations. The philosopher goes so far as to call for 
censorship of the writers of "tales," of those poets who 
would give
names of things in the underworld which make
every hearer shudder. And perhaps it is right to
delete them for another reason: we are fearful
on behalf of our guardians, lest such shudders 
make them more malleable and soft than they 
should be.
(Rep 387c.2-5)
Plato recognizes that any non-dialogical speech faces the 
potential threat of misinterpretation. (Derrida would 
counter that no speech, oral or written, is free of this
threat.) Since poetry and story-telling (the written word)
do not share the advantage of dialectic, Plato argues that 
perhaps they will mislead through their one-sided, stagnant 
format, creating unnecessary fear, weakness, and trembling 
within the spirits of the guardians of the republic. This 
stance seems to be in direct opposition to that of Gorgias
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who "recognized the persuasive force of emotion. He 
regarded an orator as a psychagogos, like a poet, a leader 
of souls through a kind of incantation" (Kennedy, APG 63). 
Although they may differ in the form of logos they prefer 
and in the objectives they have for rhetoric, both Gorgias 
and Plato advocate the actual presence of the listener.
Further consideration of Derrida's viewpoint shows
that he takes Plato's argument a major, and thoroughly
deconstructive, step farther. He argues that "correct"
communication of any kind, either in writing or speaking,
is a misnomer— even an impossibility. In her translator's
introduction to Dissemination, Barbara Johnson provides a
succinct overview to Derridean philosophy as it applies to
the absent presence in language. According to her, Derrida
critically views both language and thought within the
milieu from which they spring: Western philosophical and
cultural tradition. Placed in this rhetorical setting,
language and thought are
structured in terms of dichotomies or polarities: 
good vs. evil, being vs. nothingness, presence 
vs. absence, truth vs. error, identity vs. 
difference, mind vs. matter, man vs. woman, soul 
vs. body, life vs. death, nature vs. culture, 
speech vs. writing.
(Johnson vii)
Although not necessarily opposite in connotative meaning, 
the opposing terms create a hierarchical relationship, with 
the first term having "priority" over the second. And not 
strictly an either/or, neither/nor pairing of terms, they
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are arbitrated by the very culture from which (according to
Derrida) they spring.
Unlike Plato, Derrida does not argue that speech is
better than writing. Nor does he
simply reverse this value system and say that 
writing is better than speech. Rather, he 
attempts to show that the very possibility of 
opposing the two terms on the basis of presence 
vs. absence or immediacy vs. representation is an 
illusion, since speech is already structured by 
difference and distance as much as writing is.
(Johnson ix)
In an abrupt twist of rhetorical terms, Derrida suggests 
that absence always exists, in both language and writing. 
Neither can approximate the original thought because, like 
speech, any
text remains moreover, forever imperceptible.
Its law and its rules are not, however, harbored 
in the inaccessibility of a secret; it is simply 
that they can never be booked, in the present, 
into anything that could rigorously be called a 
perception.
(Pis 63)
This idea of the inability of the spoken word or the 
written text to produce a "perception" is known by numerous 
deconstruction terms: a lack, a slippage, "a difference, a
gap, an interval, a trace" (Johnson x). But they all 
suggest the Derridean argument that presence "is an 
ambiguous, even dangerous, ideal" (Johnson xii).
Absence may be the lack of presence, and presence may 
be the lack of absence; but I suggest that presence, for 
Derrida, is not something that can be acquired through the
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philosophical ascendancy of Plato's upward way or through 
the metaphysical movement into Burke's transcendent realm. 
Derrida seems to say that an exact transference of the 
original thoughts of the writer/speaker to his intended 
audience is impossible— either through spoken language or 
the written word. Because of the very quality of language 
itself, the task is impossible— in both the present 
presence of the speaker and in the absent presence of the 
writer.
Ferdinand de Saussure, in his work in linguistics, 
examines the difficulty inherent in any attempt to 
communicate. Language is only "a system of signs" ("OL" 
156). In this imperfect system, understanding is, at its 
best, arbitrary; at its worst, understanding is 
illusionary. Nevertheless, individuals continue to strive 
to find meaning, in spite of certain slippage. The writer 
of a text, much like a responsive reader, must assume 
responsibility for his text; he must carefully incorporate 
"signs" that will guide a reader through his maze of words. 
He accomplishes this through the linguistic arrangement of 
syntax, the inclusion of metaphor, and the addition of 
punctuation. If the writer succeeds at every level of 
composition, the result is that the written logos works its 
"magic” in the mind of the reader. Although the action may 
be deferred, the written logos, which is tangentially 
linked to its now-absent creator, functions similarly to
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the learned philosopher: it creates desire for verbal
intercourse in those who are willing to participate in the
reading process.
Plato would have us believe that this desire is 
totally separate from emotion. More than a speaker 
entering into a passionate exercise of persuasion "which 
produces mere belief" (Gor 454) in his audience, Plato's 
partners embark upon a journey of knowledge that at death 
will return the soul, as Grube notes in Plato's Thought, 
"to truth and eternal Forms" (125). Unlike Gorgias who 
defends emotion as a legitimate tool that can be used 
against the listener for the purpose of convincing him of
an opinion, Plato argues that a reality (truth) exists
apart from emotion, that logos, in its quest for pure 
knowledge, the knowledge of Forms, supersedes emotion. 
Although Plato may want to discount emotion, the words of 
his mentor suggest otherwise.
One reference that tends to refute Plato's disavowal
of emotion is his myth of the soul, which depicts a
charioteer seeking to control his team of two horses. As
John Dillon explains in his introduction to Alcinous: The
Handbook of Platonism, the traditional interpretation of
this mythic account is that Plato uses it to elucidate his
tripartite division of the soul:
The divine soul has three aspects, the critical 
or cognitive (gnostikon), corresponding to our 
rational part, the appetitive or 'dispositional'
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(parastatikon), corresponding to our spirited, 
and the 'appropriative' (oikeiotikon), 
corresponding to our libidinous.
(&:HE xxi)
Emotions, both the "spirited" (which is the good horse) and 
the "libidinous" (which is the bad horse), arise from 
either part of the soul that is not rational. That which 
is dangerously emotional (the insolent and proud horse) 
confuses the individual in his journey toward the ideal; it 
is that which forces him to lose his wings and fall back to 
earth. When the charioteer focuses on the eyes of a 
particular horse, he becomes that which he sees: the bad
horse stirs his negative emotions and makes him rebel from 
the Ideal; the good horse keeps him focused on, or 
"obedient" to, the Ideal (Eh 253c). But it is important to 
note that emotions control both horses.
This myth does not represent Plato's only 
acknowledgement of emotion in an individual's movement 
toward the Ideal. Near the end of his discourse in The 
Phaedrus, Socrates, who previously denigrates those who 
elicit emotion as a means to persuade, says: "Since the
function of oratory is in fact to influence men's souls, 
the intending orator must know what types of soul there 
are" (Ph 271c-d). The implication is that a philosophical 
rhetoric will incorporate a knowledge and a use of 
psychology. This description does not seem far removed 
from that which Plato denigrates, the psychagogos whose aim
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is the same as that verbalized by Socrates: "to influence
men's souls." Although he might disclaim the comparison, 
Plato's account of the myth of the soul describes the power 
of eros (logos) that is quite similar to that which is 
recounted by Gorgias in the Encomium.
In the Phaedrus (251a-252b), as he explains the
physical changes wrought through the immortality of the
soul, the embodiment of spiritual love, Plato writes of
another rape, a rape reminiscent of the inception of Helen
of Troy, as depicted by W. B. Yeats in "Leda and the Swan":
A sudden blow: the great wings beating still
Above the staggering girl, her thighs caressed 
By the dark webs, her nape caught in his bill,
He holds her helpless breast upon his breast.
(11. 1-4)
This sexually charged union between Zeus, in the form of a 
swan, and Leda, a helpless human female, exposes the primal 
nature of heterosexual relationships, a nature that Plato 
reformulates for his own philosophical purposes.
Plato might shape his rape by pederastic conventions 
so as to characterize an "ideal homosexual relation" 
(Hackforth 98), but his reformulated description is 
surprisingly similar to Zeus's rape of Leda, as poetically 
rendered by Yeats, and Paris's rape of Helen, as 
instructionally inscribed by Gorgias in the Encomium. The 
difference is that Plato seeks to transcend the sexual 
limitations of the physical world:
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and but for fear of being deemed a very madman he 
would offer sacrifice to his beloved, as to a 
holy image of deity. Next, with the passing of 
the shudder, a strange sweating and fever seizes 
him: for by reason of the stream of beauty
entering in through his eyes there comes a 
warmth, whereby his soul's plumage is fostered; 
and with that warmth the roots of the wings 
are melted.
(Eh 251a-252b)
Interfacing the sexual act (which sheds its carnal wings) 
with the spiritual experience (which achieves communion 
with Beauty of Forms), wisdom supplants eros as the 
motivating force of the logos. Thus controlled by wisdom, 
logos continues to penetrate, but its aim moves from self­
gratification to self-abnegation as it reflects the "eye of 
the soul" fRep 508d.4) of True Being.
Plato may seek to transcend the sexual limitations of
the physical world, but his incorporation of eros belies 
his efforts. A paraphrasing of Burke's explanation of the 
relationship between persuasion and eros suggests that 
Plato cannot do that which he would attempt. Persuasion is 
always implicit in eros, since the goal of eros is to 
overcome difference; conversely, eros is equally implicit 
in persuasion, since the conceptualization of a sexual 
desire is revealed in the struggle for unity in a culture 
of estrangement (RM 176-77). If we apply this apparent 
paradox to the reading experience, we might note that both
persuasion and eros are equally implicit in the reading
process: as a writer verbalizes ideas, he generally
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solicits agreement; as a reader takes up that text, he 
willingly (except perhaps in those instances of required 
reading) offers himself as a pawn of persuasion. Even if 
the reader chooses not to be persuaded, if he chooses to 
disagree with the ideas presented by the writer, his 
willful act of participation affirms the seduction of eros.
Plato could not accept this implicit relationship 
between eros and persuasion. Seemingly undaunted in his 
defense of persuasion which is void of sexually charged 
eros, Plato offers his myth of the soul to counter 
sophistic doctrine. His myth frees the idealized soul from 
the encumbrances of heterosexual mortality, presumably to 
supersede the tacit connection between persuasion and eros. 
The result is that his method of transcendence
simultaneously creates the fatal rhetorical wound that will
eventually lead to the demise of his restrictive concept of
logos as a purely oral activity.
If the spoken word and the presence of the listener 
are the criteria for understanding and achieving pure 
knowledge, why does Plato's myth refer to the eyes ("beauty 
entering in through the eyes") rather than to the ears as 
points of entry (penetration) for beauty (eros), which is 
the metaphorical equivalent of logos? Although he may 
profess otherwise, he lends at least some credence to the 
emerging power of a persuasive written word, of a logos 
that will find its energy in, and through, the non-
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deconstructed absent presence which seeks union with a 
reader.
The significance in Plato's shift from hearing to 
seeing is crucial. Not only is sight the sense that 
individuals use in reading, but it also is that physical 
ability which computes the distance between the seer and 
the seen. The instant of transcendent union between the 
two admits to distance and deferral, but it also allows for 
understanding. Ong takes up this issue in Interfaces of 
the Word and The Presence of the Word. Commenting on the 
gleaning and accepting of knowledge in our Western society, 
he assesses:
To a culture so visualist as ours (despite the 
recent build-up of the auditory), the world of 
early oral-aural man and the sense of presence it 
enjoys can appear curiously unreal. It seems too
little objective, too much given to illusion, too
threatened by subjective forces. For us, not 
hearing but seeing is believing. We feel truly 
at home only in a world of sight.
(£W 169)
Ong seems to say that, somewhat curiously, the modern 
individual has been lulled into a complacency of "seeing is 
believing," as evidenced by the one who accepts for truth
something simply because he sees it in print. For him,
such a world of sight provides a potentially deceptive 
confidence that he "knows," when indeed he may not, a topic 
Ong addresses in his later book, Interfaces of the Word.
In the chapter, "'I See what you Say': Sense
Analogues for Intellect," Ong concludes that "in a field of
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sight there is always a beyond or a beneath which is not 
seen" (IH 125). For the individual to begin to grasp that 
which he cannot see with the physical eye, he must be 
willing to shorten the distance between seer and seen, 
between knower and known, between reader and writer. This 
is accomplished through the intellect. Willfully engaging 
in synchronous activity with writer and text, the reader 
comes to certain, though not necessarily the same, 
knowledge as that set forth by the writer.
Plato's Republic, which espouses an idealized 
rhetorical and an admittedly political environment, both 
which rely on the auditory senses, ignores a seemingly 
obvious fact: for posterity to follow his philosophical
precepts, his words ultimately must be written. Norris 
explains Plato's attending paradox:
For the fact is— to put the case at its 
simplest— that Plato is inescapably condemned to 
writing, even as he seeks to denounce its effects 
and uphold the authority of self-present (spoken) 
truth. And this predicament repeats itself 
wherever philosophy refuses to acknowledge its 
own textual status and aspires to a pure 
contemplation of truth independent of mere 
written signs.
f Per 33)
Norris suggests that Plato's panegyrical avowal of "non­
write" paradoxically is his reluctant admission of writing. 
Once he puts his words to paper, Plato, quite unwillingly 
(but perhaps not quite so unwittingly), opens the 
rhetorical door to a new partner, the absent presence.
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When the word is written, the once-controlled discourse is 
no longer restricted to a teacher and his like-minded 
interlocutor; another presence emerges— the absent presence 
of the future reader.
In Disseminationr we find Derrida's lengthy, but quite 
complete, explanation of the ambivalence of written texts. 
His reference to "this pharmakon, this 'medicine,' this 
philter, which acts as both remedy and poison" (Pis 70) 
suggests the third element in the rhetorical process; the 
reader. Derrida determines that the reader is the 
"philter," the one who determines whether a text is 
"remedy" or "poison." Referring to Plato's disparagement 
of the written word, he describes how the determination 
(cure or curse, boon or bane, understanding or confusion) 
is made:
There is thus for Plato no such thing as a 
written thing. There is only a logos more or 
less alive, more or less distant from itself. 
Writing is not an independent order of 
signification; it is weakened speech, something 
not completely dead: a living-dead, a reprieved
corpse, a deferred life, a semblance of 
breath. The phantom, the phantasm, the 
simulacrum (eidolon, 276a) of living discourse is 
not inanimate; it is not insignificant; it simply 
signifies little, and always the same thing.
This signifier of little, this discourse that 
doesn't amount to much, is like all ghosts: 
errant. It rolls (kulindeitai) this way and 
that like someone who has lost his way, who 
doesn't know where he is going, having strayed 
from the correct path, the right direction, the 
rule of rectitude, the norm; but also like 
someone who has lost his rights, an outlaw, a 
pervert, a bad seed, a vagrant, an adventurer, a 
bum. Wandering in the streets, he doesn't even
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know who he is, what his identity— if he has 
one— might be, what his name is, what his 
father's name is. He repeats the same thing 
every time he is questioned on the street corner, 
but he can no longer repeat his origin. Not to 
know where one comes from or where one is going, 
for a discourse with no guarantor, is not to know 
how to speak at all, to be in a state of infancy. 
Uprooted, anonymous, unattached to any house 
or country, this almost insignificant signifier 
is at everyone's disposal, can be picked up by
both the competent and the incompetent, by those 
who understand and know what to do with it {ceux 
qui entendent et s'y entendent) (tois espiousin), 
and by those who are completely unconcerned with 
it, and who, knowing nothing about it, can 
inflict all manner of impertinence upon it.
fDis 143-44)
The reader, then, willingly and wittingly, in his 
competence or incompetence, makes meaning for himself 
through the written words in the absence of the author.
The absent presence thus becomes a dual activity, operating 
from both sides of the text. The author presumes the
presence of the absent reader when he places his words on
paper; conversely, through the very act of reading, of 
mentally interacting with those same words that the author 
put on paper, the reader acknowledges the presence of an 
absent author.
That which unites writer and reader is, in the words 
of Burger, a "product of writing." Hesitating to go as far 
as Derrida who refers in the passage above to that product 
as "a logos more or less alive" (PPh 143), she suggests 
that writing has no life until a responding, and 
responsible, reader takes it into himself:
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The product of writing, like the creature of 
painting, is not an independent being with a life
of its own, able to speak for itself; it requires
its begetter to protect it against unjust abuse.
(PPh 97)
For meaning to be effected, the reader cannot be a passive
observer of the words before him. He must, as Burger
further argues, purposefully engage in "the activity of
interpretation" fPPh 97). Believing should not necessarily
equate with seeing. Acting as both life-giver for and
guardian of the quiescent words, he must protect them
"against unjust abuse" and careless misinterpretation (PPh
97). According to Burger, it is then, and only then, that
resuscitated with the breath of thought, the 
written corpse of the dialogue becomes a living 
being, knowing when to speak and when to remain 
silent, able to defend itself against all unjust 
abuse.
(PPh 3)
If the resuscitated words (a text) are positioned in a 
triangular framework with a responsible reader and a 
dominant authorial presence, the result is the rhetorical 
triangle.
Burger does not specifically refer to the rhetorical 
triangle in her discussion of the irresolute conflict 
between the spoken and written word that she finds in 
Plato's Phaedrus. However, her discussion of the 
responsibility of the reader, who works in tandem with the 
writer, attests to an absent presence already at work. 
Certainly Plato's own writings do not clearly address this
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issue of the absent presence as it operates within the 
rhetorical triangle, but his dialogues lay the framework 
from which this critical term will emerge. We need to look 
only as far as Aristotle to see clearer evidence of its 
formulation.
Aristotle's On Rhetoric offers an irreversible
dialogic construct, the rhetorical triangle with an
implicit absent presence. Aristotle's recognition of this
dynamic contributor to a written text affirmatively answers
Plato's question: Do criteria exist for creating not only
an acceptable, but a masterfully cogent, written discourse?
(Ph 276a-277b) Conforming to his philosophic tradition,
Aristotle maintains the dialogic form. Werner Jaeger
addresses this issue in Aristotle: Fundamentals in the
History of His Development. He states that, presumably
like other members of the Academy, Aristotle
regarded the dialogue as the established vehicle 
for giving living form to esoteric philosophy, 
and . . . desired to see the master's effect 
on himself reproduced in such a medium.
fA:FHD 27)
His dialogue, however, is dramatically different from those 
of Plato and his peers: he does not offer the text of a
learned teacher intellectually guiding his willing 
interlocutor. Perhaps most significantly, he does not have 
an external audience; rather, he relates a discourse that 
occurs in his mind, presenting a verbal interplay between 
the rational spirit and the questioning self which comprise
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his being. Proof of his mastery of the centuries-old 
discursive method, Aristotle reformulates that which was 
used by his mentor into an inner dialogue, making it more 
suitable for the written word than was that which was 
generally practiced.
Although one might argue that the two aspects of 
Aristotle, the individual, are present in his creation of 
an inner dialogue, he does essentially what Walter J. Ong 
describes as "fictionalizing" an audience; he creates a 
physically, but nevertheless powerfully, absent presence (a 
mentally projected audience), which guides and directs his 
treatise on rhetoric. Aristotle's dialogue thus becomes a 
treatise of metarhetoric through which the third element of 
the rhetorical triangle is a recognizable force.
Aristotle may reflect Plato in some of his earlier
works, but he dramatically departs from his mentor's
transcendental quality of forms. Reflecting his training
in biology and the empirical sciences, Aristotle considers
all forms through their organic development. In so doing,
he creates his complex philosophical system of rhetoric as
a means for grounding words, or discourse, in a
quantitative study of being, knowledge, and language. This
triadic system of study establishes a pattern of triangular
completeness that recurs throughout Aristotle's On 
3Rhetoric. Arguments or speeches are either deliberative, 
epideictic, or judicial [1358b]; they involve ethos,
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pathos, and logos [1356a]; and they require a listener, a 
speaker, and a subject [1358a].4
And the concept of the absent presence evolves
directly from these latter two triangular systems, as one
system overlaps the other. The modern rhetorical triangle
(reader, writer, text) directly parallels Aristotle's
ethos, pathos, and logos while it simultaneously
corresponds to his listener, speaker, and subject.
Evidence of the evolutionary movement from the oral
tradition of classical rhetoric to the written tradition of
modern rhetoric is seen as reader and writer replace
listener and speaker in the rhetorical triangle. Ong
describes the differences that distinguish Aristotle's
triangle from its modern counterpart;
the spoken word is part of present actuality and 
has its meaning established by the total 
situation in which it comes into being. Context 
for the spoken word is simply present, centered 
in the person speaking and the one or ones to 
whom he addresses himself and to whom he is 
related existentially in terms of the 
circumambient actuality. But the meaning caught 
in writing comes provided with no such present 
circumambient actuality, at least normally.
("WA" 85)
Lacking a "present actuality" or a present presence of the 
speaker, the written word necessarily relies, albeit 
imperfectly, on the absent presence of its author to shape 
meaning for the reader. As the reader, who is an absent 
presence when the text is composed, partners himself with 
an equally absent author, he connects with that author.
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Although the connection may be incomplete and the 
understanding may be arbitrary, the logos nevertheless 
creates an indisputable bridge between author and reader.
The purpose of that bridge is to effect meaning 
through the text; unfortunately, the process is often 
precarious, as meaning slips through the mental recesses of 
the reader's mind. Burke argues that a "word's 'meaning' 
is not identical with its sheer materiality" because there 
is "a realm that transcends the empirical" (RR 16, 36). 
Because of linguistic transcendence, the idea that the 
writer placed upon the page may not materially be the same 
idea as interpreted by the reader, but it has a semblance 
of that materiality if the reader is, as Burger suggests, 
responsive and responsible. Burke's theory concerning this 
linguistic transcendence is that language is the 
individual's "dramatic" attempt to get to "the form of a 
thing [that is] called its 'whatness,' or quidditas" (GM 
228), a concept that can be traced to Aristotle.
As the individual seeks to understand the "whatness" 
of self, world, and Other, he necessarily begins a journey 
of exploration; or, as Aristotle might say, he begins his 
journey toward his greatest potential. It is a journey of 
activism, involvement, perhaps even intellectual risk. 
Holland summarizes Aristotle's dramatistic view of man as 
speaker in his society:
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for Aristotle, man's life is an activity. It is 
a 'becoming' through acting and doing of what he 
'potentially is.' The ultimate end or good for 
which he strives is 'happiness.' Individual 
happiness will result when he learns to follow 
the rules of reason and realizes in actuality all 
the capacities of which his soul (nature) is 
potentially capable. Man is not only a rational 
animal, but he is by nature a political or social 
animal. He will achieve social happiness when he 
applies his knowledge of individual good to the 
good of society.
(S E fc  8 3 )
Aristotle's writings reflect an aggressive approach to life 
and a utilitarian approach to rhetoric. To help ensure the 
good of the community, he offers rhetoric as a dynamic art 
that might benefit individuals in the drama of their lives. 
Establishing it as a techne, a "reasoned habit of mind in 
making" (NE 6.4.3), he then offers it as habit that can 
pervade and positively impact every arena of living—  
ethical, political, legal. His is a rhetoric steeped in a 
logic that is inherently beneficial to his society, serving 
as a means both for understanding and improving the self 
within his world.
Burke comments that "Aristotle's concern with logic as 
the instrument (organon) of human reason is 'incipiently' 
pragmatist" (GM 276). As he espouses that logic in his 
written treatise, the written word becomes an acceptable 
tool (organon) for the process of communication, for the 
purpose of disseminating ideas. Applying his logical 
approach to written language, Aristotle sees it as a
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natural phenomenon and as rational instrument. 
Aristotle analyzes the arts of language in terms 
of symbolic properties and linguistic structures. 
Logic, rhetoric, and poetic are none of them 
purely 'verbal arts' in Aristotle's philosophy: 
they are based on the natural properties of 
words.
(McKeon, "ACL'1 176) 
Aristotle views all of language as an instrument, an 
instrument for verbal communication that might successfully 
occur both in the presence and in the absence of the 
speaker. Unlike his mentor Plato, he recognizes efficacy 
in discourse that is non-dialogic.
Aristotle may not clearly elucidate for the modern 
reader how this written instrument effects meaning, but his 
writings yield some significant determinations. Unlike 
Plato and the sophists, he does not offer eros as that 
which creates like-mindedness. On the contrary, he submits 
a rational, triangular framework as at least partial 
explanation. Rather than seducing an audience in the 
manner of eros, Aristotle's speaker exudes good will, 
ethos, that will draw a listener (reader) to him.
Partnered with the logos (text) and the pathos of the 
listener, the speaker (writer) might elicit understanding. 
Burke, speaking through his Aristotelian heritage, further 
extrapolates.
Attempting to define the human individual, the 
"symbol-using animal" (Symbolic Action 3), Burke overlays 
Aristotle's empirical knowledge with Platonic
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transcendence, a transcendence which allows for 
differentiations between essence and being. Ontologically, 
the individual communicates a sense of reality through 
symbols. The •'reality" which the words describe is absent; 
nevertheless, the words themselves create their own reality 
for the reader/listener.
Wendell V. Harris, in "The Critics Who Made Us,"
formulates an equation which helps explain how Burke's
system of verbal transcendence works;
symbols = verbal parallels to recognized patterns 
of experience = formulas = definitions = 
interpretations of situations = means of 
orienting or adjusting to a situation. The 
symbol names the pattern of experience, and 
at the same time interprets it and helps us 
orient ourselves so as to meet it successfully.
We can neither name nor define anything without 
interpreting it, and our very interpretation 
orients us in our response to it.
(458)
Relating this to the rhetorical triangle, which, for the 
written text, implicitly contains an absent presence, the 
individual necessarily interprets those symbols before him. 
The meaning of the absent author thus becomes shaped in 
part by the reader as he brings his own experience into the 
process. The result is that the interpretation of the 
author's words becomes more real for the reader than the 
actual experience about which the author writes. The 
reader, through a transcendental movement, leaps from the 
essence of that author's experience to its recapitulated 
being in his mind. A similar triangle operates in the
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spoken word as the hearer likewise struggles to understand 
the speaker. As in Derrida's diffFrance, understanding 
comes only through deferral.
This mental process that links the speaker to the 
listener and the reader to the writer emphasizes the power 
of logos, a power that creates the bridge of collaboration 
between author and reader. Reminiscent of the erotic power 
of Paris, Burke describes this collaboration in seductive 
terms:
Once you grasp the trend of the form, it invites 
participation regardless of the subject matter. 
Formally, you will find yourself swinging along 
with the succession of antitheses, even though 
you may not agree with the proposition that is 
being presented in this form. Or it may even be 
an opponent's proposition which you resent— yet 
for the duration of the statement itself you 
might 'help him out' to the extent of yielding to 
the formal development, surrendering to its 
symmetry as such. Of course, the more violent 
your original resistance to the proposition, the 
weaker will be your degree of 'surrender' by 
'collaborating' with the form. But in cases 
where a decision is still to be reached, a 
yielding to the form prepares for assent to 
the matter identified with it. Thus, you are 
drawn to the form, not in your capacity as a 
partisan, but because of some 'universal' appeal 
in it.
(RM 58)
Whether in agreement or in disagreement with the printed 
words, the reader who willingly engages in the reading 
process becomes a dynamic player in the rhetorical process, 
"surrendering” to and "collaborating" with the text. Like 
Helen at the hands of Paris, he may initially want to 
resist the "proposition" in the text. But, also like
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Helen, who is unable to withstand the allure of Paris, he 
is drawn into participation.
The reader engages, not in a violent rape, but in what
Tilly Warnock describes as a rhetorical "dance" with the
writer. Warnock argues:
Clearly the dance that Burke is describing is no 
solo performance on the part of either the writer 
or the reader, and clearly the reader's 
resistance and the writer's enticements, and 
vice-versa are parts of the dance.
("RKB" 73)
That which holds the reader and writer together in 
rhythmic, rhetorical unison is the appeal of the written 
word. And that appeal, perhaps but not necessarily 
universal, is interpretively sifted through the experience 
of the reader.
So, then, how does the transcendental element invade
this process? Burke argues that transcendence occurs
through the symbolic nature of language, a process which
renders its own sphere of "reality." Through metaphor,
metonymy, synecdoche, and irony, the writer enables the
reader to grasp meaning beyond the words in mere context.
Writing in "Volume and Body in Burke's Criticism, or
Stalled in the Right Place," Angus Fletcher explains:
Language as figured speech, in short, implies 
immediate verbal transcendence. As soon as you 
have poetry, figured speech, you have a beyonding 
of plain indication. You point, and you point 
beyond. Thus, in this larger view, signs can be 
transcendences of other signs. Words for general 
classes can transcend words for particulars, and
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of course, as in traditional dialectic, ideas can 
transcend things and even other ideas.
("VBBC" 167)
Poetry, of course, applies rather universally to discourse, 
since virtually all language contains figured speech. As a 
reader then enters into the text of an absent writer, "he 
experiences 'critical moments' when he transcends the 
division between himself as a reader and the text he is 
reading" (Warnock, "RKB" 72). The word, or logos, thus 
becomes the instrument (the organon) of transcendence. 
Although these "instruments are 'essentially' human, since 
they are products of human design" (£M 283), they ascend 
into the realm of the symbolic, thus transcending the realm 
of the empirical.
Burke employs a system of metaphorical hierarchy to 
comment on this process: "the analogy of naturalistic
correlations becomes necessarily the reduction of some 
higher or more complex realm of being to the terms of a 
lower or less complex realm of being" ("FMT" 506). This 
reduction in the mind of the reader becomes a 
representation of the writer's thoughts. Much like 
Derrida, Burke recognizes the slippage that is inherent in 
language? it is slippage .which causes the necessarily 
reductive version of that which it linguistically 
represents:
Men seek for vocabularies that will be 
faithful reflections of reality. To this end, 
they must develop vocabularies that are
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selections of reality. And any selection of 
reality must, in certain circumstances, function 
as a deflection of reality.
(SM 59)
Ultimately, then, all language offers a reduction of 
reality as it seeks to replicate that which is reality. I 
fully recognize that the term “reality" is an abstract 
term. It can refer to that which is divinely real, that 
which allows individual transcendence to a spiritual state 
of Otherness; but, it also suggests that which is humanly 
real, experienced sensorily or imaginatively, hence 
determined "real" by the individual. In either reference, 
however, real is that which is manifest as some something 
that discernibly affects the essence, the being, of the 
individual.
And Burke posits that a writer can capture the essence
of that reality through a language of words, a confusing
concept that Burke attempts to explain:
Thus, if we flatly contrast existence with 
essence, it follows by the sheer dialectics of 
the case that 'essences' do not 'exist.' Nor can 
existence as such be an essence. In Plato, the 
world of being (that is, essence) was more real 
than the world of our everyday experience (which 
was for Plato the world of appearance). But 
Santayana has synonymized appearances and 
essences to the extent that all appearances are 
essences, though there are many more essences 
than there are appearances.
While I was puzzling over Santayana's way of 
distinguishing essence from existence, a six- 
year-old solved the problem for me when he 
explained, 'There is an Easter Bunny, but he 
isn't real.' I saw the application immediately:
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the Easter bunny has a being, or essence, but he 
does not exist.
(SM 219)
The same is true of the absent presence of the writer? he 
does not physically exist to guide his interlocutor to 
knowledge through a dialectic process. Nevertheless, his 
presence, his being or essence, is irrefutable. Empowered 
by, and through, the written word, the absent presence of 
the writer of a given text establishes a common ground of 
understanding with the reader. If the reader yields 
completely to that presence, he can hope for at least 
momentary, though perhaps highly reductive, unity with the 
writer. The experience, which is embedded in the words, no 
longer exists. But the reader can capture the essence of 
that experience through the words that are offered by the 
writer.
Logos thus continues its seduction, seeking that
transcendent state of perfect union which Yeats describes
in "Among School Children":
O body swayed to music, 0 brightening glance,
How can we know the dancer from the dance?
(VIII 7-8)
Through the metaphor of the dancer and the dance or through 
countless other figurative images, the writer, in his 
absent presence, guides his reader to transcend the flat, 
denotative meaning of words on the printed page. The two, 
writer and reader, consequently engage in meaningful mental 
discourse.
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Because the reading process was in its infancy in the
time of Plato and Aristotle, these two philosophers could
not adequately address the complexities of the intellectual
process. What they could, and did, address is the presence
of spirit, which manifests itself through a dialogic
encounter. As Hall writes in Word and spirit.
The Greeks sensed this presence of spirit in the 
place where it most normally appears, namely, in 
the dynamic and lively practice of speaking to 
one another in the course of their everyday 
lives. And this sense of the presence of spirit 
on the level of the speech-act was perhaps all 
the stronger by virtue of the fact that speech 
was so central to Greek life.
(W£ 72)
The Greeks took what they sensed, processed what they 
believed to be true, and placed it in a verbal construct 
that provided meaning for themselves and their 
interlocutors. Perhaps not realizing that they were on the 
threshold of an intellectual revolution, one made possible 
through the written word, they sought to understand self, 
world, and Other through the best, and the most logical, 
means available to them. Little did they know that one of 
their own would outline a logical framework that would 
allow analysis, and subsequent understanding, of the 
operations of a rhetorical absent presence.
Aristotle, choosing to use the written word to his 
advantage, gives validity to the written text. Recognizing 
it as an additional linguistic tool, he fashions his text 
On Rhetoric so as to perpetuate the relationship between
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logos, ethos, and pathos. In so doing, he creates a 
textual inner dialogue, which will allow the emergence of a 
secondary absent presence, that which operates between a 
lover and an absent beloved, both of whom are characters in 
a literary text. Narratives of conflict between a lover 
and an absent beloved continue to plot the individual's 
epistemological journey toward understanding of self, 
world, and Other.
The next chapter continues this analysis, focusing on 
the New Testament as the text that first significantly 
yields a character who speaks from a text. I will argue 
that the journey trope and the literary absent presence 
(Word as character) cohere in the Christian rendering of 
God manifest as flesh. In order to woo his people back 
into right relationship with him, God offers his son Jesus 
as the central being in his text: Jesus, the Word of God,
is the word (text) that will unite Creator and created.
For the purposes of my development, the New Testament 
readily exemplifies dual absent presences, rhetorical and 
literary, that operate through a literary work.
Chapter 3
The Absent Presence in Christian Theology
Any analysis of the Christian text, even one such as 
this which advocates a plenitude of hermeneutic 
possibilities, is potentially vexed by the intrusion of 
dogma. Although I will strive for objectivity, I realize 
the virtual impossibility of omitting dogma from an 
implicitly dogmatic text such as the Bible. Since most of 
my discussion focuses on the New Testament, the avowedly 
Christian text, many of my conclusions necessarily will be 
stated from the Christian perspective. In no way do I come 
to these conclusions so as to preclude divergent postures 
of belief; rather, as a willing, a responsible, and a 
responsive reader, I filter my interpretations through the 
Christian milieu from which the words proceed while 
simultaneously sifting them through exegesis that is 
shaped, at least in part, by our contemporary society.
Compression and panorama, an admittedly oxymoronic 
approach, will determine the development of this chapter. 
Within this compression, which focuses on selective 
passages from the lengthy Biblical text, is a panoramic 
landscape from which emerges the absent presence as 
literary character. Through a textual probing of this 
bellwether of Western literature, I will suggest that not
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one (the writer), not two (the writer and reader), but 
multiple absent presences (writer, reader, and character or 
characters) merge to create meaning from a literary text. 
Because the events in the New Testament are traditionally 
viewed as a fulfillment, a continuation, of the Old, it is 
critically linked to the Old, hence the panorama. But it 
is the text of the New Testament which produces the absent 
presence as character who also figures into the making of 
meaning for the reader.
To situate the New Testament in its intellectual and 
spiritual milieu, I will also make periodical references to 
the Greek culture which preceded it. Ronald L. Hall's Word 
and Spirit will underpin this portion of my argument, which 
posits that Christianity, with the Word-as-Flesh, benefited 
from a world-view that was denied the Greeks. It is this 
pneumatic world-view, spirit as speech, which allows for 
Christ through his Holy Spirit, spirit and speech, to 
become a textual presence that discernibly influences the 
readers of God's Word.
My reasons for including the Bible, especially the New 
Testament, in this study are numerous.1 Not the least of 
these is that the advent of Christianity significantly 
alters the formerly accepted views of time and history. 
Pre-Christian Greeks, most notably Plato, tended to view 
history as cyclical, moving rhythmically within a 
structured and an ordered cosmos. Plato's doctrine of
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Forms seeks to explain the process. A highly simplistic 
synopsis of that esoteric doctrine is that at death all 
Forms return to their beginning; there, they are reunited 
with True Being where the imperfections of human existence 
fall away. The higher the Form, such as the philosopher, 
the more that Form will resemble True Being.
Hall explains some of the problems attenuating this 
Platonic world-view:
In a cosmos, even the paradigms of temporal 
succession are cyclical and thus closed, finite, 
self-contained, and essentially timeless. It was 
this picture of temporal succession that Plato 
was relying on when he said of time that it is 
'the moving image of eternity.' In such a cosmic 
picture of time, novelty and contingency are 
denied their ontological rights. This denial is 
the consequence of picturing time as an eternally 
repeating cycle of nature.
(W£ 19)
In such a view, the individual is little more than an 
impersonal object who is subject to an "impersonal 
principle of being, a logos” (W£> 19). According to Plato's 
cosmic world-view, the individual has no hope for latitude 
in the existence beyond: he is forever, and repetitively,
for good or for bad, locked into his earthly hierarchical 
stratum. The individual is simply a cog in the wheel of 
time.
As the written word became available to the masses, 
allowing the individual to read and to begin to process 
ideas independently, Plato's theory became more and more 
unacceptable. Gradually came the recognition that the
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individual "cog," far from being impersonal, is a person, 
with a personality and an intellect for thinking, with a 
mind for pondering "Who am I?" The very asking of the 
question, it would seem, admits to "novelty and 
contingency" (Hall, W§. 19). Because Plato's questioning 
implied difference and individuality, it placed in doubt 
the cosmic view of life. If man is capable of seeing the 
selfhood of his being as separate from that of others, if 
he is capable of questioning his beginning and pondering 
his conclusion, he needs a world-view different from that 
offered by the Plato and his contemporaries.
Aristotle, departing from Plato's Doctrine of Forms, 
espoused a different, a more progressive, concept of man in 
his world. Assuming a dramatistic position, Aristotle 
reasoned: if man is capable of thinking, he is capable of
becoming. He may (and again I over-simplify a complex
theory) be a cog in the wheel of time, but he can at least 
move toward being the best cog in it. Regardless of his 
earthly hierarchical status, each individual assumes the 
responsibility for reaching his fullest potential. The 
difficulty with this theory is that the standards are 
arbitrary: before the individual can move toward his best, 
he must first recognize what his "best" is— a potentially 
difficult quandary for the non-intellectual.
The Christian view is dramatically (and
dramatistically) different from the ones offered by Plato
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and Aristotle, an analysis that William Barclay makes in 
his introduction to The Bible as History. Christianity 
places time in a linear sequence. No longer cyclical, time 
is sequential; it moves along a story-line that has a 
beginning and an ending. As the Bible records this 
beginning and foreshadows its ending, it creates a 
narrative. And at the center of the narrative is the 
individual, possessed with a unique consciousness and an 
independent will that assure him of "novelty and 
contingency" (Hall, W£ 19). These novel and contingent 
qualities reflect man's greatest potential, but they also 
cause his greatest downfall. They allow him to triumph, 
but they also lead him to failure.
Central to the Christian narrative, which begins with 
the creation of man and his subsequent expulsion from the 
immediate presence of his Creator, is humanity's attempt to 
overcome spiritual difference, difference which causes 
separation between Creator and created. The journey trope 
thus dominates the text of the Bible. In his notes on The 
Anchor Bible, E.A. Speiser states that the reason for the 
journey "reduced to basic terms, was a spiritual one"
(xlv). Most significantly a spiritual quest, it is given 
physical dimensions in the Old Testament. The physical is 
a metaphor for the spiritual. When God directs Abraham to 
return the people of Israel to Canaan, he offers the 
corporeal experience (the physical journey back to the
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homeland) as a manifestation of the incorporeal experience 
(the spiritual journey back to God) he hopes to effect in 
them. Because of "the record of that progressive quest, 
the Bible became and has remained a factor in cultural life 
and an influence in world literature" (Speiser lii). 
Especially in its narration of the physical struggles and 
the spiritual triumphs of a people relating to their 
Creator, the Bible is a necessary link in the idea of the 
absent presence. Significantly contributing to Western 
literary thought, the Bible reveals an absent presence 
which dominates the text, operating within and reaching out 
from a textual narrative.
Ong suggests perhaps an even more convincing reason 
for inclusion of the Bible in a study such as this: it is
the oldest extant literary work that most clearly reflects 
society's movement from an oral/aural to a verbally 
scripted world. In his book The Presence of the Word, 
which plots a kind of history of "word," showing its 
changes in society as it moves from the Greek oral medium 
to the Hebraic printed medium, Ong suggests that the Bible 
creates a standard for the communication of ideas. Vital 
to that standard is that which enables any communication: 
the word. Ong argues for numerous functions of "word," as 
he sees them evidenced in the Bible.
After subdividing word as it appears in the Christian 
text, Ong then delineates seven particular Biblical
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operations: word as divine power, word as communication
between God and man, word as God's communication to the 
prophets, word as that which is heard in sermons, word as 
inspiration to writers of Biblical text, word as what was 
actually written by those writers, and "the Word Who is 
Jesus Christ" (Egf 182-84). Certainly the term "word" as 
used in the Bible functions in each of these capacities. 
However, each of the seven has one of two common 
denominators: word as text or Word as character within
that text. Logos, or word as text, was enunciated by 
Aristotle, as discussed in my previous chapter. But it is 
Word as character, the physical embodiment of text, that 
will be the focus for this chapter. Word as character 
cannot be isolated from the Biblical text because its being 
exists in and through the text; if one accepts the text, he 
also accepts the Word. This premise is especially 
evidenced in the New Testament.
Initially the Word as character refers to the physical 
Jesus, God's own Son, the Word Incarnate who dwelt among 
man. During his time on earth, the New Testament describes 
him as a physical presence, as one who was raised in the 
household of Joseph, a carpenter. In his chronological 
history of the Bible, Essentials of Bible Historyf Elmer 
W.K. Mould assesses the advent and life of Jesus:
We have now reached the central personality of
the Bible, Jesus of Nazareth.
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There are no contemporary records of the life 
and teachings of Jesus. He himself wrote 
nothing. Nor have any documents been found to 
throw light upon his life and teachings which 
date within the generation that witnessed his 
life and death.
(EBH 488)
A "central personality" without textual validation other 
than that which was recorded "approximately forty years" 
after his crucifixion (EBH 488), this character in the 
Christian narrative represented more than a textual 
presence. He was parousia, or real presence, what 
Augustine refers to as the "flesh being" that was "assumed 
by the Divinity," fEnchiridion X). And his purpose was to 
create dialogue between God and man; teleologically, then, 
Christ entered into the narrative of humanity in order to 
overcome difference or separation.
So that he could maintain his renewed dialogue with 
humanity after the death of his Son, God created an 
additional "character" who would continue to speak his 
words: the Holy Spirit. From a narrative point of view,
Jesus and the Holy Spirit as characters in a text represent 
a major development in the operation of the word. Bidden 
by, and integrally linked, to the author (God the Father), 
they speak his words to his audience. The result is that 
the rhetorical triangle of logos (text), ethos (writer), 
and pathos (reader) produces an additional triangle (what I 
call a literary triangle) between text, writer, and 
character. The writer, or more precisely, the producer of
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the text, empowers his central character to be spokesman 
for him— to bridge the gap between writer and reader.
Fully empowered by creator of the text, the absent presence 
of the character then speaks from the text the words of the 
writer to his reader. Not only are reader and writer 
rhetorically united through the logos, but reader and 
character also become linked. As the reader responds to 
the words and actions of the characters within the text, he 
relates to a secondary, and literary, absent presence.
The Bible is not the first text to suggest these 
separate, but simultaneous operations, but it is the first 
to apply them successfully— and universally. Sappho's 
poetic fragments and Homer's epics, all of which are in the 
oral Greek tradition, unquestionably create characters who 
emanate from the rhetorical triangle that links speaker, 
listener, and spoken text. But these characters function 
primarily as representative, but textually unapproachable, 
figures within their mythological worlds. In his book 
Sacred Discontent, Herbert Schneidau further assesses the 
character of Sappho. He says that she is "capable of 
seeing herself as an individual— not in the fact that she 
loves, but in the emotional turmoil it produces" (SjQ 260). 
However, Schneidau suggests that Sappho's "seeing" does not 
lead to self-examination, which would presumably, in turn 
(if the rhetorical triangle were fully operational), 
similarly provoke her listener.
80
The metaphor of 11 seeing," in Western thought, involves 
more than the visual act. As discussed in Chapter 2, it is 
the predominant trope for knowing or understanding. Hall 
adds to Ong's idea that "in a field of sight there is 
always a beyond or a beneath which is not seen" (IW 125).
He says that "what is 'seen' in the truest sense is not 
what is seen with embodied eyes but with the introspective 
'eyes of the mind'" (£JS 25). Referring to perception as 
the visibly objectified, Hall suggests that that which is 
"beyond" or "beneath" can be approached only in the mind. 
After the seer grasps, lays hold to, that which is beyond 
the visual, he potentially gleans understanding as he 
"sees" through the words of the writer.
Richard Jenkyns takes this discussion a step farther, 
noting that for Sappho "there is nothing beyond the poem 
itself. Her poems state; they do not examine" f TCP 22).
She does not "see." Because she does not see, she cannot 
offer insight to her reader. If the texts of this Greek 
poet do not examine, then any voice that the listener 
"overhears" is one confined within the text itself. Such a 
voice does not fully span the separation between speaker 
and listener, inciting the listener to self-examination. A 
voice speaking from the text, a voice that compels the 
reader to attention and then subsequently leads him to 
self-examination, comes initially and most significantly in 
the Hebrew writings of the Bible. Certainly Homer's
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characters speak from their texts, but these larger-than- 
life heroes of Herculean proportions negate the possibility 
of a personal identification with those common mortals who 
listen to their tales of superhuman valor.
In Total Presence. Thomas Altizer recognizes that
these epic heroes were some of the first to speak in a
text, but their speech was highly constricted:
While speech cannot be said to be primal or 
ultimate in the Greek religious and mythical 
traditions as such, it is so in the Homeric epics 
and in Greek tragedy, and the historical coming 
together of classical culture and the Bible in 
Christendom can give us a decisive clue to 
the unique identity and role of literature in the 
Western tradition.
(T£ 1-2)
Although Homer and the Greek tragedians may have first 
given the world speech that was "primal and ultimate," 
these writers did not initiate speech of critical self- 
examination. As Hall notes, theirs is not speech "that 
impinges on our lives and demands to be reckoned with" (WS 
72). It does not force the individual to internalize, and 
thus personalize, the words of the writer. Because they do 
not provide personal meaning, they do not "speak" to him in 
his world. The association between speaker, listener, and 
text is present, but the relationship is a tentative one.
The Bible is the text that first profoundly bridges 
the gap between speaker and listener. When Isaiah, for 
example, prophesies the mission of John the Baptist who 
will herald the arrival of the Christ, we witness a self-
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alienation, an abandonment of self, which will become
characteristic of Western man— and of Western literature.
In The Birth to Presence. Jean-Luc Nancy discusses this
abandonment as that which God does for his people so that
his voice might be heard. Filtering his ideas through
Hegel and Nietzsche and equating abandonment with a kind of
transcendental movement, he writes:
To abandon is to remit, entrust, or turn over to 
such a sovereign power, and to remit, entrust, or 
turn over to its ban, that is, to its 
proclaiming, to its convening, and to its 
sentencing.
(IE 44)
The text of the Bible, in part, relates the lives of 
individuals who "abandon" themselves to God, and who, if 
only temporarily, empty themselves of self and entrust 
another, their Creator, to live and speak through them.
For that transcendent moment in time, they and their 
Creator are one— in spiritual and intellectual communion.
Implicit in such an act of abandonment is love: 
patriarchs and apostles abandoned themselves to God so as 
to become spokesmen for him; God abandoned Jesus at the 
cross so that his love could redeem humanity; Jesus 
abandoned his followers and died a physical death to 
accomplish the same end; and a reader abandons himself to 
the text so that the words of another might create meaning 
for him. A death-in-life and life-in-death struggle 
typifies abandonment, a struggle not unlike that which
83
occurs in a reading process: when a writer puts living,
spoken words to paper, he abandons or "kills'1 those words; 
then, when a reader takes those words and makes meaning 
from them, he resurrects or gives life to those dead words.
Although he does not refer specifically to the 
rhetorical exercise, Nancy's discussion of love applies to 
a similar abandonment that occurs in the reading 
experience:
What 'the love of God' means is that love 
alone abandons. What is not love can reject, 
desert, forget, dismiss, discharge, but love 
alone can abandon, and it is by the possibility 
of abandonment that one knows the possibility, 
inverted or lost, of love.
(BE 41)
The love herein described is caritas, a rejuvenating and 
empowering love akin to agape, God's love. Unlike eros or 
cupiditas, both temporal forms of love, it is atemporal, 
allowing for transcendence. It is a love that overcomes 
difference, that mends separation. This passage can be 
applied especially to the reader. If he does not enter 
into a text with a genuine love for knowledge, an earnest 
desire to understand, he can quickly "reject, desert, 
forget, dismiss, [or] discharge" the words of the writer.
But, as Augustine writes in The Trinity, a word 
birthed in a love for textual mutuality has the potential 
for dynamic consequences. Allowing for both negative and 
positive responses from a word "conceived in love," 
Augustine says,
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the word is born when that which is thought 
pleases us, either for the purpose of committing 
sin or of acting rightly. Love, therefore, as a 
means, joins our word with the mind from which it 
is born; and as a third it binds itself with them 
in an incorporeal embrace, without any confusion.
(Trinity IX.viii)
Love seems incongruous with "committing sin," but Augustine 
addresses this earlier in the same passage. There, he 
differentiates between "the word of the creature and the 
word of the Creator." One is changeable and subject to 
corruption; the Other is unchangeable and allows for 
redemption. And the receptor determines his response, 
negative or positive, to the words that he reads. Only 
when he abandons himself to the text, only when he entrusts 
his mind to the "other," only when he submits himself to 
the words of the author might he hope to achieve a 
transcendent instant of understanding that will inspire him 
for evil or for good.
The desire for good is that which motivates the 
patriarchs of the Old Testament and the apostles of the New 
Testament as they abandon themselves to "speak" the voice 
of God, who is producer of the text. The prophet Isaiah 
affirms this premise. Speaking of the forerunner of the 
Christ, the Word-made-flesh, Isaiah says of John the 
Baptist: his will be the "voice of him that crieth in the
wilderness" (Isaiah 40:3). His will be the textually 
recorded voice that speaks directly to his listener, 
calling for universal self-examination. For the seeker of
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Christ, the ultimate purpose of self-examination is to 
instruct him to repent from his wayward ways. And that 
repentance is to come through the Word of God, the eternal 
logos that is incarnated in the world as God's own son.
Hall reminds us that the Christian logos is different
from that perceived by the pagan Greek community. Neither
mere word nor "the dynamic act of speaking" nor "the
impersonal, rational, and static principle of cosmic order"
(WS 31-32), the Christian logos finds its roots in the
Hebraic dabhar, the spoken word as spirit. The Hebrew
people placed the spoken word of Jehovah (Yahweh), which
was audible, dynamic, and life-altering, at the center of
their reality (WS 29). God himself was "a speech-act." He
was the great "I am" who spoke
the world into existence. In this picture God 
not only creates the world with his word but also 
sustains its continuity with it. Here everything 
that exists, including the self, is pictured as 
owing its existence to, and hence absolutely 
dependent on, the creative and providential 
dabhar of God. Here the paradigm of human action 
is established: to act is to speak as God
speaks; in the act of speaking (dabhar) spirit 
finds its decisive expression in man. This 
spirit is pneuma, spirit as 'the breath of 
speech.' Spirit as pneuma . . . must be sharply 
distinguished from spirit as psyche, spirit as 
the natural order of the cosmos. It is precisely 
spirit as pneuma that Christianity first posited. 
In the Christian world-picture a radically 
transcendent spirit becomes radically immanent in 
the world: the dabhar— and not the logos becomes
flesh.
(WS 30)
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Because of its pneumatic and transcendent quality, word as 
spirit is that ontological means through which humanity 
might come to understand self in the linear span of time.
As a reader of, and a player in, the narrative of humanity, 
he can look to the words inscribed in the Biblical text to 
see where he stands in relation to his world .(and to others 
in it) and to his Creator. As Hall suggests, it opens up 
an "awesome realm of possibility and contingency" (HS 31).
The Bible, specifically the New Testament as it
exposes Christianity to the world, is the first and
certainly the most significant written text that presents
the Word, the Hebraic Logos (dabhar), as a character who
dominates the story and who inspires both the writer in his
composition and the reader in his perusal of that created
text. This is, and once more I quote Hall, the
word that provides a transhistorical ground to 
the historical. Again, this is not the 
ahistorical ground of the Greek logos, but the 
temporally unfolding intentional and subjective 
ground of dabhar; here the real is grounded in a 
speaker whose words bring the world forth and 
whose steadfast fidelity holds it together 
through time.
In this biblical picture, human beings,
created in the image of God, are vested with the
power of the speech-act and hence with the power 
to call the world forth in its full actuality 
and to sustain it as such. . . . That is, human 
beings are not called to create actuality from 
nothing, rather, they are called to actualize 
actuality.
(HS 127)
While the New Testament may have continued the Greek 
emphasis upon logos (which can mean word or speech, or the
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meaning or structure of either), it meaningfully expands 
and, as Hall recognizes, "grounds” the role of voice.
Voice is actualized in the person of Jesus Christ. Both in 
and prior to time, the Christian logos is spirit and voice, 
method and matter.
Altizer addresses this issue of spirit and voice in
his discussion of the parabolic language of Jesus.
Plotting speech along a historical time-line, he describes
it as moving from that of limited participation between
interlocutors (that espoused by Plato and his
contemporaries) to that which is "primal" (that of Homer
and the Greek tragedians) to that which is "actualized"
(that spoken within the text by a character whose identity
then reaches outward to the reader). Like Hall, Altizer
uses the term "actualized." He, too, recognizes that
speech assumes a different role with the advent of
Christianity. To paraphrase and further expand Altizer's
argument, we could say that speech thus assumes a new
character. Specifically it becomes a character, one who is
"actualized" within the text:
Nothing quite like this was previously present in 
either Greece or Israel, for only with the birth 
of Christianity does a speech appear and sound 
which is simultaneously praxis and voice.
Christian anamnesis is not mere remembrance or 
recollection, it is rather a renewal or re­
presentation of an identity which is originally 
act and voice at once.
(IE 5)
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Underscoring a critical tenet of Christianity, Altizer 
succinctly explains the role of Jesus within the biblical 
text while also explaining the,.provocative role of the New 
Testament.
To state Altizer's premise in theological terms, Jesus 
as the eternal logos is both the message (praxis) and the 
messenger (voice). He is both the Word and the means 
whereby that word finds utterance. And the avenue for that 
utterance is the New Testament. Departing from Homeric 
epics and Greek tragedies which provide "a mere remembrance 
or recollection" of characters within an action, the 
Christian text espouses "a renewal or re-presentation of an 
identity," namely the identity of Jesus Christ, the 
incarnated Son of God. Successful textual communication 
is, in great part, determined by the voice that speaks from 
the text to the reader. If that voice succeeds, it 
functions in a unique way: it intrudes into the inner
sanctum of the individual.
Richard Kroner argues that "Christianity interfered 
much more seriously with the inner life of a man than Greek 
religion had ever done" (SR 16). Perhaps nothing better 
exemplifies this interference than the life of St. 
Augustine. Although Augustine lived and wrote almost four 
centuries after the advent of Christianity, his 
autobiographical writings dramatically depict this 
spiritual interference. Because of the extensive and
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highly descriptive account of his personal struggles, 
especially in his Confessions. we see the various stages of 
Augustine's response to the voice that reaches out to him 
from the biblical text. In his autobiography, Augustine 
plots his struggle with the voice that would have him 
become a Christian. Responding to that "actual actuality" 
(God Incarnate), he first rebels against the voice, living 
a life of debauchery and becoming a member of the Manichean 
sect. Then he ignores the voice, seeking life's answers 
through philosophy. Ultimately he can no longer disregard 
the "meddling" voice that projects from the biblical text,* 
as a consequence, Augustine's life is permanently altered 
as he finally succumbs to the voice, yielding himself to 
the priesthood. His response to that dominant voice 
suggests that speech emanating from the Biblical text is 
quite different from its predecessors. It is a voice which 
not only allows but forcefully demands participation from 
its hearers (readers).
A beneficial adjunct to this dynamic activity is that
the Christ, who is "spoken" through the text, works as a
positive force in the individual. Allowing spiritual
movement into that which is beyond the printed word, Hall
tells us that Christian
Speech provides us with resources for situating 
ourselves within a world and with the resources 
for stabilizing our existence within historical 
continuity. And it is able to provide this
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stability within immanence without robbing us of 
our dynamic transcendence.
(WS 53)
This transcendence, effected through the words in the text, 
allows the individual to "see" the spirit, which is self, 
in relation to spirit, which is other, and to Spirit, which 
is Other. In "'Narrative' in Christian and Modern 
Reading," Hans W. Frei refers to this act as "the 
disclosing power" of the text ("NCMR" 159). It is dynamic, 
active, and capable of mediating. The written text, in a 
way precluded by the spoken word, allows the reader to 
internalize thought, to suspend it in his mind, to return 
to it time and again if necessary so as to apprehend its 
meaning.
These dynamic, concrete, and provocative operations 
within the rhetorical triangle of Bible/God/Christian 
depart significantly from those espoused by Greek rhetors 
of the classical age. Although it claims to be powerful, 
Christian mediation between author and reader does not 
presume to be the result of Eros, magic, sorcery, or the 
physical penetration of the word through the ear. The 
textual logos of Christianity does not assume materiality; 
it thus opposes the Gorgian theory of the materiality of 
both word and soul. It also negates the premise that the 
rhetorical exchange is a psychic or physical experience, 
one that Gorgias compares to Paris' rape of Helen (Encomium 
on Helen). Neither is it comparable to Plato's form of
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logos which creates a hegemonic relationship between the 
more knowledgeable older speaker and his willing, but 
inexperienced interlocutor. Plato may presume to establish 
a rhetorical relationship that reciprocates between speaker 
and listener, but in actuality he creates a hierarchical 
exchange. The dominance may be subtle as the speaker 
guides his listener, but it nevertheless determines the 
structure of the discourse. Such dominance is non-existent 
in Christian rhetoric. Assuming a radically different 
rhetorical stance, Christianity eliminates the dominant 
aspect of the logos that is found in Greek dialogue. In 
its stead, it creates a rhetoric in which the logos 
produces full reciprocity between author and reader.
In his text Biblical Religion and the Search for 
Ultimate Reality, Paul Tillich explains this fundamental 
concept of Christian logos, the basic concept that 
distinguishes it from its Greek counterpart:
Man is asked to listen, but he is left free to 
decline. He is not supposed to be overpowered by 
the word, as in sorcery, where the word is used 
as a physical cause, or in magic, where the word 
is used as a psychic cause, or in suggestive 
talk, where the word is used as an emotional 
cause. These uses of the word are possible, 
but they eliminate the essence of the word, its 
quality as the bearer of meaning.
(BE 32)
Success of the Christian logos is totally dependent upon 
the will and receptivity of the individual. Specifically, 
its success is radically contingent upon the individual.
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The Biblical text appeals directly to the human intellect, 
to that part of the individual that seeks to understand 
himself in relation to his universe and his creator.
Through a dialogic interchange with the author, the reader 
can hope to find meaning for his personal life. He may not 
fully conclude his ontological search, but he can at least 
ease some of his concerns about his being.
Though not provocative in the sexual sense, the 
Christian logos is highly provocative as God, producer <pf 
the text, seeks to inspire, to move his readers to an 
understanding of world, Creator, and self. Robert McMahon 
addresses this issue in Augustine/s Prayerful Ascent. 
Analyzing the roles of the players involved in the 
rhetorical triangle of God/Logos/Christian, he writes:
Interpreting Scripture involves seeking God's 
voluntas, the intention or desire that stands at 
the origin of his words, as of all communication. 
That search is to be conducted by means of the 
voluntas of Moses, the inspired scriptor of 
Genesis, and these related voluntates are 
approached through the verba of the sacred text. 
Interpreting Scripture, thus, clearly involves a 
return to origins: movement from material signs
to the divine voluntas at the origin of the text.
f APA 131)
Voluntas, in its rigidly defined state, is selfishness or 
self-loving. As McMahon applies it, however, it becomes 
the intention or desire of the writer to effect meaning 
through his text. In either its pejorative or non- 
pejorative sense, voluntas (for vain reasons of self­
perpetuation or for more honorable reasons of perpetuation
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of knowledge) is essential in the writing process. But, on 
the opposite side of the text, the reader also must exhibit 
voluntas, a desire to gain meaning. It is personal 
voluntas that incites the individual to probe the text, 
sacred or secular, so as to glean understanding.
This activity, exegesis of the Christian text and 
hermeneutics of the secular text, affirms the absent 
presences of writer, speaker, and reader. And those absent 
presences, as they operate in and through the New
Testament, will be my focus for the remainder of this
chapter. To understand and to ground their origins, we 
first must look to that which precedes the Christian text.
The Old Testament, a preamble to the New, lays the
foundation for the spiritual and literary operation of the
absent presence in the New Testament. As the Old Testament
describes Jehovah or Yahweh, God who is pure spirit, it
also foreshadows his spirit which would take on
physicality. Conceived of a virgin, this spirit-made-flesh
would be both presence and speech (pneuma):
So shall my word be that goeth forth out of my 
mouth; it shall not return unto me void, but it 
shall accomplish that which I please, and it 
shall prosper in the thing whereto I sent it.
(Isaiah 55:11)
This dual activity of God's Word (both presence and speech) 
required a means whereby it could accomplish its task of 
establishing direct communication and thus restoring 
relationship between God and man. In order for this
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physical/audible sign of God's Word in his created world to 
become known to mankind, a medium necessarily had to be 
provided through which God's spirit could be made manifest. 
The New Testament becomes that medium. It is the textual 
"stage*' through which God places himself, in the form of 
Jesus, as a literary character within the history of 
creation.
The Old Testament provides us with only limited 
examples of man interacting with God's text, his word.
Even then the rhetorical triangle is skewed, picturing God 
as the omniscient/omnipotent/omnipresent Jehovah and man as 
his tentative interlocutor who seldom dares to pose a 
question to his Deity. And when he does dare, as with Job, 
he fears possible annihilation. Although conversations are 
recorded between God and Adam, God and Abraham, God and 
Moses, God and Job, and God and the prophets, the tenor of 
the rhetorical situations is that of the powerful speaker 
addressing the powerless listener. In the Old Testament, 
we see virtually no empowerment of the listener.
Repeatedly, God's word passes through his spokesmen to his 
chosen people without permanently transforming hearts of 
rebelliousness into a people of faith. The Israelite 
nation follows God's text of obedience for a time; then 
they stray into flagrant disobedience, blatantly 
disregarding the words of Jehovah. Because of their 
stubborn, "stiff-necked" ways, their communication with God
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is broken and one-sided (Exodus 32:9, 33:3, 34:9 and 
Deuteronomy 9:6, 13; 10:16). Obstinately refusing to 
follow God, they deprive themselves of the potential power 
that is theirs as Jehovah's chosen people if they would
only adhere to his word.
A foreshadowing of the Christian rhetorical
empowerment of the listener begins to emerge in the Greek
texts of Plato (especially Phaedrus and The RepublicT r 
becoming even more evident in Aristotle's On Rhetoric. As 
these texts suggest the absent presence within the 
hegemonic relationship between speaker and listener, they 
span the gulf between the Old and New Testaments. Not only 
do they highlight man's growing contemplation of himself as 
an integral player within his personal world, but (as my 
second chapter details) they also point to the emergence of 
an absent presence within the rhetorical text between 
author and reader.
The rhetorical and philosophical concerns of Greek 
society did not die with the advent of Christianity. Quite 
the contrary. Early Christian writers took the existing 
modes of thought and practice and adapted them to their 
tenets of belief. A case can certainly be made that early 
Christian writers infused existing Greek philosophy with 
their revealed insights, irrevocably wedding the two. As 
Richard Kroner argues in Speculation and Revelation in the
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Aae of Christian Philosophy. "Philosophy and religion are
intimately related" because both focus on
the same ultimate issues: God, man, and the
universe. Consequently, no matter how devious 
their approach, philosophy and religion in the 
past either have overlapped or have been opposed 
in respect to the same ultimate goals. Complete 
union is impossible, but like Hero and Leander, 
they also cannot resist embracing.
(SE 13)
And the texts that arise from philosophy and religion also 
"embrace" or overlap, each influencing the other either 
negatively or positively. Judeo-Christian treatises often 
reflect or question ideas of Greek thought just as Greek 
writings frequently suggest or contradict some concerns of 
Judeo-Christian beliefs. A given text is not created in 
isolation; neither does it' exist in isolation.
David Klemm, in "The Autonomous Text, the
Hermeneutical Self, and Divine Rhetoric," comments on this
quality of the written word:
The text is not reducible to the thoughts 
inscribed within, nor to the materiality of the 
individual object. Every text engrafts other 
texts and is in turn grafted onto other texts.
("AT" 6)
If an author has read previous texts and if his text is 
subsequently read, ideas between those texts conflate or 
contradict, confirm or deny. The same is true for the 
Bible. Most Christians generally accept that "all 
scripture is given by inspiration" (2 Timothy 3:16), 
although theological views do differ on exactly how this
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inspiration came to man who lived and wrote in a decidedly 
Greek intellectual milieu.
The authorial task would necessarily be formidable.
Not only would these writers have to situate God in 
history, they would also have to verify his being. Unlike 
Plato who could develop an abstract philosophy that defies 
proof, these writers (especially those of the New 
Testament) were commissioned to present God not as a shadow 
but as a reality— a living, breathing, omniscient, 
omnipotent, omnipresent, spiritual essence who interacts 
with his creation. Platonic philosophy had, without 
universal success, attempted to answer the questions: "What 
is true?" and "What is real?" The closest this 
philosophical enterprise came to resolving the issues of 
truth and being was to outline a complex program of True 
Being through which only a privileged few, namely 
philosophers who devoted their lives to the pursuit of 
knowledge, might ever achieve the source of ultimate truth 
and discernible reality (Republic^.
The difficulty with Plato's theory of True Being is 
that it depicts truth, being, and reality as highly 
nebulous concepts, existing only in the minds of 
philosophers. New Testament writers could not espouse such 
theoretical beliefs because they were writing for the 
understanding and the acceptance of all— not the 
privileged, educated few. They thus confronted the
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enigmatic task of textually proving a spirituality, of 
proving beyond doubt (at least to those who would be 
receptive) the reality of God. To do this, their text 
necessarily had to affirm the existence of God through the 
death of Jesus, the power of the Spirit as it supplants the 
powerlessness of the Christian. Such is the mystery and 
paradox of Western literature that is "structured in terms 
of dichotomies or polarities: good vs. evil, being vs.
nothingness, presence vs. absence, truth vs. error"
(Johnson vii) and illusion vs. reality. New Testament 
writers necessarily had to address the question of illusion 
or reality if they were to convince their readers of the 
existence of their God. Therein lay their monumental task. 
Like Plato before them, the New Testament writers would 
have to confront the question: "What is real?" But unlike 
him, they would have to validate their answer. In doing 
so, they necessarily would, as Ong writes in The Presence 
of the Word, "encounter a paradox" (171). According to 
Ong, this paradox results from the binary operation of the 
objective and subjective senses.
Aristotle's writings suggest that he was aware of 
these binary operations: a student of scientific and
empirical knowledge, he heralds happiness, an arbitrarily 
subjective emotion, as the ultimate goal of human action 
(Rhetoric 1.5). Aristotle may have sought to rationalize 
the paradox between the objective and the subjective, the
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physical and the spiritual, even though his extant texts do 
not fully substantiate such an assumption. He, like Plato, 
focused his attention on language in the field of 
philosophy— on rhetoric, on that "faculty of observing the 
possibly persuasive concerning anything at all" (Gellrich 
243). As a result, his corpus also lacks a verbal program 
that offers proof to the questioning individual that he can 
hope to find a practical knowledge of self in his relation 
to world and Other.
Proof, as Aristotle's empirical training would have 
taught him, generally arises from objective observation, 
but "spiritual proof" defies objective observation, thus 
making the term itself an oxymoron. Because of the highly 
subjective nature of anything that is spiritual, anything 
that is beyond tactile determination, the New Testament 
writers sought to accomplish that which Plato and Aristotle 
could not: to overcome the paradox between the objective
and the subjective. In affirming the subjective through 
the objective, they set out to prove the existence of a 
spiritual God through the physical life, death, and 
resurrection of his Son. Scripture in the King James text 
provides neither a definition nor a discussion of "real." 
Cruden's Complete Concordance does not even list the word 
"real" as occurring in the King James version of the Bible.
The New International Version, which is offered as a 
closer translation of the original Hebrew, Aramaic and
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Greek texts, does include "real," most notably in words 
that Jesus uses to describe himself. The original Greek 
word alethes, which means "real, true, truth, actual," can 
be found in two verses in the gospel of John that relate to 
transubstantiation, the physical assuming the spiritual and 
vice versa:
Jesus said to them, 'I tell you the truth, 
it is not Moses who has given you the bread from 
heaven, but it is my Father who gives you the 
true bread from heaven. For the bread of heaven
is he who comes down from heaven and gives life
to the world.
(HIV John 6:32-33)
and
For my flesh is real food, and my blood is 
real drink.
(HIV John 6:55)
Writers of New Testament scripture view the reality of God 
as a given: the words of Jesus are life-sustaining, the
"true bread from heaven," and his blood is real blood that
coursed through the veins of the one who spoke to them.
In pondering this issue and seeking to allay all doubt 
concerning the Godhead, Augustine determines:
But God is without doubt a substance, or 
perhaps essence would be a better term, which the 
Greeks call ousia. For just as wisdom is so
called from being wise, and knowledge is so
called from knowing, so essence is so called from
being [esse].
(Trinity v.ii)
Through the process of deductive reasoning, Augustine seeks 
to rationalize the existence of God: God is because
humanity observes and personally validates the effects of
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his being. Unlike the passage quoted in Chapter 2 where 
Burke analogizes being and essence through the Easter 
Bunny, Augustine grounds God, giving his being verifiable 
substance, ousia. That substance manifests itself through 
the lives of those who respond to his Word, allowing it to 
make and shape their reality. For writers of the New 
Testament, for Augustine three centuries later, and for 
individuals today, reality is that which they witness or 
experience; it is that which personally impacts their 
lives. Reality is thus personal and subjective, but it can 
be grounded objectively.
In The Presence of the Word. Ong outlines a method for 
determining those grounds; he explains how an individual 
might know that which is "real.'1 While it parallels the 
one used by writers of the New Testament, Ong's method also 
echoes Augustine's discussion of ousia, a verifiable 
essence:
When I say real, something existing outside my 
own consciousness of it, something out there and 
in this sense objective, I do not actually mean 
existing with no relationship to me. Because my 
concept of reality is tied up with the sense of 
touch, it is also tied up with my sense of my own 
being. 'Real' means, in this way, not just 
something out there but something that I am 
involved in and that is involved in me (or, by 
extension, something that I could be involved in 
or that could be involved in me). The objective 
reality of something is in this way measured by 
one's own subjective awareness (as caught in the 
sense of touch), not merely by something out 
there but rather by something out there 
interacting with something in here.
(EW 171)
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If we define real, then, as that which can be proved both 
objectively (impersonally existing outside the individual 
consciousness) and subjectively (personally affecting the 
individual consciousness), the New Testament writers 
proceeded to prove the reality of God both objectively and 
subjectively. The four gospels record the life, death, and 
resurrection of Jesus, the Christ, objectively placing him 
in a historical context. The remainder of the New 
Testament successively records the residual effects 
resulting from that life, death, and resurrection.
Although these residual effects are highly subjective, they 
are recorded as unmistakably life-altering events for those 
who encountered the Living Word.
We cannot overlook the fact that the New Testament 
writers who recorded these events lived in a particular 
part of the world during a particular time with particular 
social mores, particular philosophical and spiritual 
questions, and particular rhetorical styles. Although 
early Christians may have engaged in a refutation rather 
than a corroboration of Greek beliefs, an inescapable 
infusion of philosophical Greek overtones finds its way 
into Scripture. This recognizable infusion does not 
necessarily dilute the accepted tenets of Christianity, but 
it does affirm that Scripture is the physical product of a 
particular time in history, a time that witnessed the 
movement from esoteric philosophy to applied religion, the
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movement from an oral to a textually scripted culture. 
Inherent in that move was the potential for the concrete, 
physical, and audible logos (dabhar) to supplant the 
abstract, universal logos.
Kroner recognizes an obvious distinction between the 
abstract and the concrete, between "ancient speculation and 
Christian revelation'1 (SB 15)/ but he also argues that 
"undoubtedly there is a striking kinship evident in the 
speculative idealism of Plato and the revealed faith of 
Christianity" (SB 24). He even describes Plato's republic 
as religious in character. "Such a community is, according 
to our language, no longer a state; it is what we call a 
church" (SB 26). Because Plato's ideal state is "a picture 
of the 'best life' that man could and should love," Kroner 
determines that the philosopher's community, though devoid 
of faith and revelation, has an "unmistakably religious 
character" (SB 25).
Kroner concludes that the objectives of church and 
ideal state are similar: the pursuit of wisdom, truth,
highest good, and happiness. What distinguishes the two is 
that one functions through faith and revelation and the 
other through intellect and speculation. Even if Kroner 
does not succeed in convincing us that Plato's ideal state 
is a church, part of his argument is valid: at least one
aspect of Plato's idealism is worked out in Christian 
thought. Specifically, Christianity proposed the solution
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to Plato's conundrum of man, his creator, and the role of 
each in the universe. Christianity moved man from Plato's 
confusing, enigmatic world of shadow to Jehovah's faith- 
centered, revelatory world of concreteness, a concreteness- 
with-God-in-it. By incarnating himself as the Word in the 
form of physical man, God enabled man to validate not only 
his own existence but the existence of a Prime Mover, the 
instigator and preserver of creation.
The action culminating in God's incarnation was
necessarily complex and would involve all three persons of
the Trinity: God the Father, the omnipresent spirituality?
God the Son, his omniscient physical presence in the form
of man; and God the Spirit, his omnipresent absent presence
who is presumed available to all of mankind. This same-
but-different quality of God confuses many who seek to
understand the Trinity. Augustine is numbered among those
in this struggle. Attempting to explain it in terms of
himself, he says:
For I am, and I know, and I will. I am a knowing 
and a willing being; I know that I am and that I 
will; and I will to be and to know. In these 
three functions, therefore, let him who can see 
how integral a life is; for there is one life, 
one mind, one essence. Finally, the distinction 
does not separate the things, and yet it is a 
distinction.
(Confessions XIII.xi) 
Through his training in philosophical analysis, Augustine 
could, at least occasionally in moments of divine
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inspiration, come to terms with those seemingly 
inexplicable, faith-demanding aspects of Christianity.
Many fundamental purveyors of Christian doctrine after 
the time of Augustine, however, came to doubt the 
usefulness of Greek philosophy; they even came to fear the 
consequences of the same philosophical musings that had 
aided Aristotle in his understanding of Scripture. Some 
•'Christian philosophers disdained Greek speculation 
altogether. This speculation finally acknowledged that it 
could not establish any sure knowledge out of itself" 
(Kroner, Sfi 103). Doing a tremendous injustice to 
theological hermeneutics, those vehement critics of 
philosophical speculation failed to recognize that "the New 
Testament was not only written in a Hellenistic atmosphere, 
but [that it] was definitely influenced by Greek ideas and 
concepts" (Kroner, Sg 20). We need to look no farther than 
to the most prolific writer of the New Testament to find 
the greatest evidence for this fact. Saul, whose Christian 
name was Paul, the writer of thirteen of the twenty-seven 
books of the New Testament, typifies the amalgamation of 
the cultures of his time. This amalgamation necessarily 
influenced Paul's reception of God's words to him while 
subsequently determining his presentation of God's words to 
his readers.
A Roman citizen by virtue of his birthplace, Saul, a 
Hebrew, spent his early years in the Greek city of Tarsus,
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which "was the home of a philosophical school, a university 
town, where the intellectual atmosphere was colored by 
Greek thought" (Zondervan 828). Although there are no 
records showing that Paul, who was a tent-maker by 
profession, received a formal education while in Tarsus, we 
can assume that he was at least exposed to the concept of 
higher education. We do know, however, that he studied 
Hebrew "at the feet of Gamaliel," the most prominent 
Pharisee of first-century Judaism (Acts 22:3).
The Interpreter's Bible further describes Gamaliel as
a personification of the elder statesman. His 
counsel is one of wise restraint. Do nothing for 
the time being. Wait. See what happens. If the 
[Christian] movement is bad, God will destroy it. 
If it is good, no one will be able to destroy it. 
He is a perfect instance of the moderating 
influence of the judicial mind.
Gamaliel and his kind might be called well- 
balanced people. They see both sides of a 
situation. They are able to stand apart from it 
and look at it with dispassion.
(86)
According to this description, Gamaliel was a practitioner 
of the dissoi logoi, a common Greek exercise in which the 
rhetor sought to understand and then argue both sides of an 
issue. As a Jewish Pharisee, Gamaliel may not have argued 
the case for Christianity, but his wait-and-see attitude 
suggests that he inculcated the practice of the dissoi 
logoi among his students, not the least of whom was Saul.
If indeed Saul was instructed in this skill, we might view 
his Damascus Road experience as a logical movement into the
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more convincing argument. Rather than a "sudden" 
revelation, his conversion experience might have been the 
rational culmination of a long period of philosophical and 
spiritual debate between Christianity and Judaism.
In Saul's day, Gamaliel and his Pharisaical sect 
performed similarly to the Greek philosophers of Socrates' 
day. They lived their lives in search for the truth 
concerning God, man, and world. Instead of debating in the 
Forum or the Acropolis, though, they conversed in the 
Temple (Z 298, 627-31). If Saul, the Greek, studied in 
this philosophical milieu, then we must conclude that Paul, 
the Christian, incorporates a similar mode of thinking into 
his New Testament epistles. But Paul radically departs 
from pure philosophy, overlaying its speculation with what 
he describes as revealed faith, a faith that he argues was 
indisputably and personally revealed to him on the Damascus 
road (Acts 9). As Paul records his experience, which is 
his personal validation of God-in-the-world, he employs the 
rhetorical techniques of his Greek-centered society.
In his brief but informative text Rhetoric and the New 
Testament f Burton L. Mack convincingly places all of the 
writings of Paul, and of the entire New Testament, in the 
historical context of the classical Greco-Roman world. 
Mack's thesis is that the Christian text follows many of 
the rhetorical practices that were developed in the 
philosophical era of the Hellenistic period. As he focuses
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on specific passages from the New Testament, analyzing 
their content and structure according to Greek rhetorical 
paradigms, Mack shows how all of the New Testament writers 
were unabashed practitioners of persuasion.
Although these Christian writers may have blurred the 
distinguishing parameters of judicial, deliberative, or 
epideictic speeches as outlined by Aristotle, Mack observes 
that they nevertheless retain the vestiges of Greek 
rhetoric:
Early Christian rhetoric was a distinctively 
mixed bag in which every form of rhetorical issue 
and strategy was frequently brought to bear 
simultaneously in an essentially extravagant 
persuasion. Thus the occurrence of traditional 
patterns of argumentation may not always be a 
firm basis upon which to judge the intention of a 
speech. . . .  In general, early Christian 
rhetoric was deliberative in the sense that 
every aspect of the new persuasion (including the 
imagination of founder figures and founding 
events, beliefs, behavior, and the adjudications 
of social issues) had to be approached as a 
matter of policy that would determine the future 
of (membership in) the community.
(ENT 35)
Like Plato, the Judeo-Christian world disdained sophistic 
eloquence, condemning the "eloquent orator" (Isaiah 3:3) 
and re-educating the "eloquent man" Apollos "in the way of 
the Lord" (Acts 18:24). The "way of the Lord," what Mack 
refers to as Christian "policy," is presented clearly and 
logically (albeit sometimes parabolically) in order to 
appeal to the masses of interested listeners, to those 
willing interlocutors who would be receptive to the Word.
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The clear and logical presentation certainly harks 
back to Plato and Aristotle, but Christian policy radically 
broadens the scope of its rhetorical audience, claiming to 
speak to every man, to each individually, in his specific 
circumstance or situation. Additionally, it assumes the 
character of an applied philosophy, one that addresses man 
in his personal world and shows him in relation to his 
creator. Christian philosophy thus positions itself as the 
answer to Plato's questions concerning man, creator, and 
universe. It would seem, then, that those critics who 
disavow the link between philosophy and religion ignore New 
Testament textual evidences that cannot otherwise be 
explained, and they also overlook a substantive link that 
can be found in the last book of the Old Testament, the 
book that bridges the gap between Judaism and Christianity.
Malachi (5th century B.C.), the author of the book 
which bears his name, was a contemporary of Socrates, 
although it cannot be established that the two actually 
met. Nevertheless, Malachi's writing suggests that he was 
well-acquainted with the style of his Greek counterpart.
His book is presented in the Socratic method, a dialectic 
between the speaker, God, and his interlocutor, Malachi, 
who represents the nation of Israel. The book seeks to 
establish a dialogue, a dialogue of faith and commitment 
between God and his disillusioned and repetitively "stiff­
necked" and errant people. Of those who had recently
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returned from Babylonian captivity, only the faithful 
remnant, the few who "feared the Lord spoke often to one 
another" of God's call to commitment (Malachi 3:16). But 
even these faithful few were not yet ready to hear the Word 
because the kairos, the right time, had not yet come. They 
were not yet prepared to meet God in their world and 
establish a personal relationship with him.
From Malachi's writing in the Old Testament to the 
time of Matthew's writing in the New Testament, roughly 435 
years lapsed during which God was, as far as Scripture 
indicates, silent. Writers of The Bible and History refer 
to these years as the "intertestamental period" (155). 
Ironically, it was the period during which man first became 
notably vocal in his search for understanding of himself, 
his creator, and his world— the ontological search for 
ultimate meaning and reality. Greek learning reached its 
pinnacle during this time, expanding its influence beyond 
Greece to the rest of the civilized world, and especially 
to Rome. Historians and theologians alike recognize that 
"the full impact of Hellenism [was] felt among the Jews" 
during this "intertestamental period" (BH 165). And it was 
in the Roman province of Palestine (or Judah, in the Old 
Testament) that God chose to break his silence and propel 
his Word into the midst of humanity.
The idea of the divine Logos breaking the 
silence of God is very profound. It means that 
the divine abyss in itself is without word, form,
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object, and voice. It is the infinite silence of 
the eternal. But out of this divine silence, the 
Logos breaks forth and opens up what is hidden in 
this silence. He reveals the divine ground.
(Tillich, H£I 22)
According to Tillich's analysis, this "divine ground" is 
that which also grounds humanity; it is that which answers 
the ontological ruminations of mankind. The Greek concept 
of the universal "logos" could not adequately encompass the 
paradoxical ramifications of the eternal Logos. The term, 
therefore, underwent a necessary transformation since 
"Logos is a universal principle, whereas Jesus is a 
concrete reality. His is a concrete personal life 
described by this term. This is expressed in the great 
paradox of Christianity: the Logos became flesh" fHCT 15). 
The abstract logos thus manifest itself through the 
concrete Jesus Christ. This complicated intrusion of God 
into his world set into motion the essential mediation that 
had been lacking between man and his creator. Through his 
Mediator, the Christ who is his Word, God invites man to 
engage in a dialogic exchange, an exchange that will 
necessarily demand something from the listener/reader.
According to Augustine in his Enchiridionf that demand 
is belief in the "statement that 'the Word became flesh and 
dwelt among us,' so that we should then believe in 'the 
only Son of God the Father Almighty, born of the Holy 
Spirit and Mary the Virgin.'" As Augustine continues his 
handbook to the Christian, he argues that such a demand is
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not too difficult if man realizes that when the “Word was 
made flesh, the flesh being [was] assumed by the Divinity, 
not [that] the Divinity being [was] changed into flesh” 
(Enchiridion X). In a unique way God imparted his Spirit 
into human form, thus creating physical, spiritual, and 
verbal mediation between himself and man. In its 
proclamation of an interceding logos which "became flesh," 
Christian theology parts company with Greek philosophy.
The Logos is no longer a matter of speculation; it is a 
matter of revelation. As a result of this period of 
kairos, Greek philosophy and its ancient world begin a 
downward spiral which will lead to their demise.
The revealed Christ, the Incarnate Word, does not 
specifically operate as a character in the Old Testament, 
although subtle suggestions are made of His existence 
(along with that of the Holy Spirit) as early as Genesis 
1:26: "And God said, Let us make man in our image, after
our likeness." The pronoun "our" suggests that the Trinity 
existed before recorded time and that all three (God the 
Father, God the Son, and God the Holy Spirit) were present 
during the creation of world and man: "In the beginning
was the Word, and the Word was with God, and the Word was 
God. The same was in the beginning with God" (John 1:1-2). 
Gerard Loughlin likewise argues, "Precisely as the figure 
who meets us in the New Testament, Jesus the Christ is 
already prefigured in the Old" ("MP" 100).
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In his Confessions f Augustine ponders this complex
issue, this "enigma11 of the Trinity. He comes to exclaim
in revelatory insight:
See now, how the Trinity appears to me in an 
enigma. And thou art the Trinity, 0 my God, 
since thou, 0 Father— in the beginning of our 
wisdom, that is, in thy wisdom born of thee,
equal and coeternal with thee, that is, thy Son—
created the heaven and the earth.
(XIII.v)
Augustine, the philosopher/teacher/theologian admits that 
the concept of a Triune God is confusing, but he argues 
that understanding is made possible through the wisdom that 
God gives to man if he willingly enters into a rhetorical 
exchange with his creator. The implication is that 
knowledge begets greater knowledge as man submerges himself 
in dialogue with God. Knowledge of God, universe, and self 
increases through a kind of hermeneutical spiral as man 
submits his intellect to the wisdom of God.
Like the poet in Yeats' "The Tower," man ascends to
ever-enlightening levels of understanding; but unlike the 
poet who finds "decay" and "dull decrepitude" or "worse 
evil" at the top, the Christian finds hope for eternity.
As he continues to engage God's text, which is the New 
Testament, man will learn that the Son, the one who becomes 
the Word in the New Testament, is further described as the 
head of creation, the one who "made the worlds" (Hebrews 
1:2):
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For by him were all things created, that are in 
heaven, and that are in earth, visible and 
invisible, whether they be thrones, or dominions, 
or principalities, or powers— all things were 
created by him and for him.
(Colossians 1:16)
As John continues his account of creation in the first book 
of his gospel, he likewise credits Christ, the Incarnate 
Word of God, as the sculptor of the universe and the life 
therein: "All things were made by him; and without him was
not anything made that was made" (1:3). Jesus Christ, the 
Word, the eternal Logos, then assumes the unique role of 
both Creator and created as we view him as the one who not 
only made the worlds but who then becomes an integral 
player, if you will, within the story of his own creation, 
specifically within the New Testament story of his personal 
relationship with mankind.
Scripture then becomes "a moment in God's own reading 
of his own life. It is because the Bible is in this sense 
God's own reading of himself and his action, God's reading 
of his own story, his dealings with the world" (Loughlin 
104). God's Word is thus two-fold: it is a rhetorical
text that unites God (author) to his reader (Christian), 
and it is also God's Son, a character within that text.
The rhetorical triangle (author, reader, text) thus 
branches out into another triangle, the literary triangle 
comprised of author, text, and character. As a character 
who has enabled the writer to present his message (Jesus
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willingly died on the cross so that God's story could be 
told), the eternal Word likewise empowers the text, whose 
consequent purpose is to empower the willing interlocutor, 
the Christian who embraces the Word.
This embracing the Word is a significant departure 
from the stance in the Old Testament which repeatedly warns 
that man could not approach God; he could not look upon the 
face of God. "And he said, Thou canst not see my face, for 
there shall no man see me and live" (Exodus 33:20). If man 
does encounter God in the Old Testament, God's presence is 
camouflaged. When God gives the ten commandments on Mt. 
Sinai, Moses meets him in a cloud which shields the 
presence of Jehovah: "Lo, I come unto thee in a thick
cloud, that the people may hear when I speak with thee" 
(Exodus 19:9). Later when the Israelites wander through 
the wilderness, God's presence is as a pillar of cloud by 
day and a pillar of fire by night (Nehemiah 9:19).
With the advent of Christianity, man not only can look 
upon the absent, but very real presence of God, but he can 
also converse with him: the Word speaking the words of God
directly to man.
The New Testament goes even farther than the 
Old in what it makes of the word. It presents 
the word of God as even more the center of its 
teaching, announcing that the Word was made flesh 
and dwelt, a Person, among us. As is the case in 
no other religion, the Word is here the proper 
name of a person, the Son of God, himself God.
(Ong, m  13)
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Christ as teacher of God's Word, like Plato and Cicero, 
lived in a predominantly oral culture, and the New 
Testament as a written text grew out of his oral 
performance. Because of this unlikely orator, who wore the 
practical cloak and girdle of a carpenter rather than the 
luxurious mantle of a philosopher, God's 435-year silence 
was broken. Speaking simply but convincingly, he 
established a new order of communication between God and 
man; in so doing, he also created an additional element, 
the absent presence of himself, to effect communication 
between writer and reader.
God supplanted his silence of four centuries with his
absent presence, first in the form of Jesus, the Christ,
and later in the form of the Holy Spirit. Absent presence
is not the same as full presence (parousia). For God to be
fully present would be for him to negate his own existence
as the great nI Am" which was before, and now, and evermore
(Revelations 1:18). Altizer explains why God's presence on
earth is not parousia. He argues that God
cannot be totally present, and cannot be finally 
present, for to be finally and totally present 
would be to cease to be before and above.
Moreover, it is the transcendent identity of God 
which realizes itself in consciousness as the God 
who is beyond, who is wholly other, and wholly 
other and beyond every possible form of identity 
or consciousness.
(IE 52)
Man's finitude prevents him from identifying with God "who 
is wholly other." Another means had to be implemented
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through which man might penetrate the infinitude of God.
That means was the Christ, God-in-the-world. Ong analyzes
this juncture in history, a juncture establishing
innovative, and eminently personal, textual communication:
God entered into human history in a special 
fashion at the precise time when psychological 
structures assured that his entrance would have 
greatest opportunity to endure and flower. To 
assure maximum presence through history, the Word 
came in the ripeness of time, when a sense of the 
oral was still dominant and when at the same time 
the alphabet could give divine revelation among 
men a new kind of endurance and stability.
(m  190-91)
God thus burst into the world in the form of a babe, Jesus, 
who would grow into a man, the Christ, the incarnated Son 
of God. While on earth, Christ sought to establish 
"personal presence" with all of mankind (Ong, £W 113). 
Because full presence (parousia) is predicated upon sound, 
upon the speech-act, personal interaction was made 
possible. As Ong comments, "the word has immediate 
religious significance" (EW 113), but it also has far- 
reaching societal significance, allowing person-to-Other 
spiritual transcendence between Creator/created and person- 
to-person intellectual transcendence between 
created/created.
A.I. McFayden addresses this idea in "The Call to 
Discipleship." Inherent in the Christian concept, 
"disciple" is a to/for mandate: the individual is a
disciple to Christ and a disciple for others. That is, he
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subscribes to the words of the Master and then shares those 
words to willing listeners. This vertical and horizontal 
matrix of communication was made possible through the 
advent of Christianity, and it is operational when anyone 
reads the text of another then interprets that reading for 
others. McFayden refers to this as "the meeting point," 
and it was instigated by the Christ. Because Christ 
represents "the meeting point between God and humanity," he 
became
the person in whom God's Word and obedient human 
response are conjoined. In this he is an 
individual but at once more than an individual, 
the mediating point between all humankind and 
God. As such he is turned towards all humankind 
becoming not only the mediation of our relation 
to God but of our relations to one another.
("CD" 477)
The Word of God, like many texts, is a tool of ontological 
mediation— between writer/reader, between reader/other, and 
between reader/other. Hall reminds us that mediation, all 
mediation, results from the pneumatic, or Christian, world­
view. Unlike the psychic world-view (spirit in a closed 
cosmic structure) envisioned by the Greeks, the pneumatic 
world-view recognizes spirit as the "breath of speech" (WS 
31). Neither static, closed, nor rigidly silent, this 
pneumatic view empowers the individual to move along, to 
mediate within, and to assume at least limited control over 
his life.
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According to Hall, this "positing of the pneumatic 
world-picture then provided the necessary conceptual 
context for spirit, in its dynamic and temporal 
transcendence, to appear in the world in its full 
existential actuality and power" (i*[£ 30). In this "new" 
pneumatic context, the advent of the Word (both text and 
person) provided humanity with an actualized method for 
"presenting themselves to one another in their words and 
deeds" 73).
The Greeks, Hall continues, could not accomplish this
feat of Christianity because they lacked "a pneumatically
qualified world-picture" and thus
were not able to acknowledge or embrace this 
incipient presence of spirit. Lacking such a 
picture, temporality and contingency were 
terrifying; indeed it is no wonder that the 
Greeks sought to flee into eternity, necessity, 
fate, stasis, and silent contemplation.
(WS 73)
Failing to recognize spirit as a temporality, failing to 
place it in a historical context, failing to see it as an 
individual's contingency, the Greeks could not comprehend 
their own reality. Not necessarily a fault with their 
intellect, they, we might conclude, were simply born too 
early. Their era predated the interstitial elements that 
would collide and permanently impact humanity. As the 
historical (birth of Jesus), the linguistic (printed 
medium), and the spiritual (the embraced concept of the 
Christ) converged in time, within its linear construct,
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humanity was given a dynamic, spiritual, and transcendent 
part to play. Without pushing the comparison too far, the 
Word of God as text became the individual's script; it 
became his prescriptive handbook for relationships. Though 
far removed from the rhetorical handbooks of Greek culture, 
it is in some ways analogous because it, too, is a 
handbook— a spiritual handbook.
Enter another character in the biblical text; the Holy 
Spirit who becomes the viable and powerfully absent 
presence of God the Father, the presence that transcends 
the limitations of time and space, reaching across textual 
boundaries as he speaks not only to men of first-century 
Palestine but also to men of the current age. Mould 
describes the advent of the Holy Spirit as the most 
"mystical religious experience connected with the origin of 
Christianity" fEBH 529). Certainly it was a mystical 
experience, but I suggest that transcendence, rather than 
mysticism, better describes the rhetorical relationship 
that the Holy Spirit effects between Christian and Christ, 
between believing reader and text.
Although I have argued that the Holy Spirit, like the 
Christ, is prefigured in the Old Testament, it is only with 
the death of Christ that the perpetual and pervasive 
essence of the Trinity is released into the world to 
confront mankind personally and individually. Conversely, 
it is only by the agency of the Holy Spirit that one can
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call God by name. God-to-man through the Holy Spirit and 
man-to-God through the Holy Spirit is the rhetorical 
construct that firmly establishes the pneumatic world- 
picture in Western thought.
John writes in his gospel that the text of God in his 
world follows a particular sequence: God as Jehovah in the
Old Testament, then God as Christ in the New Testament, who 
subsequently releases God as Holy Spirit who is confined by 
neither time nor space (John 7:39). When the redemptive 
mission of the physical presence of God is instituted with 
the death, burial, and resurrection of Christ, God does not 
end his communication with man. Rather, he continues the 
personal communication initiated by Christ, further 
developing his text through the Holy Spirit. After the 
ascension of Christ, God reads himself as a discernible, 
albeit spiritual presence, who continues to move and to 
speak in his world. “For though I am absent in the flesh, 
yet am I with you in the spirit" (Colossians 2:5).
Although these are the words of Paul to the church in 
Colossi, they typify the operation of the absent presence 
of God. His voice may no longer be as audible as it was 
through the spoken words of Jesus, but Scripture asserts 
that it is just as powerful— perhaps even more so because 
of the omnipresent quality of the Holy Spirit.
Addressing this issue of the pervasive power of the 
Spirit who would come after him, Jesus said, "He that
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believeth on me, the works that I do shall he do also; and 
greater works than these shall he do, because I go unto my 
Father" (John 14:12). The "greater works" would be made 
possible through the number of individuals who could hear 
and respond to the absent present of God through the Word 
and the Spirit. No longer would the message be limited to 
the voice of one individual, Jesus Christ, who enlisted a 
few followers to share his message. In a death-defying act 
of total abandonment, the physical Christ committed his 
final, and most convincing, deed of love. He sacrificed 
his life so that humanity could embrace a radically 
different world-view, so that they would no longer be 
"denied their ontological rights" of "novelty and 
contingency" (Hall 19). Still, and always, fully human, 
they, too, would be fully spirit— capable of transcendence, 
a transcendence which allows ideas to prompt, even to 
change, the spirit that is self.
But without a recorded text and without a pervading 
spiritual presence to reach the willing receptors, the 
redemptive message of God was not fully operational. That 
was to happen with the loosing of the Holy Spirit and its 
subsequent operation through the printed text. With the 
New Testament dispensation of God's Spirit, Jehovah 
fulfills the Old Testament promise of the "new covenant" 
that he henceforth will "write in their hearts" (Jeremiah 
31:31, 33). This covenant involves listener, text, and
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speaker (now the Holy Spirit) who empowers the recipient of 
his Word.
As it appealed to first-century individuals to embrace 
this covenant, Christianity created an irrevocable break 
with Platonic philosophy. Essentially it reversed Plato's 
concept of being, which argues that reality is not 
experienced through the senses, but that it exists through 
the immaterial reality of another realm. In his scheme of 
being Plato describes the soul as the tri-partite life- 
force of mortal man. Although Plato views the soul as 
immortal, as once having had access to True Being, he 
suggests that the possibility for reunion, for regaining 
immortality, is ambiguous. Certainly the common throng 
cannot aspire to reunite with True Being, but perhaps those 
philosophers who spend their lives in search of the truth 
have at least a vague hope for restoring that broken 
relationship which was caused by their mortal existence. 
Hope for mortals becoming immortal is bleak at best within 
Plato's realm of True Being.
Conversely, the possibility of immortality is the 
nexus of Christian thought, primarily because the Christian 
concept of soul is radically different from that which is 
espoused by pagan philosophers who preceded Christianity. 
For the Christian, the soul is that which makes the mortal 
immortal. Augustine describes it as the "inner man," that
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space where ”1 turned my thoughts into myself" and "sought
my God" (Confessions X. vi). Tillich further explains:
The soul is the inner realm, in contrast to Greek 
philosophy in which it is the power of life. The 
discovery of soul in this sense is one of the 
most important consequences of Christianity. In 
includes the world as the sum of all appearances. 
In contrast to the Greeks, where the soul is a 
part of all things, the world now becomes an 
object. The world is an appearance for the soul, 
which is the only real thing.
(HC2 113)
In Christianity, then, the soul, the part of man that 
communicates with God through his Word, is the only "real" 
part of existence, the only part that exists beyond mortal 
time. But even more significant in Christian belief, that 
immortality is possible for everyone. Through 
communication with its creator, the Christian soul becomes 
that which allows the biblical rhetorical and literary 
triangles to engage completely. The soul is that part of 
man which enters into dialogue with the Word, through the 
Spirit.
This is not a mystical, purely emotional interchange, 
although the activity may temporarily assume 
characteristics of mysticism or emotionalism. Rather, it 
is a transcendent encounter in which the finitude of man 
meets the infinitude of God. Such an encounter discernibly 
affects the individual. It is the "something out there" of 
God which personally and discernibly interacts with the 
"something in here" of the individual (Ong, £32 171).
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Paul's life-changing encounter on the Damascus Road 
explains such an experience. A Jewish zealot who was en 
route to Damascus to persecute Christians, Saul was 
personally confronted by God's Spirit. As concrete, 
objective evidence of the spiritual, Saul saw "a light from 
heaven" and heard the voice of Jesus, a voice that so 
interfered with his personal being that his life was 
forever altered. Saul, who aimed to destroy Christianity, 
became Paul, who sought to perpetuate Christianity. 
Ultimately, this permanent life-change was the objective 
"proof" that appealed to Paul's listeners, both Jew and 
Greek.
The movement from non-believer to believer, however, 
is not always so clearly defined. Early Christian 
theologians struggled to understand what happens in the 
transition. Tillich paraphrases the words of priest- 
philosopher Augustine who labored to satisfy those who 
questioned this spiritual process: "After going into your
soul, transcend yourself. This means that in your soul 
there is something which transcends your soul, something 
immutable, namely, the divine ground" CHCT 113). By 
willingly engaging in communication with the eternal Logos, 
by transcending himself, man has the potential for 
dispelling the Greek notion of aporia, that state of being 
which is "without a way" (Tillich, SB 6). Christianity 
thus appeals to the intellect, to the will of the
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individual who can choose either to accept or to reject the 
triangular relationship between God, Word, and self.
Even so, textual communication and subsequent
understanding are not automatic; they are not achieved
through some kind of spiritual trance or by "magical"
osmosis. Rather, they necessitate ability on the part of
the reader. If the writer has followed prescribed rules of
grammar and syntax, if he has written with his voluntas,
and if he has created a sound and meaningful body of ideas,
then the reader must come equally prepared to the table of
discourse. In the words of Frei, he must have "an ability
to use it [language] appropriately in specific texts." He
then explains how the reader might accomplish this:
To understand concepts is to have the ability 
both to explicate and to apply them, without 
necessarily resorting to a theory that would 
indicate how to couple the two. In the case of 
the Bible, this finally cannot be done without 
learning how to use the Bible, including its 
narratives, within the church and as its canon.
("NCMR" 160)
Conceptualizing, explication, application— not simply 
esoteric knowledge is necessary for understanding a text. 
Frei suggests that any meaningful textual relationship, but 
especially that which is engendered through the Bible, is 
the result of work from either position on the rhetorical 
triangle.
If the individual accepts the relationship and enters 
into the Christian "way," which is discourse with God
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through his absent presence of the Holy Spirit, he enters 
into a rhetorical exchange. In order for that exchange to 
be successful, the reader (listener) necessarily becomes an 
active participant. "It is a communication that requires 
interpretation and partnership between speaker and 
listener. It is a relationship that provides communion 
through mutuality" (Zelechow 166). This mutuality does not 
imply that the Christian is equal to God, but it does 
suggest that his relationship with God is a reciprocal one. 
As a "joint-heir" with Christ (Romans 8:17), the reader who 
embraces the notion of a living/dying/buried/resurrected 
Jesus enters into a "person-to-person relationship [that] 
is actual through the word. One is related to a person in 
speaking to him, and one remains in relation to him only if 
he answers" (Tillich, SE 31).
This dynamic premise of God speaking to man and man
responding in turn is that which fuels the triangular
operation of God, Word, and man. In oneself as Another, a
text that examines the speaking subject in its quest for
selfhood, Paul Ricoeur comments on the kind of reciprocity
that is involved. Without positing a Christian stance,
Ricoeur comments that
the idea of God is in me as the very mark of the 
author upon his work, a mark that assures the 
resemblance between us. I then have to confess 
that 'I perceive this likeness . . .  by the same 
faculty through which I perceive myself.'
(QA 9)
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This perception, which arises from the innate spirituality 
that is within man, is the result of momentary 
transcendence, a transcendence that is mediated through the 
Christian logos (dabhar).
According to Karl Barth in Dogmatics in Outline, this
transcendence occurs
at the point where the divine reason, the divine 
Logos, sets up His law in the region of man's 
understanding, to which law human, creaturely 
reason must accommodate itself. When that 
happens, man comes to knowledge? for when God 
sets up His law in man's thought, in his 
seeing and hearing and feeling, the revelation of 
the truth is also reached about man and his 
reason, the revelation of man is reached, who 
cannot bring about of himself what is brought 
about simply by God himself.
(DO 24)
Christianity thus posits faith as the element that is 
missing in the Greek equation of God, man, and universe. 
Barth argues that faith is a conscious and rational 
"decision,11 one that creates an "event" between God and man 
(DO 28). This meeting place between God and man is that 
moment of transcendence in which at least partial 
understanding of God, man, and universe becomes possible. 
Because man cannot come to knowledge of himself through his 
own finite analysis, he must willingly and consciously look 
outside himself for any hope of quieting his questions 
about his being, his creator, and his place within the 
universe.
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Tillich applies the idea of spiritual/intellectual 
transcendence more universally, arguing that if man engages 
in any ontological questioning, he automatically aligns 
himself with his Creator. As one questions, he admits 
(consciously or unconsciously) the existence of a power 
greater than he is, of a mind infinitely more knowledgeable 
than his own (BE 11-14). The Christian, even the 
uneducated and inarticulate one, becomes philosopher, 
though perhaps involuntarily, because he is engaged in the 
same kind of ruminations that occupied Plato. But unlike 
his renowned predecessor, the Christian has the rhetorical 
and literary schemes fully in place to assist him. By 
willingly aligning himself with the Holy Spirit, God's 
absent presence, he can hope to gain personal, and 
potentially beneficial, understanding through the Bible, 
the word of God. As the character of Jesus speaks from 
that text, the Word then filters through the mind of the 
individual, where it is hermeneutically processed as 
precepts for life— and for the world beyond.
The Christian refers to this hermeneutical activity as 
the "priesthood of the believer." Within this spiritual 
situation, the Holy Spirit empowers the Christian 
individually through the Word of God, giving him the skills 
of discernment and interpretation. The process is never 
complete. With each reading of the text, with each 
encounter with the Word, the individual presumably has
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lived, has experienced, and has matured so that he is 
neither intellectually nor spiritually the same person who 
previously engaged in the rhetorical exchange. In the 
words of the Greek philosopher Heraclitus: "One cannot
step twice into the same river, nor can one grasp any 
mortal substance in a stable condition, but it scatters and 
again gathers; it forms and dissolves, and approaches and 
departs" (LI). Understanding, then, is progressive; for 
the Christian, it is the progressive revelation of God, 
which is made possible through spiritual dialogue.
In Philosophical Hermeneutics, Hans-Georg Gadamer
provides a contemporary assessment of the Christian's
dialogic encounter with God's Word. When he enters into
the triangular relationship with God and Word, the text
does not simply speak its word, always the same, 
in lifeless rigidity, but gives ever new answers 
to the person who questions it and poses ever new 
questions to him who answers it. To understand a 
text is to come to understand oneself in a kind 
of dialogue.
(EH 57)
This argument does not refute the New Testament description 
of God's Word, of "Jesus Christ [who is] the same 
yesterday, and today, and forever" (Hebrews 13:8). Rather, 
it affirms that spiritual and intellectual quality of 
humanity that allows growth and understanding; it is the 
same quality that enables the finitude of man to encounter 
the infinitude of God. And the rhetorical triangle of God, 
man, and text provides the matrix for the encounter. While
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participating in this rhetorical grid, the reader 
additionally "meets" the primary character, the Word of God 
who speaks to him from within that literary text.
A similar activity occurs in any aesthetic activity, a 
premise that I will elucidate in the next three chapters.
As I move from the sonnet-sequence of Sidney, to the 
sonnets of Shakespeare, and through selected poems of 
Dickinson, I do so on the assumption that the Bible,
especially the New Testament, establishes the literary
precedent for Western aesthetic literature. Implicit in 
that precedent is that the reader, comprised of spirit and 
intellect, is capable of responding to the words of the 
writer as they are verbalized through the characters in his 
text. The next three chapters will highlight some (and
certainly there exist numerous others) of the variations of
this activity that dominates the reading process.
Chapter 4
The Absent Presence 
in
Sidney's Astrophil and Stella
The movement from the spiritual arena in which man
"meets11 God through his son Jesus, who is the Word, to the
aesthetic world of poetry in which man most frequently
encounters himself in a word, may seem to be a confusing,
if not an insurmountable, leap. But if aesthetics is, as
Immanuel Kant suggests in his Critique of Judgement, man's
attempt to bridge the gap between the spiritual and the
material, between the physically absent and the verifiably
present, then the step from the New Testament to poetry may
not be so great after all. Defining the term "aesthetic
idea," Kant explains that it
is a representation of the imagination, annexed 
to a given concept, with which, in the free 
employment of imagination, such a multiplicity of 
partial representations are bound up, that no 
expression indicating a definite concept can be 
found for it— one which on that account allows a 
concept to be supplemented in thought by much 
that is indefinable in words, and the feeling of 
which quickens the cognitive faculties, and with 
language, as a mere thing of the letter, binds up 
the spirit (soul) also.
(CJ 179)
Aesthetics, much like spirituality, is individually 
conceptualized, exacting different intellectual and 
emotional responses from those who enter its realm.
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Though sometimes "indefinable/1 aesthetic meaning, 
according to Kant, can be discerned through the "cognitive 
faculties" of the seeking individual. Kant organizes 
cognition into two distinct categories: that which is a
priori (that which comes from experience) and that which is 
a posteriori (that which is not experiential but can 
nevertheless be known). Kant proposes that aesthetics 
falls under his latter premise: one can come to knowledge
through the reading of a text, through textual, or 
aesthetic, experience. Similar to the spiritual sojourner 
who seeks to understand self in relation to God and world, 
the aesthetic habitud embarks upon a quest in the mind.
This quest, which occurs through the aesthetics of poetry, 
is perhaps an individual's greatest effort to understand 
the infinitude of the spirituality that comprises the human 
soul in terms of the finitude of the material world that 
can be sensorily determined. Any understanding that occurs 
between poet and text, and subsequently reader and text, is 
accomplished through the language of the writer.
Transforming ideas into a language of metaphor and 
symbol, the poet, through his poetry, allows both himself 
and his readers to translate that which often seems beyond 
translation into at least a brief glimmer, a momentary 
space, an epiphanic vision of understanding. As it enables 
the poet to probe the "otherness" of that-which-is-not-I 
and place it in relation to the "thisness" of self, it
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subsequently allows the reader to comprehend that which is 
absent in terms of that which is present. The process and 
the language may be different, but the purpose of the 
poet's journey is the same as that of the philosopher and 
the theologian: to contemplate self, world, and creator in
all their complexities. Poetry then, like philosophy and 
religion, is an ontological journey; it is a search for 
understanding the core of human existence. In "An Essay on 
Art," Jacques Maritain goes even farther in his assessment, 
stating that poetry is ontology because "it realizes in act 
one of the fundamental aspects of the ontological likeness 
of our soul with God" (87).
The writings of any number of poets could substantiate 
the ontological premise of poetry. But in an attempt to 
show this idea through the operation of the absent 
presence, which is totally "other," I delineated several 
common denominators as a means of limiting my field of 
poets to Sir Philip Sidney, William Shakespeare, and Emily 
Dickinson. Although numerous differences inarguably 
separate them as singular geniuses whose art makes them 
unique, their poetry and underlying poetic philosophies 
share unmistakable similarities. Each of the three wrote 
for a small circle of friends: Sidney penned his poems for
the entertainment of his courtly acquaintances; Shakespeare 
wrote his sonnet sequence for his immediate friends; and 
Dickinson apparently intended for her poems, which she
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carefully arranged in personally crafted fascicles, to be 
read only by her family and few friends. Seemingly none of 
the three wrote for publication; they each envisioned a 
small, personal audience with whom they could share 
intimate musings of their inner beings. The imperative of 
Sidney's Muse to "looke in thy heart and write" applies to 
the personae of each.
The remainder of this study will develop from the 
premise that even Sidney and Shakespeare, who may not have 
had vocabularies fully sufficient to explain what they 
recognized as the inner voice, nevertheless specifically 
recount the musings of that inner being. Anne Ferry's book 
The "Inward" Language provides a thorough analysis of the 
difficulty that sixteenth-century writers faced as they 
struggled to verbalize the inward state in terms of the 
outward self. She cautions us to remember that we quite 
readily take for granted references that apply to the 
workings of the mind; as post-Freudians, we are cognitively 
conditioned to understand even subtle allusions to that 
inner being which truly defines the individual. Ferry 
argues,
These [references] are so embedded in our 
language that we use them concurrently or 
interchangeably, without remembering their 
different origins, or troubling about their 
possible inconsistencies or their conflicting 
implications. The reason for their often 
unquestioned acceptance is, I believe, that they 
are all associated with our now deeply held 
belief in the existence of an inner life or a
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real self, phrases so familiar, so rooted in our
view of human nature, that we have virtually
ceased to think of them as metaphors.
(IL 7)
Although great strides were made in the study of the human
psyche between the Renaissance writings of Sidney and
Shakespeare and the nineteenth-century writings of 
Dickinson, even she did not share our Freudian vantage. 
Because of Freud and his successors, we have an extensive 
vocabulary that conditions us to analyze and then to 
express the psychological operations of the inner man.
Ferry's argument is convincing— to a point. Focusing 
on psychoanalytic theory, she ignores the role that 
literacy played in these cognitive operations. To refer 
again to Ong and The Presence of the Word, literacy 
fostered, or at least significantly enabled, an individual 
sense of interiority. Ong asserts quite emphatically that 
"formal logic was invented in an alphabetic culture" (PW 
45), noting that "Aristotle's Art of Rhetoric could not 
come into being without writing" (PW 26-27). We might also 
conclude that the same assertion applies to Psalms, 
Augustine's Confessionsf Dante's Infernof or any aesthetic 
text that provokes self-examination.
Ong argues that the written word, especially the 
poetic text, or what he calls "verse," empowers the 
individual to interiorize thoughts, a process which then 
allows communication with the inner self:
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Verse grows more directly dependent on writing 
than oratory does, probably because verse is the 
sort of thing that invites exact repetition more 
than does an oration. Writing expedites 
repetition for the many who have not mastered the 
extraordinary skills of the oral epic singer.
But in implementing repetition for those without 
such skills, writing also changes the basic 
nature of repetition from the thematic to the 
verbatim.
( m  27)
This movement from the "thematic to the verbatim" results 
in individualism, which is an interiorizing of the self. 
Applying Ong's argument to spiritual and aesthetic worlds, 
it is the text, the printed word, that allows individual 
meditation. Because of reading, of taking another's 
thoughts into the being of self, any provocative work 
(Psalms, Augustine's Confessions. Dante's Inferno, poetry) 
creates a textual "reality" for the reader.
I suggest that this premise is especially true for any 
aesthetic text which recounts a poet-lover and his absent 
beloved. Through such a literary encounter, the inner 
being of the reader can allow absence (of a lover or an 
author) to become an absent presence that might 
intellectually and emotionally act upon her present.
Because of the written words that allow the reader to take 
the aesthetic experience into the self, she can interiorize 
the thoughts of the writer who is other. Certainly some 
writers are more skilled at this than others. I will argue 
that Sidney, Shakespeare, and Dickinson do not simply allow 
their readers to interiorize; they demand it.
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Crucial to the argument hereinafter set forth is that 
the personae of all three are poet-lovers. And love is key 
to understanding their work? in a causal relationship, it 
is the inspiration that yields the poetry. It was Plato's 
love of knowledge (philosophia) that drove him to seek a 
verbal plane of greater knowledge with his like-minded 
interlocutors? and, in a similar manner, the Biblical text 
represents God's love for his creation, prompting him to 
incarnate himself through his Son, the Word, who is 
paradoxically both the character in and the text of the New 
Testament. The relationship between love and the texts of 
Plato, God, and poet-lover is that of cause-and-effect.
Love may not create the text, but it is the animating 
factor in the writing process? it incites voluntas. Love 
also operates from the opposite side of the text, 
compelling the reader to enter into dialogue with the 
author through the printed word. If we are willing to 
recognize, as George Steiner does in Real Presences f that 
"Eros and the aesthetic experience are close kindred," then 
we can begin to ferret out the element that controls the 
absent presence of poetic expression (RP 182-83).
Commenting on this subject in his study of Emily 
Dickinson's poetry, Inder Nath Kher further argues that 
love is the force which empowers that "aesthetic 
experience" (Steiner, RP 182) and thus enables the reader's 
imagination to embark upon a poetic journey with the writer
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of the text. Love, as Kher defines it, is antinomical in
nature. Much like Heraclitus, who viewed all of life as
comprised of endless opposites, Kher sees a creative
tension operating in and through love, which is both the
spiritual and physical life-force of humanity:
Love is energy? it is imagination to which alone 
all forms are possible. It is inclusive of the 
contradictory postures of self-other, living in 
death and dying into life. It generates the 
opposing moods of happiness and woe, pleasure and 
pain, remembering and forgetting, freedom and 
bondage. It is sensuous, it is spiritual. It is
fleeting, it is abiding. It is speech, it is
silence. It is ignorance, it is wisdom. It is
water, it is fire. It is dark, it is light. It
is absence, it is presence.
(LA 136)
The emotional stress operating within a poetry of love is 
that which yields the absent presence. Though comprised of 
opposites, absence versus presence, the two paradoxical 
elements (ek-demeo and en-demeo) affirm the other. One 
exists only in oppositional relation to the other.
Although overtones of deconstruction necessarily 
emerge in such an assessment, I do not presume a strictly 
deconstructionist stance. Rather, I simply suggest that 
much of Western literature relies upon oppositional 
elements as one means of establishing communication between 
writer and reader. Lexically conjoined terms, such as 
"absence" and "presence," are linguistic opposites, but, as 
Derrida suggests, they are not strictly an either/or, 
neither/nor pairing. Rather, the opposing terms create a
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reciprocal relationship, with the first term sharing 
commensurately with the second.
The terms "present" and "absent" do not preclude each 
other; on the contrary, each heralds the other. Commenting 
on the term "absence," Susan Handelman cautions us to 
remember that "absence does not equal nonexistence" (98). 
Rather, absence is the otherness of presence. Only through 
absence of the reader does the writer create the text, and 
only through the absence of the beloved does the poet 
create the absent presence within that text.
A recurring theme in the next three chapters is the 
erotic opposition that paradoxically allows unity between 
the poet and the absent reader through the poetic medium 
that depicts a poet-lover who seeks solace through the 
absent presence of a departed beloved. The opposition that 
arises from the contradictory elements of love that was yet 
still is produces rhetorical unity between 
writer/reader/text while subsequently, though perhaps only 
temporarily, reconciling absence and presence into an 
absent presence.
If we view love as a positive force (agape or caritas) 
that yields equally positive rhetorical reactions, we can 
observe that love is multi-dimensional in the aesthetic 
world, operating sequentially and on several levels. The 
first overture of love is, according to Sidney, that 
between Creator and poet. As a further means of
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establishing communication with mankind, God makes the 
poet, in the words of the Renaissance humanist, "the first 
light-giver" (Defense 606). As God "gifts" the poet with 
discernment, he arms humanity with an aesthetic means for 
coming to partial understanding of that which comprises the 
emotional and intellectual life of humanity. The poet then 
uses his gift as the creative means through which he 
presumes to establish a relationship with his reader. Such 
a relationship derives from, and is fostered by, love.
A.C. Hamilton recognizes, in Sir Philip Sidney: A
Study of His Life, this love of writer for reader "is 
experienced in the act of giving [the drama] poetic form" 
(85). The final performance of love, the one that 
completes the triangular loving relationship, is that of 
the reader as she encounters the text. As with any loving 
relationship, she must make herself vulnerable to the text. 
She must be willing to sacrifice her preconceived notions 
of self/world/creator and be wooed by the inscribed words 
on the printed page. She must listen to the voice of the 
persona who speaks from the text. These players from each 
point of the triangular relationship necessarily depend 
upon the others in order to produce meaning, in order to 
create understanding.
The writers who create rhetorical exchanges 
incorporate "voices" whereby their words can find 
believable expression. Host frequently, as with Sidney,
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Shakespeare, and Dickinson, textual voices come through 
their personae, all of whom are poet-lovers. As Sidney's 
Astrophil, Shakespeare's older poet, and Dickinson's female 
counterpart relate their tales of lost or distant love, as 
they expose their internal struggles with self in relation 
to lover, each poet-lover also shares his or her views of 
poetry and art. Shakespeare and Dickinson may not have 
written critical texts comparable to Sidney's Defense f but 
they did insert critical remarks into their poetry. Taken 
cumulatively, these comments about poetry and poet help us 
to determine their philosophies of art. All three describe 
the transcending power of words; through words, their 
disappointing relationships are transformed into something 
worthwhile. Specifically, emotional turmoil that is 
brought about by absence of the beloved prompts artistic 
endeavor which, in turn, results in works of art that 
"speak11 from the pages and across the centuries to their 
readers.
Yet each poet-lover also recognizes the inability of 
words to bridge completely the gap between the actual and 
the recreated experience. If we consider both the literary 
and the rhetorical perspectives, we note that dual gaps 
exist for these poets. The first is both literary and 
rhetorical as the author struggles to translate verbally to 
the reader that which was formerly fully present (either a 
physical or imaginative experience) into a textually
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dynamic absent presence. In creating personae, these three 
writers especially succeed in developing textual presences 
who act to motivate, to control, and to give meaning to the 
composition of the poetry. Each persona then ••speaks" that 
(or another) meaning to the reader.
The second gap, which is rhetorical, occurs during the 
reader's subsequent perusal of the text as she attempts to 
decipher the nuances of the author's language, recognizing 
all the while that the hermeneutic possibilities preclude 
any prospect of total union with the writer. This study of 
the sonnet sequences of Sidney and Shakespeare and of 
selected poetry of Dickinson will necessarily be highly 
selective, focusing on those sonnets and poems that suggest 
most substantially the operation of the absent presence on 
either of these two levels— that of author as he or she 
creates the literary text and that of reader as she 
rhetorically enters into dialogue with the text.
My premise is that dual absent presences are the 
primary means by which these two gaps may be at least 
partially bridged. Inherent in these absent presences that 
operate in and through a text is the idea of transcendence. 
As George Steiner proposes in his book Real Presences.
"This essay [too] argues a wager on transcendence. It 
argues that there is in the art-act and its reception, that 
there is in the experience of meaningful form, a 
presumption of presence" (214). And that presence assumes
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a kind of spirituality, a kind of God-likeness, because it 
enables one intellect, one human mind, to comprehend and 
share in that which was experienced or conceptualized by 
another individual.
This ability separates rational man from irrational
animal and places him on a spiritual plane of intellectual
and emotional discernment. In the words of Steiner, it
then would seem
that any coherent understanding of what language 
is and how language performs, that any coherent 
account of the capacity of human speech to 
communicate meaning and feeling is, in the final 
analysis, underwritten by the assumption of God's 
presence. I will put forward the argument that 
the experience of aesthetic meaning in 
particular, that of literature, of the arts, of 
musical form, infers the necessary possibility of 
this 'real presence.'
(EE 3)
Such a critical assumption, however, does not require that 
the poet must necessarily postulate metaphysical ideas 
concerning the divine nature of poetry and the poet. Nor 
does it require a belief in God, an absent presence which 
is wholly Other. Rather, it suggests the rudimentary level 
at which the poet recognizes the power of words to 
communicate meaningfully with a reader.
In her book Poetry as Epitaph, Karen Mills-Courts 
argues that the poet, perhaps more consciously than other 
writers, struggles to affirm presence because it is in 
presence that meaning is gleaned from the written word.
She says that poetry is "the most powerful attempt to
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incarnate voice, meaning, intelligibility, even 'Truth,' in 
language. Poets, more than any other writers, need to 
secure presence in their work" (£E 3). Although that 
presence, according to Mills-Courts, simultaneously heralds 
loss through its written expression, it nevertheless holds 
the potential for yielding an instant of symbolically 
embodied meaning to the reader. Beginning with Sidney, 
then moving to Shakespeare and finally to Dickinson, I will 
attempt to show that these three poets, who may be 
separated by religious beliefs, by gender, or by centuries, 
nevertheless share a critical tenet that underlies their 
poetry: they each rely significantly on the literary and
rhetorical operations of absent presences to create and 
then to perpetuate meaning through their work.
Having provided prefatory information that outlines
the critical landscape from which this chapter will
develop, I now turn to the Protestant humanist Sidney who
provides a logical transition into poet and poetry. Indeed
his personal and poetic views underscore the paradox of
Western thought: Christian orthodox commingled with pagan
1
Greek. Believed to have translated at least portions of
The Rhetoric, Sidney processed his ideas of moving the
reader to action (energeia), of imitating that which is in
nature (mimesis), and of seeing the "poet as maker" through
2Aristotle's Poetics. Though he might have been an 
accomplished scholar of rhetoric and philosophy, Sidney
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could never get very far away from his Calvinist teachings 
of Providence at work in man's world. He recognized his 
role of poet as that which was made possible by the divine 
Creator and thus "could never have supported, for instance, 
the verbal effort to divinize the self" (Doherty xxv). 
Because of the Edenic fall, man as poet is forever 
fallible. His mind, which is God-like with creativity and 
discernment, may imagine perfect communication of ideas, 
but his verbal ability to express those ideas somehow 
always falls short of perfection.
Sidney laments in his Defense of Poesy that "our 
erected wit maketh us know what perfection is, and yet our 
infected will keepeth us from reaching unto it" (D£ 608). 
Because of his "erected wit," which encompasses his dual 
ability to perceive man in relation to his world and then 
to express that relationship through his manipulation of 
language articulated by metaphor and symbol, the poet is 
potentially capable of expressing that perfect truth of 
man's being, that truth of man in relation to self, world, 
and creator. However, a discernible breach exists between 
wit and will, between gnosis and praxis. The poet may know 
some of the truths of his existence, but he does not always 
succeed in imparting those truths to his audience. This 
breakdown frequently results from lack of presence— from 
his Creator who is teacher and from his reader who is 
interpreter. Although he may seek plenitude (connoting
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presence)# the poet's “infected will#*1 which implies a lack 
in both perception and verbal expression# inhibits his 
incarnation of exact or full presence (parousia).
Mills-Courts argues that a verifiable presence# a
presence which is almost "spiritual," dominates Sidney's
poetic process. She likens it
to the 'cleared' vision that enables David's 
divinity. The poet's 'golden' world is not a 
truth delivered by the voice of God# but the 
expression of the 'truth' that God has already 
created and that already resides within. The 
poet is not possessed by God, but through God's 
grace he is in possession of an 'erected wit,' 
which clears the muddiness of the 'infected will' 
and 'invents' images superior to the world 
humankind has wrecked with its Fall.
(EE 26)
As Mills-Courts recognizes, Sidney does not credit the poet 
with creating "truth." Only God is creator. That same 
God# however, provides the poet with the mental perception 
and the verbal ability to translate that truth to humanity. 
If we apply this analysis to Sidney's Astrophil and Stella, 
it would seem then that the poet in the persona of 
Astrophil does not create presence in lieu of absence; 
rather, he "invents" an absent presence, thus replicating 
Stella's presence through artistry.
Not just an imitation, this replicated absent presence 
is duplication— the best, albeit inexact, duplication that 
the poet can make possible with an "infected will." Robert 
Kimbrough rightly argues, "The poet is a maker; he 
imitates. He takes the stuff of life, molds it, and
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projects it as art" (SPS 52) in an attempt to duplicate the
* 3life experience through verbal reenactment. According to
Sidney's own assessment in his Defense, that duplication
(which is artistic imitation) has merit; precisely, it has
power to affect the reader in a manner similar to that of
the actual experience: "For that feigned example hath as
much force to teach as a true example (for as for [sic] to
move, it is clear, since the feigned may be tuned to the
highest key of passion)" (BE 611). The poet, through his
erected wit, can elicit passion in his readers. But
something is lost in the process; an absence results, since
duplication through language necessarily implies loss and
reduction of full presence.
To restate Kenneth Burke's premise of the reductive
quality of language, Sidney and other poets undoubtedly
seek for vocabularies that will be faithful 
reflections of reality. To this end, they must 
develop vocabularies that are selections of 
reality. And any selection of reality must, in 
certain circumstances, function as a deflection 
of reality.
(GM 59)
Reflection - selection - deflection results in what Sidney 
refers to as "another nature" which comes from "the vigor 
of his own invention." Especially for the Renaissance poet 
Sidney, who lacked a vocabulary that could express the 
reality of the inner man, "Invention" was not optional; it 
was necessary in order to approach and decipher those God- 
given truths.
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Invention, which comes through the poetic process, is
thus closely aligned to Aristotle's concept of mimesis.
According to Richard McKeon's assessment of Aristotle's
theory, poetry is mimesis. It is
an imitation of things as they are or ought to 
be, and each kind of poetry produces its proper 
pleasure; but it is also a whole, complete in 
itself, with a beginning, middle, and end and 
with all the organic unity of a living creature.
("ACL" 212)
But S.K. Heninger, in his preface to The Poet as Maker.
argues that Sidney takes Aristotle's position a notable
step farther.
As its distinctive feature, poetry no longer 
reflects heavenly beauty or echoes cosmic 
harmony— it isn't rhyming and versing that make a 
poet, Sidney insists. Instead, poetry becomes a 
depictive art, an activity that produces images, 
a narrative with semantic content.
(PM x)
We thus see a significant literary progression from 
Aristotle to Sidney as poetry moves from pure pleasure that 
is elicited through Aristotle's mimesis to artistic 
depiction of inherent truth, the idea which embodies 
Sidney's use of "Invention."
Basically, then, Sidney's "Invention" is, as Kimbrough 
describes, "the discovery or uncovering of a truth that 
exists in nature or beyond nature" fSPS 61). These truths, 
which for Sidney comprise the Christian Logos, are already 
operational; they were put in place by the Creator. The 
poet's role is to discover and translate those truths to
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his readers. For Sidney, Invention becomes the means 
whereby the poet might fashion "things either better then 
Nature bringeth forth, or, quite anew, forms such as never 
were in Nature" (£)£ 607). Tempering this Aristotelian 
argument with his Christian beliefs, Sidney argues that the 
moral mandate of the poet is to "teacheth and moveth to 
virtue" (EE 616). For him, the poet is the noblest 
teacher, ranking higher than the philosopher, the 
historian, and the scientist; and the poem is the preferred 
instrument of learning, performing more effectively than 
philosophy, history, or science. As a result of the poet's 
efforts, poetry, that noblest vehicle for learning, exposes 
through artistic representation the manifold truths in 
reality. However, because poetic reality is inhabited by 
absence and reduced by language, its relation to reality is 
necessarily the same-but-different. This same-but- 
different aspect is that which defines aesthetics, and it 
is the focus of the remainder of this study as I analyze 
the poet's attempts to express the spiritual, his emotions, 
through the material, his words.
Through the creative act, the poet produces an 
aesthetic "reality" which allows the reader to implicate 
herself in that which the poet describes. This "reality" 
may even be reproduced as fiction. When the poet 
undertakes this reproduction, he reifies reality through
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the printed word, a process that Sidney outlines in Sonnet 
45:
Stella oft sees the verie face of wo 
Painted in my beclowded stormie face:
But cannot skill to pitie my disgrace,
Not though thereof the cause her selfe she know: 
Yet hearing late a fable, which did show 
Of Lovers never knowne, a grievous case,
Pitie thereof gate in her breast such place,
That from that sea deriv'd teares spring did 
flow.
Alas, if Fancy drawn by imag'd things,
Though false, yet with free scope more grace doth 
breed
Then servants wracke, where new doubts honor 
brings
Then think my deare, that you in me do reed 
Of lovers ruine some sad Tragedie:
I am not I, pitie the tale of me.
Prior to this sonnet, Sidney has described, through his
persona Astrophil, love and suffering that are real. (At
least they are punctuated as "real" in the poetic drama.)
But the beloved Stella is moved neither by Astrophil's
pronouncements of love nor by his remonstrations of
suffering. Almost accidentally the poet-lover discovers
something that might make Stella sympathetic to his plight.
Observing that his beloved heard and was moved by a 
"fable" that parallels his situation with her, he 
recognizes that fiction affects her in a way that 
disclosure of his true feelings has not. Although he may 
not understand how and does not attempt to explain why, he 
realizes that the fiction, the "fable" that duplicates his 
feelings for Stella, has greater emotive power than his 
personal story. He thus justifies using the fiction of
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"Lovers never knowne" to further his erotic cause. This 
fiction, which applies universally, is the same as his 
reality— a lover rebuffed by his beloved— but it is 
necessarily different because of its fictive recreation.
He proposes ambivalently that "I am not I," but he seems to 
suggest that "I am emotionally the same as the I in the 
recreated fiction."
Implicit in the poet's fictive recreation is the
rhetorical death-to-life concept of putting the words to
paper so that they may "live" again in the mind of a future
reader. Theodore Spencer contends in "The Poetry of Sir
Philip Sidney" that something else is at work in the love
sonnets of Sidney's personae: through a life-in-death
experience, the poet-lover discovers himself:
But there is one constant fact which is true of 
all poets and at all times; the discovery of 
oneself depends on an act of submission. For the 
poet, as for the human being, to lose one's life 
is to find it. In our time this fact has been 
widely recognized, though it has been expressed 
in widely differing terms. In a minor way it is 
what Pound means when he calls his poems 
'Personae'; it is what Housman discovered when he 
spoke through the mouth of the Shropshire Lad.
It is the fact that lies behind the search of 
W.B. Yeats for the anti-mask— the discovery of 
the self by contemplation of its opposite; it is 
what T.s. Eliot expresses by his theory of 
'objective co-relative' and by his requirements 
that poetry should be as 'impersonal as 
possible.'
In the sixteenth century this saving loss of 
personality, this discovery of self through 
submission to an 'order,' could be accomplished 
to a considerable extent through convention. 
Convention is to the poet in an age of belief 
what the persona is to the poet in an age of
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bewilderment. By submission to either the poet 
acquires authority; he feels that he is speaking 
for, is representing, something more important 
than himself— or, in the case of the persona, he 
is at least representing something different from 
his own naked and relatively insignificant ego? 
in both cases he has taken the first step toward 
universality.
("PSPS'* 46)
This is a lengthy quote, but it is important because it 
clearly and specifically explains what Astrophil, Sidney's 
poet-lover, does within the sequence; he discovers his 
artistic self through the absent presence of his beloved. 
Through his painful, and frequently retrogressive, coming 
to terms with the loss of Stella's present presence, he 
gradually acquires authority over the creation which houses 
her absent presence as it interacts with his persona. The 
result is poetic power, a discernible artistic self, that 
reaches out from the text to the reader.
Contrary to Thomas Roche's vilification of Astrophil 
in "Astrophil and Stella: A Radical Reading," the poet-
lover 's "infernal heroics" do not "mask a basic 
childishness, which he transfers immediately by making his 
idol Stella into a child to be whipped into shape" ("AStRR" 
207). From his truly radical point of view, Roche sees no 
redeeming qualities in Astrophil. The best that he can say 
about him is that "He teaches morality by negative example" 
("&S:RR" 188). I disagree. As Sidney partners himself 
with his persona, he moves his reader from a negative to a 
positive state, from an actual to a fictional world.
154
In so doing, Sidney uses Astrophil's emotional
transference from fact to fiction, a kind of aesthetic
transcendence, as the basis for his personal defense of
poetry from his own Renaissance critics. Kimbrough
paraphrases Sidney's argument, saying that
Poetry is made; it is a fiction. Because fiction 
is projected from the mind of the poet, because 
it is imaginative, the word has the connotation 
of 'not true.' But fiction only stands for life, 
is a reading of life, and can be lifelike; it 
does not pretend to be life.
(SPS 49)
Poetry is not life because it is comprised of words, 
whereas life is comprised of living, dying, loving, hating 
humanity; but poetic words allow a "reading of life" that 
can duplicate the emotions that arise from all of that 
emotionally throbbing life.
And Astrophil, the poet-lover, who has failed to
excite passion in his real-life situation with Stella,
decides to chance the fiction. He wagers that Stella's
reading of his "lifelike" fiction may sway her in a way
that he cannot. As she reads his text, she may find
something to move her that even he did not envision:
Looke on againe, the faire text better trie:
What blushing notes doest thou in margine see? 
What sighes stolne out, or kild before full 
borne?
Hast thou found such and such like arguments?
Or art thou else to comfort me forsworne?
Well, how so thou interpret the contents,
I am resolv'd thy errour to maintaine,
Rather then by more truth to get more paine.
(Sonnet 67)
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Astrophil encourages Stella to read his story; in so doing, 
he seeks an alternate way of wooing her. Astrophil thus 
proposes to Stella a reciprocal relationship, one in which 
he empowers her to interpret his words. In the process, 
the poet-lover establishes parameters for his proposed 
rhetorical relationship. Sidney, through his persona, 
relies on a textual operation that functions similarly to 
Plato's concept of Idea.
•A reductive rendering of that theory of Forms is that 
it allows for an archetypal correlation between phenomenal 
realities and their corresponding invented representations 
fThe Republic V). Sidney attributes this action to the 
poet, a kind of Renaissance philosopher. As the poet- 
lover, who is foremost the poet, translates that which is 
into his poetry, he limits the borders of interpretation, 
artistically corresponding the actual (the phenomenal 
reality) with its most exact metaphor or symbol (the 
invented representation). Relying on this process, 
Astrophil implores Stella to engage herself with his absent 
presence, hoping that she might understand and then respond 
in kind to his feelings for her. Even if she misinterprets 
his fictive efforts, even if he does not succeed in 
establishing exact boundaries for her interpretation, he is 
willing to take his chances on the fable. If he must, he 
determines her "errour to raaintaine." Realizing that her 
misinterpretation of his fable can be no worse than the
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"truth" of their actual relationship, which she deems non­
existent, he goes with the fiction. So he gambles with the 
persuasive power of the artistic word, only to be 
disappointed again.
Gary Waller analyzes this triangular relationship 
between writer/text/reader in English Poetry of the 
Sixteenth Century. He argues that the role of the reader 
is crucial, if not the most important element, within the 
rhetorical triangle. "It is the reader's cognitive 
processes that create the reading, not the author's 
intentions" (EPSC 57). Certainly textual understanding is 
dependent upon a reader; however, the reader operates in 
conjunction with the other two equally significant elements 
in the rhetorical triangle. Like Wimsatt and Beardsley in 
"The Intentional Fallacy," I disregard as fallacy the idea 
that a reader/critic needs to determine the author's 
intentions in order to understand and find meaning from a 
poem. They state "that the design or intention of the 
author is neither available nor desirable as a standard for 
judging the success of a work of literary art." Since a 
poem is "embodied in language," whose syntax and semantics 
can be artfully manipulated by a writer but can never be 
exactly recovered by the reader, "the work is measured 
against something outside the author" ("IF" 3, 5, 10).
Addressing that "something" in "The Affective 
Fallacy," Wimsatt and Beardsley ultimately conclude that
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the cognitive and affective effects of poetry upon the 
reader are inseparable:
Poetry is characteristically a discourse about 
both emotions and objects, or about the emotive 
quality of objects. The emotions correlative to 
the objects of poetry become a part of the matter 
dealt with— not communicated to the reader like 
an infection or disease, not inflicted 
mechanically like a bullet or knife wound, not 
administered like a poison, not simply expressed 
as by expletives or grimaces or rhythms, but 
presented in their objects and contemplated as a 
pattern of knowledge. Poetry is a way of fixing 
emotions.
(»AF» 38)
To extend Wimsatt and Beardsley's metaphor: unlike the
pathologist who can dissect a body to determine the 
specific cause of death, the reader cannot similarly 
isolate the various elements within a poem to determine the 
specific cause of a reader's response to it. Rather, a 
combination of factors effect the reader's reaction: a
language that is manipulated by the writer, a culture that 
is different both in time and locale, and a personal and 
differing lifetime of experience that the reader brings to 
the text. Because of appropriate articulation in the 
writing process and equally appropriate interpretation in 
the reading process, an individual's response to a 
particular text is sometimes one of almost inexplicable 
intimacy.
In such rhetorically intimate encounters, Waller 
posits that a unique relationship develops between 
writer/reader/text. In a life-imitating-art comparison, he
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suggests, and here I agree, that Sidney's sonnets demand
intimacy with their readers. Like Astrophil's fiction to
Stella which evoked "Pitie for lovers never knowne,"
Sidney's sonnets are
poems which require an unusually active 
involvement from their readers, and which produce 
meanings only within the changing encounters 
between poem and readers. The poet offers 
himself to an audience of sympathetic listeners 
as a mirror less of his experiences than of 
theirs. Sidney's poems work upon their readers, 
suggesting, manipulating, but never compelling, 
meanings.
(BESS 147-48)
Like Plato who required a willing interlocutor to probe the 
wellspring of knowledge, the poet similarly requires a 
willing reader to "complete" the composition of his text, 
to provide meaning. To understand why Astrophil fails to 
convince Stella to respond to his love for her, we might 
consider a contrasting relationship, one in which the lover 
successfully convinces his lady to respond in kind. Such a 
lover is Othello, the "noble Moor" who woos the "gentle 
Desdemona."
As Othello defends his method for winning the hand of 
Desdemona, he admits to using a method similar to that used 
by Astrophil: he tells a story. Othello's tale differs
from Astrophil's in that his is explicitly biographical, 
recounting his heroic adventures on the battlefield. As 
author of his own story, however, he has the power to 
embellish the facts, to fashion them in order to achieve
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his desired purpose, which is the same as Astrophil's fable 
to Stella. Like Astrophil, he is driven by eros or 
cupiditas; he wants to consummate his love for Desdemona. 
Where Astrophil fails, however, Othello succeeds.
In answering the Duke's charges against his winning of 
Desdemona's hand, Othello recounts the means by which he 
persuaded her of his love. Speaking to Brabantio, he says, 
perhaps with exaggerated modesty:
Rude am I in my speech,
And little blest with the soft phrase of peace. 
For since these arms of mine had seven years' 
pith
Till now some nine moons wasted, they have used 
Their dearest action in the tented field.
And little of this great world can I speak,
More than pertains to feats of broil and battle, 
And therefore little shall I grace my cause 
In speaking for myself. Yet, by your gracious 
patience,
I will a round unvarnished tale deliver 
Of my whole course of love— what drugs, what 
charms,
What conjuration and what mighty magic—
For such proceeding I am charged withal—
I won his daughter.
(Othello I.iii.81-93) 
Like Astrophil, Othello uses neither drugs, nor charms, nor 
conjuration, nor magic to win Desdemona; again like 
Astrophil, he uses only his words. So why does Othello 
succeed and Astrophil fail? Why does he persuade Desdemona 
"To fall in love with what she feared to look on I"— a 
"rude" Moor who is ignorant of the ways of polite society?
The answer lies in Desdemona herself, the willing 
interlocutor who listens to his story and then responds
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positively to the power of his words. He tells Brabantio, 
"She'd come again, and with a greedy ear/ Devour up my 
discourse” (I.iii.149-50.). She thus becomes a reciprocal 
partner in the rhetorical exchange, incorporating the 
discourse into her inner being. Her initial response, for 
him to teach his story to one of his friends who loved her, 
was not the one that Othello wanted:
She thanked me,
And bade me, if I had a friend that loved her,
I should but teach him how to tell my story 
And that would woo her. Upon this hint I spake. 
She loved me for the dangers I had passed,
And I loved her that she did pity them.
This only is the witchcraft I have used.
(Othello I.iii.163-69)
Ultimately, though, she allows his words to seduce her, to 
bring her into the relationship he desires.
In this context, I do not use "seduce" in the 
pejorative sense. On the contrary, I suggest that Othello 
merely manipulates his words in much the way that Ross 
Chambers argues in Story and Situation: Narrative
Seduction and the Power of Fiction:
• If such power can be called the power of 
seduction, it is because seduction is, by 
definition, a phenomenon of persuasion; it cannot 
rely on force or institutional authority 
('power'), for it is, precisely, a means of 
achieving mastery in the absence of such means of 
control. It is the instrument available to the 
situationally weak against the situationally 
strong.
(212)
Textual seduction, as described by Chambers, parallels 
Warnock's rhetorical "dance" (cited in Chapter 2) in which
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•’the reader's resistance and the writer's enticements, and 
vice-versa are parts of the dance" ("RKB" 73). The partner 
who issues the invitation to the rhetorical dance is the 
writer? depending upon his literary expertise and his 
socio-political knowledge, he can be either the stronger or 
the weaker partner. In the Othello/Desdemona relationship, 
Othello is the weaker party, but he has a significant 
advantage: his words. Situationally weak because he is an
outsider who is unskilled in Venetian romance, Othello 
employs words, and only words, to weave a tale of love in 
order to persuade Desdemona to accept his marriage 
proposal. Since his words are his own, he fashions them so 
as to elicit a particular emotional response from his 
listener Desdemona.
Proof of his rhetorical manipulation is that Desdemona 
believes his words and loves him for the valor portrayed 
therein. His text successfully elicits a reaction; 
communication is established between lover and beloved. 
Responding positively to the power of words, Desdemona 
willingly places herself in a position to be persuaded by 
them, something that Stella refuses to do. Thinking 
himself safely ensconced in the marriage-bed, Othello 
gloats to his friend about the success of his love-quest. 
During this brief interlude of confidence in Desdemona's 
fidelity, Othello credits the oral word with the honorable 
"seduction" of his wife. Such is never realized by
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Astrophil. Because of his erotic frustrations, Sidney's 
poet-lover fails to extricate himself from his emotional 
attachment to Stella.
In Renaissance Minds and Their Fictions. Ronald Levao 
addresses this dilemma:
The only true release would be through actual 
seduction, but Astrophil returns repeatedly to 
the realization that his poetry is not persuading 
Stella. No matter how sweetly he utters forth 
the conceits of the mind, Astrophil's goal 
remains irrevocably distant.
(171)
Astrophil's tactic is the same as Othello's, and his words 
are no less persuasive. The difference seems not to' lie in 
the words of the poet-lover, but in the attitude of the 
perceptor herself, Stella. Levao correctly recognizes 
Stella's role when he says, "Perhaps the fault lies with 
the hearer" (RMTF 171). Because she chooses not to partner 
herself with Astrophil's implicitly persuasive words,
Stella is unmoved by his erotic entreaties.
Stella is not, as A.C. Hamilton accurately notes in
"Sidney's Astrophil and Stella as a Sonnet Sequence," an
"ideal reader." Because her response is not that which
Astrophil desires, Hamilton rightly concludes that he, as
poet-lover, chooses to modify his approach.
Frustrated as both poet and lover, he is forced 
to abandon his passive role.
Paradoxically, the limited success of 
Astrophil's courtship precipitates a crisis for 
him both as poet and as lover. In his opening 
program, he had assumed that Stella would be an 
ideal reader who would take pleasure in reading
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of his pain, and knowing his pain would pity him,
and through love would offer him her favor.
Unfortunately, she is not properly programmed: 
she turns out to be an increasingly perverse 
woman, balking at each step of his literary 
ladder.
("S&SSS" 215)
I question Hamilton's use of “perverse" to describe Stella;
the word inaccurately and harshly characterizes one who
seems to be a respectable, married woman of the Renaissance 
court whose primary fault is the spurning of her would-be 
suitor. I do agree, however, with his assessment that her 
refusal "precipitates a crisis for him both as poet and 
lover." Crises, especially when viewed in retrospect, are 
not always bad. They can, as they do for Astrophil, incite 
personal and professional change, an idea that I will 
develop more fully later.
Although Stella may not be "perverse," she is an 
unwilling "reader" of Astrophil's words. She hears, she 
even "sees" (understands), but she does not respond in the 
way he would have her do, as my later discussion of the 
Eighth Song will suggest. Because her personal 
circumstances and objectives are in sharp contrast to those 
of Astrophil, their dialogic relationship disintegrates. 
Astrophil's poetry, his fiction, fails him in his personal 
time of need.
Waller addresses this poetic failure in his discussion 
of sixteenth-century poetry. He accurately notes that 
"poetry's ability to move its readers is not predictable or
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automatic; man may not be moved at all, or may not 
translate vision into praxis" (EPSC 55). Stella's ultimate 
refusal to be moved by Astrophil's provocative narrative of 
"Lovers never knowne" and Desdemona's gradual willingness 
to be wooed by Othello's equally seductive story represent 
two opposing roles assumed by readers of texts: the reader
who refuses to enter into reciprocal relationship with the 
author through the written word and the one who agreeably 
partners herself with the author and the text.
For author, text, and reader to consummate a
relationship, the reader must, like Desdemona, be swept
along by the seduction, by the persuasive wooing, of the
word. Waller describes this activity as the rhetorical
relationship between writer/text/reader, an activity which,
if it is to succeed, requires active participation from the
reader. He argues,
When we read, we temporarily adopt a new 'self,' 
one suggested by the poem and our experience of 
reading it. The play between that flickering 
self, the self with which we started to read the 
poem, and the reconstituted self we have when we 
finish reading the poem is, it has been 
suggested, part of the essential value of reading 
poetry— perhaps even of reading in general.
(EESC 55)
Something tangible occurs when a reader willingly embraces 
the words of another. She becomes something that she was 
not before? her inner being is altered into a 
"reconstituted self" as she intellectually and emotionally 
assimilates the drama recounted by the writer.
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Paul Ricoeur says this tangible something is 
understanding of the words in the text. Expressing 
Waller's explanation another way in The Conflict of 
Interpretationsf Ricoeur says "to understand, for a finite 
being, is to be transported into another life" fCl 5). 
Ricoeur's "another life" and Waller's "reconstituted self" 
are hermeneutic renderings of the same idea. Any 
understanding that comes from a textual experience is the 
direct result of the reader partnering herself with the 
writer through his words; the process is like unto that 
faith relationship between the Christian and his God.
Just as Karl Barth argues that the Christian's 
rational decision to believe in God creates a dialogic 
event between himself and God, so the reader's willful act 
to partner herself with writer and text is a kind of good- 
faith gesture (JDQ 28). The result is a-brief interlude of 
transcendence as the reader "temporarily adopts a new 
'self'" in her perusal of the text. For at least a while, 
she encounters the "other" who penned the text (the absent 
presence of the author) and the "other" who speaks to her 
from the words on the printed page (the absent presence of 
the character or persona who is central to the text).
This temporary union comes about through rhetorical 
and literary factors working in unison, not the least of 
which is the persona. The persona does not have to be a 
character within the action (although he or she may be),
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but his (or her) presence does dominate the text. As one
of the early British writers to create a persona who is
sustained throughout a text, Sidney successfully
incorporates a relatively innovative literary technique in
his sonnet sequence. Ferry recognizes that
Sidney is viewed as crucial in this development 
for his invention of Astrophil as the first 
persona in English poetry who controls 'with 
recognizable voice and attitudes' the whole 
sequence, as Petrarch's poet-lover shapes his 
poems to Laura.
(XL 14)
Although Ferry fails to acknowledge that Chaucer previously 
introduced a sustained narrator in his Canterbury Tales, 
she justifiably credits Sidney for presenting a text with a 
perceptibly singular voice operating within the narrative. 
Something which we take for granted, a solid presence 
emerging and a discernible voice speaking from a text, is 
that which most notably distinguishes Sidney's sonnet- 
sequence from the sonnets of his peers, Wyatt and Surrey.
Not incidentally because of its incipience and 
relative simplicity, the persona of Astrophil seems to be a 
logical subject for a study of the workings of the absent 
presence. Unencumbered by the stream-of-consciousness 
thought processes of more modern personae, Astrophil's 
musings of the heart and mind are rather straightforward, 
thus facilitating our analytical task. That is not to 
suggest that as both persona and character Astrophil is 
simple or that his actions are simplistic. Indeed, his wit
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tends to disarm, even on occasion to confuse, the reader. 
The vacillations in the emotions that denote his character 
serve to represent a lover who is totally human, driven by 
the combined complexities of the intellectual and sexual 
desires of the personality.
These vacillations and sometimes confusing emotional 
gyrations may be explained through Bakhtin's idea of 
"architectonics,11 which he discusses in Art and 
Answerabi1ity. Although the term is rather fluid, subject 
to Bakhtin's own revisions in his various essays, it can 
lend some credence to the concept of the absent presences 
that operate within and through the relationships of 
author/text/reader. If we view architectonics as the 
aesthetic wholeness that comprises a text, then we might 
begin to see how that text comes into being. Bakhtin 
argues:
Every word in narrative literature expresses a 
reaction to another reaction, the author's 
reaction to the reaction of the hero; that is 
every concept, image, and object lives on two 
planes, is rendered meaningful in two value- 
contexts— in the context of the hero and in 
that of the author.
fAA xxxi-xxxii)
Astrophil's narrative may develop within the mind of the 
persona who is also hero (the central character), but it is 
Sidney who provides the energia that creates the thrust of 
the story. The witty contradictions and resulting 
confusions, according to Bakhtin's analysis, suggest the
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interplay between author and hero, between Sidney and 
Astrophil. They allow us, as readers, to see an individual 
in process, an individual whose identity we can help to 
formulate. From the rhetorical perspective, Astrophil is a 
present possibility who is defined by the absences that 
surround him.
Specifically, he is crafted through the combined
efforts of writer and reader, absences that reach from both
sides of the text in order to fashion a meaningful whole.
The poet, operating from his position within the rhetorical
triangle, commands discernible presence. Fashioned through
the poet's energia, this authorial presence, according to
Kimbrough, comprises
artistic integrity. The literary ethos of the 
writer becomes the ethos of the work, the basis 
of its delight, the force of its persuasion, and 
the means of its instruction. Because of the 
doctrine of imitation, the work is not the 
writer; the work belongs equally to the writer 
and the reader since it is the marriage of 
art and nature.
fSPS 55)
All three positions of written discourse 
(writer/text/reader) thus mutually engage to produce 
meaning. The rhetorical triangle is alluded to by Plato, 
articulated by Aristotle, and put into play through God's 
Word. And the reading of Sidney's Astrophil and Stella 
suggests that a text is also filtered through and subtly 
fashioned by the personal experiences of the individual who 
explores the text.
169
Sidney, the student of classical rhetoric,
incorporates a myriad of factors to effect successful
communication between writer and reader. For Sidney, the
rupture between wit and will, the need for Invention and
energia, the recognition of the Christian Logos, the
application of the Platonic Idea, and the absence of the
reader all fuse into the integrated whole which is the
meaningful text. One rhetorical or literary entity cannot
adequately be considered apart from the whole, because each
is contingent upon the other. Ake Bergvall addresses this
rhetorical issue in The "Enabling of Judgment."
The thought that the poetical text should be 
considered in isolation, like a well-wrought urn 
or like a centripetal galaxy of signifiers, would 
have been unthinkable to a Sidney, a Spenser or a 
Shakespeare. Equally foreign to them would have 
been the notion that their poetry was the 
spontaneous overflow of powerful feelings, the 
self-expression of the poet. Nor would they have 
understood the more extreme exponents of 
reception theory that claim interpretative 
omnipotence for the reader. The ontology of 
Elizabethan poetics, as far as it is rhetorically 
oriented, resides not in the sender, the 
receiver, or the message, but in the process of 
communication which they together represent.
(19)
The responsibility of the sender (the writer) is great.
His success, however, is in great part determined by the 
response of the reader. It is through manipulating the 
language and establishing subtle parameters of 
interpretation that the writer can hope to "meet” the 
reader in that textual instant of shared understanding. A
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persona, such as Sidney's Astrophil, is crucial to 
establishing such an aesthetic encounter.
As Wolfgang Iser assesses in The Act of Reading.
"grasping11 a text and appropriating meaning is neither
automatic nor assured for the reader. He describes a
process of communication, a process through which the
reader might come to a greater understanding of self,
world, and creator. The process is often unpredictable, as
the reader fluctuates between comprehension and confusion.
But in order to be ultimately productive through the
encounter, the reader must subject herself to "a dialectic
of protension and retention, conveying a future horizon yet
to be occupied, along with a past (and continually fading)
horizon already filled" (&B 112). The benefits, according
to Iser, outweigh the frustrations because the text can
eventually become a subtle tool of instruction or behavior
modification for the reader herself. He suggests that
every reading moment sends out stimuli into the 
memory, and what is recalled can activate the 
perspectives in such a way that they continually 
modify and so individualize one another. Our 
example shows that reading does not merely flow 
forward, but that recalled segments also have a 
retroactive effect, with the present transforming 
the past.
(£S 115)
The "stimuli" to which Iser refers come primarily through 
the perspectives of characters within the narrative.
Through the language, the actions, and the reactions of the 
different characters, the reader might glean what Iser
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calls "configurative meaning" — not plenitude, but at least 
partial understanding of self, world, and creator (&B 112).
Astrophil is not Sidney's only character in the 
sequence, but he is the one whom the reader personally 
encounters through the text. Sonnet 14 alludes to a 
nameless, apparently well-meaning, friend who questions 
Astrophil's motives for pursuing Stella, but we readers are 
not privileged with his acquaintance. The only other 
character whom we "see" is, of course, Stella, but we must 
look at her through the eyes of Astrophil. Waller warns 
that
We should not forget how firmly Astrophil and 
Stella is encoded within a male-dominated 
discourse. Stella is, like other Petrarchan
mistresses, reduced to a disconnected set of
characteristics, acknowledged only as she is 
manipulated by or impinges on her lover's 
consciousness. She is entirely the product of 
her poet-lover's desires. Sidney's sonnets 
provide a theatre of desire in which the man has 
all the active roles, and in which the woman is 
silent or merely iconic, most present when she 
refuses him or is absent.
fEPSC 146)
The operative statement in this passage is "most present 
when she refuses him or is absent." Since Stella, in the 
"real" arena of Sidney's recreated world of poetry, refuses 
Astrophil's various appeals, the poet-lover reaches into
another world to find solace for his pain. He retreats
into his aesthetic world in order to make meaning out of 
what appears to be a meaningless, non-existent 
relationship. He finds comfort in words, words that like a
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two-edged sword have both the power to destroy and the 
power to heal. Recognizing that his words of persuasive 
endearment to Stella were the cause of his beleaguered 
state, he bemoans "unhappie word*1 because "to my selfe my 
selfe did give the blow" (Sonnet 33). Astrophil thus 
assumes full responsibility for his situation. In doing 
so, he ultimately will be able to reconcile himself to 
Stella's absence.
Although he does not succeed in changing the external
conditions (Stella's refusal), he does, before the
conclusion of the sequence, alter the internal struggle,
allowing his "erected wit" to supersede his "infected
will." This recognition, however, does not come easily.
He has to endure Stella's disdain; he has to come to terms
with her public rejection of him. Wishing to be granted
the intimacy she gives her dog (the famous lap-dog sonnet
59), Astrophil slowly and painfully begins to comfort
himself through her absence. He imagines a world in which
absence becomes the catalyst whereby Stella welcomes his
erotic advances. He thus begins to "rewrite" his story of
hoped-for love:
But when the ruggedst step of Fortunes race 
Makes me fall from her sight, then sweetly she 
With words, wherein the Muses treasures be, 
Shewes love and pitie to my absent case.
Now I wit-beaten long by hardest Fate,
So dull am, that I cannot looke into
The ground of this fierce Love and lovely hate:
Then some good body tell me how I do,
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Whose presence, absence, absence presence is; 
Blist in my curse, and cursed in my blisse.
(Sonnet 60)
The prospect is not perfect because he recognizes that
absence is a curse. Conversely, though, he admits that his
curse is also his bliss. Somehow, and he does not seem to
be fully cognizant yet of how, Stella's absence will effect
something that is either positive or productive.
Of course, for the poet-lover that will become the
text, the artistic recreation of that which was hoped-for.
It is at this juncture in Sidney's sonnet sequence that we
see the blurring of the relationship between absent
presence as that which inspires the text and absent
presence as that which becomes a character in the
narrative. Steiner succinctly explains this process.
According to his analysis,
The word 'character' does not mean the actual 
marker on the page. . . . But it is, very 
exactly, the quantum leap between the character 
as letter and character as presence, and as a 
presence often far richer, more exigent of 
exploring assent, far more lasting than our 
own, which makes the point.
(EE 212)
The character of Stella, then, becomes more than a six- 
letter name; she becomes a viable presence, one who can 
impact the poet-lover's writing and subsequently command 
the reader's attention.
Ultimately through his artistic endeavor as poet- 
lover, Astrophil comes to view his detoured relationship
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with Stella as that which fuels his artistry: "Thou art my
Wit, and thou my Vertue art" (#64). Addressing his absent 
presence, Stella, who is both audience and player in his 
text, Astrophil comments on the correlation between life 
(the actual) and art (the recreated). Whether truly 
experienced (a priori) or "experienced" in the imagination 
(a posteriori), the physical and spiritual arenas of 
humanity provide the breeding ground for artistic 
creativity. It is the "stuff" of life itself that 
comprises art.
Most critics of Sidney overlook what seem to be his 
deliberate associations between Stella/art/wit, and 
Stella/Virtue/art. Inclusion of the pronoun "my" suggests 
a sequential relationship within the two sets of nouns: 
Stella, through Astrophil's wit, becomes the poet-lover's 
art; and Stella, because of that art, becomes the poet- 
lover rs greatest virtue. This sonnet, along with Sonnet 
33, seems to negate Kalstone's argument that "Always the 
victim, Astrophil appears to be involved in perpetual 
conflict, perpetual motion. He moves, a witty commentator, 
among personified virtues and public demands" (SP:CI 150). 
Astrophil is in "perpetual conflict, perpetual motion," but 
he is not a victim, especially if we consider a critical 
line in Sonnet 33: "But to my selfe my selfe did give the
blow." Astrophil does not share with his readers precisely 
how he gave the blow. However, we have to infer that he
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takes responsibility for his actions, that he chooses to 
make himself vulnerable through pursuit of love for Stella. 
If Astrophil were fully victimized by Stella, he as poet- 
lover would have become ineffectual and powerless. He 
would not have been able to use Stella's absence to empower 
the written word. Astrophil may not have been able to 
persuade Stella in her present presence to succumb to his 
erotic overtures, but he is fully in control of Stella's 
absent presence. As poet-lover, as commander of the 
written word, he can use the detoured relationship to 
create a text that speaks the universal language of love in 
its various dimensions— lust, desire, excitement, 
deprivation, pain, loss, and possibly even emotional 
regeneration through the written word.
That regeneration does not come without a struggle, a 
death-in-life and life-in-death struggle that finds 
expression through the written word. Just as the emotional 
upheaval disrupts Astrophil's sense of well-being, so the 
rhetorical disruption frustrates the reader. Astrophil's 
personal struggle epitomizes the operation of the 
hermeneutic spiral, the struggle of the reader as she seeks 
to glean meaning from a text. The reader thinks she has 
given meaning and "life” to a passage, only to find that 
meaning "killed" in subsequent sonnets. But the "killing" 
of one idea is supplanted by the "life" of another— a 
process that has the potential for continuing ad infinitum.
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Kalstone describes this roller-coaster process that unites
persona and reader:
Astrophil's role is one of sustained alertness 
and questioning in exercises of varied 
sensibility. We never are allowed to rest with 
an attitude, a gesture; for the next sonnet may 
exactly contradict an expressed view or remind us 
that a particular experience is momentary or that 
a newly discovered truth leads only to further 
complexities. Our delight depends . . . firmly 
upon the persona the poet creates for us— that 
of questioning critic.
fSPrCI 131-32)
As a willing and an active participant in the rhetorical 
process, the reader likewise finds herself in the death-in- 
life and life-in-death struggles that are experienced by 
the persona. She translates his aesthetically created 
experiences into meaning for herself.
Centuries ahead of his time as rhetorical theorist and
literary critic, Sidney alludes to that issue which
Kalstone addresses: the frequently painful process of
coming to knowledge. Through his persona Astrophil,
Sidney explains how experience is translated into poetry.
The poetic duplication always falls short of the actual
drama because the printed words necessarily herald the
"death" of the experience. Nevertheless, the experience
demands utterance by the poet-lover:
Stella, the fulnesse of my thoughts of thee 
Cannot be staid within my panting breast,
But they do swell and struggle forth of me,
Till that in words thy figure be exprest.
And yet as soone as they so formed be,
According to my Lord Loves owne behest:
With sad eyes I their weake proportion see,
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To portrait that which in this world is best.
So that I cannot chuse but write my mind,
And cannot chuse but put out what I write,
While these poore babes their death in birth do 
find.
(Sonnet 50)
Because of the reductive quality of language (both written 
and spoken, according to Derrida), Astrophil laments that 
his words are only a "weake proportion" of Stella and of 
his love for her. He recognizes that a part of the 
experience of real feelings, a part of the vitality of real 
emotions, necessarily dies when that experience is 
"birthed" upon the printed page. Just as absence denotes 
cleavage between lover and his unrequited beloved, so the 
printed word creates cleavage between writer and reader of 
the text.
This cleavage, however, may not always operate
negatively. If it is applied to the reader in her search
for understanding self/world/creator, cleavage may be that 
which prompts a greater search for knowledge. As Ong, in
Interfaces of the Word, argues:
Alienation, cleavage, is not all bad. To 
understand other things and themselves, to grow, 
human beings need not only proximity but also 
distance, even from themselves. Out of 
alienation, and only out of alienation, certain 
greater unities can come.
(IE 47)
Ong suggests that the "greater" unity is selfhood, a sense 
of human consciousness that enables the individual to find 
value in self, even in a self that has suffered rejection.
178
The recognition of "otherness," of something that is not me 
brings greater understanding of who I am. It is that which 
will prompt Astrophil to exclaim: "That in my woes for
thee thou art my joy,/ And in my joyes for thee my only 
annoy" (Sonnet 108). Again, we see a sequential 
relationship: thee/art/joy which is in antinomical 
relationship to joyes/thee/annoy. Stella, having finally 
become his art, is now his joy; and it is only because of 
his joy of that art that he continues to allow those 
annoying thoughts of her to intrude into his imagination. 
The crisis has yielded a greater knowledge of self.
The willful process is much like the one that William 
Butler Yeats employs to create the emotional impact for his 
poetry. Repeatedly, Yeats proposed to Maud Gonne, 
apparently realizing all the while that she would refuse. 
Those refusals created material for the poet-lover, 
material that Yeats creatively manipulated to enact the 
emotional drama for his Beloved poems. The poet-lover's 
emotional suffering thus becomes, in the words of Yeats, a 
choice: "The intellect of man is forced to choose/
Perfection of the life, or of the work" ("The Choice").
This principle seems to be that from which Astrophil finds 
a modicum of solace. He begins to see a light that is 
flickering, but a light that is nevertheless visible, at 
the end of his emotional tunnel of darkness. It is "That 
presence, which doth give darke hearts a living light"
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(Sonnet 77). But the presence that will give light to his 
dark heart, and to the similarly dark hearts of his readers 
(what Plato calls his like-minded interlocutors), is the 
absent presence of Stella. No longer just a "marker on the 
page," Stella, through the artistic prowess of her poet- 
lover, has made what Steiner calls that "quantum leap" (EE 
212) from absence to artistic presence— a leap into the 
absent presence of aesthetics. Because Astrophil submits, 
albeit painfully and reticently, to the death pains of 
love, he succeeds in birthing at least the hope for 
artistic pleasure.
The emotional journey to that possibility for pleasure 
is neither quick nor easy. Astrophil will vacillate 
between hope and despair for the rest of the sequence. I 
concur with Kalstone who says that he must participate in a 
"ceremony of grief" (SP:CI 177), but I assess that grieving 
process differently. Rather than creating a permanent 
slough of despondency, the grieving frees him from the 
shackles of the absent "other." Sonnet 69 suggests the 
beginning of this process:
Gone is the winter of my miserie,
My spring appeares, o see what here doth grow.
For Stella hath with words where faith doth 
shine,
Of her high heart giv'n me the monarchie:
I, I, o I may say, that she is mine.
In an ironically positive way, Stella's words of refusal 
have empowered the poet-lover. They have returned to him
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the "monarchie" of his verbal talent, his poetic 
expression, where he can reconstruct the tale of love, even 
saying "that she is mine" if he so chooses. In the form of 
the absent presence, Stella becomes his to do with as he 
wills.
Such an analysis is one that Sidney himself might have 
embraced because he, too, envisioned poetry as an 
epistemological journey— both for the poet and for the 
reader of poetry. Asserting that the poet, as "right 
popular philosopher," is to "teach and delight" the reader, 
Sidney advocates a process that will lead to "the most high 
and excellent truth" fDefense 608, 611, 615). Since 
poetry, according to Sidney, leads to truth, the poetic 
experience between poet and reader becomes one of intimate 
mutuality. Potentially, poetry can address every aspect of 
being— self, world, creator. Since the common denominator 
for all three is love of knowledge, the poet becomes 
philosopher. As the poet-lover/philosopher attempts to 
probe his inner being, as he strives to analyze his 
physical surroundings, and as he seeks to understand the 
Other who masterminded all that is, he begins his aesthetic 
movement toward universal knowledge.
In this respect, poetry becomes
a valid branch of learning, for it is a mode of 
growth. Through the practice of Art, Imitation, 
and Exercise, the poet's wit is sharpened; and, 
as it is sharpened, it becomes a more effective 
tool for the discovery of the essential
181
relationships and qualities of nature which are 
hidden beneath the 'second nature' of everyday 
reality. Through this ever-building process, 
each succeeding imitation becomes 'better'— more 
engaging and revealing.
(Kimbrough, £E£ 54-55) 
Applying the principles set forth in the Defense. Kimbrough 
argues that the poet is divinely gifted with the "Art"; 
inherent in that divine gift is an "erected wit" that 
enables him to comprehend and translate experience for his 
readers. Through his diligence and hard work, through 
"Imitation" of other poets, he can hone that gift. But it 
is primarily through "Exercise," primarily through 
subjecting himself to emotional growth which comes through 
the joy and the pain of life itself, that he can complete 
the poetic process.
In the final section of the sonnet sequence (Sonnets 
74-108), Astrophil plots his painful "Exercise." The 
journey is one of wild emotional swings that range from his 
tentative hope for a consummated relationship to a sudden 
exhilaration, which is countered by harsh disappointment. 
But because of feelings that cannot be killed by memory, 
Astrophil allows the final frustration to be tempered by 
love, a love that begins in cupiditas (#72) but ends in 
caritas (#107). The Second Song, continuing through 
Sonnets 73 and 74, suggests Sidney's borrowing from Ovid, 
but, as Mary Chan reminds us in "The Strife of Love in a 
Pream and Sidney's Second Song in Astrophil and Stellaf»
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the two lovers reach dramatically different conclusions. 
Having stolen a kiss from the sleeping Stella (Sonnet 74), 
Astrophil is bolstered by the possibility that the desire 
of his heart is within his grasp. In a blazon that pays 
tribute to her sensuality, he recognizes "That presence, 
which doth give darke hearts a living light" (Sonnet 77). 
Even that unresponsive presence, which sleeps through his 
kiss, sparks an ember of hope. It will be that same 
presence, which he eventually translates into her absent 
presence, that will sustain him through her final refusal. 
Unlike Ovid's story of Priapus and Lotis, Astrophil's love 
is not foiled by the harsh braying of a donkey; his love 
begins a transformation of the self.
The fifth and eighth songs are crucial to the sonnet- 
sequence because they reveal the inadequacy of words to 
express the complex emotions of love. The fifth song is 
too long to quote in its entirety, but particular lines are 
necessary to explain the process that enables the poet- 
lover to move from total despair into artistic confidence.
While favour fed my hope, delight with hope was 
brought,
Thought waited on delight, and speech did follow 
thought,
Then grew my tongue and pen records unto thy 
glory;
I thought all words were lost, that were not 
spent of thee:
I thought each place was darke but where thy 
lights would be,
And all eares worse then deafe, that heard not 
out thy storie.
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But now that hope is lost, unkindness kils 
delight,
Yet thought and speech do live, though 
metamorphosd quite.
• • • • • •
I thinke now of thy faults, who late thought 
of thy praise,
That speech falles now to blame, which did thy 
honour raise,
The same key op'n can, which can locke up 
a treasure.
(1-6, 13-14, 16-18)
In retrospect, Astrophil describes how he has moved up the 
emotional ladder from hope to delight. Prodded by thoughts 
of possibility, he formerly recorded Stella's "glory." 
Realizing "now that hope is lost," his writing proceeds 
differently.
Because his perspective necessarily has changed, 
because he has no legitimate claim on Stella, he must 
"metamorphose" his "thought and speech." That 
metamorphosis, another Ovidian influence,4 is effected 
through his art— through the recreation of the Astrophil 
and Stella drama. Placing himself in the position of 
power, he proclaims that "The same key op'n can, which can 
locke up a treasure." The "key" that he holds is that 
which was given to "the first light-giver" (Sidney, J3E 
606). It is the key that enables the poet-lover to probe 
the inner workings of human emotions and then, through his 
art, to share his findings with others who may likewise 
seek to understand the complexities of life— and of love.
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The eighth song, however, recognizes that the art of
the written word yields incomplete understanding. Because
it is only a duplication, only an artistic translation of
the actual experience, it necessarily is incomplete. The
poet-lover, then, must solicit the assistance of love in
order to replicate presence. He must temper her absent
presence with his love:
But when their tongues could not speake,
Love it selfe did silence breake;
Love did set his lips asunder,
Thus to speake in love and wonder.
(11. 25-28)
When the discourse is controlled by love, not simply by 
ravenous lust, the seemingly impossible occurs: Stella
lovingly responds! Speaking for the first time in the 
sequence, Stella admits that indeed she does love 
Astrophil. However, as the more sensible of the two, she 
recognizes that her marriage to another makes their union 
impossible. Therefore, she forever dashes his hopes for a 
relationship.
She further admonishes him to refrain from using terms 
of endearment for her in public; calling her "Deere" would 
cause her to blush, potentially revealing her feelings for 
him:
Therefore, Deere, this no more move,
Least though I leave not thy love,
Which too deep in me is framed,
I should blush when thou art named.
(11. 97-100)
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Stella thus permanently removes her physical presence from 
him; Astrophil honors her request and no longer refers to 
her as "Deere." In "Leaving him so passion rent," she 
exemplifies the power of words. Hers were so brutally 
incisive that they pierce even his artistic talent, 
necessitating a mending of the near-fatal wound. Astrophil 
admits "That therewith my song is broken" (#104). His song 
is not dead; it is simply in need of repair, in need of 
redirection. This redirection comes through his 
translating the actual presence of Stella into her absent 
presence which will inhabit his poetry.
That translation is not easy because he retains the 
pain from the rejection. In Sonnet 88, he commands: "Out 
traytour absence." He admonishes her absent presence to 
leave, to give him some relief, but it does not. And the 
reason that it does not leave is that he is in control of 
it and does not really want it to depart. Granted he is 
miserable, but Stella's absent presence helps to assuage 
that self-imposed misery. Through it, he manages to 
reclaim the former passion. Then incorporating that 
passion into his poetry, he artistically captures those 
emotions that continue to fuel his love: "That living thus
in blackest winter night,/ I feele the flames of hottest 
sommer day" (Sonnet 89). He may be in the blackest night 
of rejection, but focusing on Stella's absent presence 
sparks the flames of his desire. Her absent presence,
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which he perpetuates through his memory, thus becomes an 
anodyne to his injured being. The medicine, however, is 
bitter. It causes him to wonder "What inke is blacke 
inough to paint my wo?" (Sonnet 93) And before he finds 
the effective ink, before he rewrites his tale of love, he 
necessarily must experience the grief; he must undergo a 
difficult process. It is admittedly painful, but the 
artistic rendering of the experience serves to assuage his 
emotional hurt: "Only with paines my paines thus eased
be,/ That all thy hurts in my harts wracke I reede;/ I cry 
thy sighs; my deere, thy teares I bleede" (Sonnet 93). 
Through artistic reversal, in which he imagines Stella 
sharing his pain and hurt, Astrophil finds comfort in 
retributive musings. Thus begins the process through which 
he "kills" the would-be experience with the real Stella and 
"births" the artistic experience with her absent presence. 
He must come to accept that "0 absent presence Stella is 
not here" (Sonnet 106). This is the first step to healing, 
the first movement toward regeneration. Stella is not, and 
never again will be, with him in full presence.
After making this pivotal admission, Astrophil turns 
to that which can comfort him— his art. He makes a 
significant move to reclaim that which Stella almost 
managed to take from him. In Sonnet 107, he admits to the 
sovereign place which Stella retains in his heart, but he 
commands her to submit that sovereignty to him:
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Stella since thou so right a Princesse art 
Of all the powers which life bestowes on me,
That ere by them ought undertaken be,
They first resort unto that soveraigne part; 
Sweete for a while give respite to my hart,
Which pants as though it still should leape 
to thee:
And on my thoughts give thy Lieftenancy 
To this great cause, which needs both use and 
art.
And as a Queene, who from her presence sends 
Whom she imployes, dismisse from thee my wit,
Till it have wrought what thy owne will attends.
These are the last of Astrophil's words that are directed
specifically to Stella, and the message is clear: he once
again intends to control his "wit" and his "will."
Astrophil, the poet-lover, thus echoes the words of his
maker Sidney. If he is not master of his "erected wit," he
cannot hope to rise above his "infected will."
Astrophil's struggle for mastery continues. He pleads 
with Stella to "dismisse from thee my wit," but he 
recognizes that Stella, who is now an absent presence, 
intrudes with her "owne will." We must remember, however, 
that he now furnishes her with that will. As poet-lover, 
Astrophil controls Stella's absent presence. He is the one 
who allows her intrusion. At the conclusion of Sonnet 107, 
Astrophil is not fully prepared to forego presence; he is 
not yet ready to reconcile himself to Stella's absent 
presence. He has not yet committed himself to an artistic 
duplication of Stella.
The sequence ends before we witness Astrophil's final 
move toward the reclamation of all his poetic powers.
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However, the sequence itself indisputably proves his 
success. Having dutifully followed the instructions of his 
Muse to "looke in Thy heart and write," the poet-lover ends 
the beginning of his ontological journey. When he removes 
his gaze from Stella and focuses on his skill as a poet, he 
begins the transition from lover to poet-lover. The 
concluding sonnet suggests that his hope for a relationship 
with Stella has ended, but it also affirms that the future 
for his poetic greatness is imminent.
Incorporating fire imagery, Astrophil describes the
process whereby his sorrow is purified into something
worthwhile. Like the mythological phoenix that consumed
itself by fire, then rose from ashes into new life,
Astrophil likewise submits his love for Stella to the
purifying fire of art. His love for Stella will not be
destroyed; it simply will assume a new life: the life of
art. He thus "rejoices in his love" because
That experience and its expression in poetry are 
fused in the dramatic soliloquy: love is
experienced in the act of giving it poetic form. 
The lover persuades us that he truly loves 
because the poet does, so that the fact of loving 
becomes 'real' through fiction.
(Hamilton, gP§ 14, 85)
Love continues to be the force that drives the poet-lover. 
It is only because of the painful vacillations of that love 
that he has a story to tell. It is only from the 
humiliating experience of rejected love that he has the 
drama. This recognition is what compels him to exclaim in
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the concluding lines: "That in my woes for thee thou art
my joy,/ And in my joyes for thee my only annoy." Without 
the woes, he would not have the joy. Without the refusal, 
he would not have his art. Without the absence, he would 
not have the absent presence that creates and perpetuates 
his art. Because of love that was for the presence and 
because of love that is for the absent presences of his 
beloved and of his reader, the poet-lover creates his text.
In the introduction to his Visions of Presence in
Modern America, Nathan A. Scott adeptly summarizes the
poet's universal quest for presence:
The poetic world is rooted in the concrete 
particularity of lived experience? and poetic 
art, in its deepest aspect, is a way of loving 
the concrete, the particular, the individual.
But, of course, to love is to enter the dimension 
of what the French Catholic philosopher Gabriel 
Marcel called presence; it is to approach a given 
reality out of a sense of its having the 
character of a Thou. . . . The intensity of 
its love for the quiddities and haecceities of 
experience conditions the poetic imagination, in 
other words, to view whatever it contemplates as 
ignited by the capacity for exchange, for 
reciprocity: it has the dimension of presence.
(2-3)
In a labor of love for his readers, Sidney, who speaks 
through his persona Astrophil, textually examines the 
"thisness" and the "whatness" of some of the inherent 
truths of his universe. Although those truths may be 
complex and may be difficult for the finite mind of his 
reader to comprehend, the task is not impossible. As she 
commensurately offers herself to a reciprocally loving
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exchange, which demands both her emotional and her 
intellectual submission, Sidney's reader may enter that 
"dimension of presence" which allows an interlude of 
understanding.
Following a similar discussion, Theodore Spencer says 
that part of Sidney's greatness is that he "challenges" his 
reader into presence, almost forcing the reader into a "new 
reality."
This reality, this depth and pungency, we 
recognize as belonging not only to Sidney's 
awareness, but— as happens with all great 
poetry— as creative of a new awareness in 
ourselves. The art, the exercise and imitation 
which Sidney so assiduously practised . . . 
resulted, in the best of the sonnets in Astrophil 
and Stella, in poetry to which all lovers of 
honesty and directness must continually return.
In this essential respect, it is Sidney . . . who 
is the most central of English poets in the 
generation that was soon to know Shakespeare.
("PSPS" 58)
And as we turn to Shakespeare, I will argue that he takes 
up the artistic gauntlet thrown down by Sidney. In his 
version of a sonnet series, Shakespeare, like Sidney before 
him and Dickinson after him, probes absence, presence, and 
the determinable effects of an absent presence as manifest 
through readers who come to a "new awareness of ourselves." 
Dependent upon neither total agreement with the text nor 
explicit identification with the persona, this "new 
awareness" is the result of temporary partnering of the 
self, who is reader, with the writer and his words.
Chapter 5
The Absent Presence 
in
Shakespeare's Sonnets
Shakespeare's sonnets provide further substantiation 
of the role of the persona in the literary triangle of 
reader/writer/persona that originates from the rhetorical 
triangle of reader/writer/text. Focusing on the persona of 
Will, I suggest that Shakespeare provides a different 
example of a textually present, but physically absent, 
presence that dominates the reading experience. 
Specifically, his poet-lover, who also is his persona, 
assumes a major, rather than a tentative, role within the 
struggle of locating presence-in-absence.
Borrowing the words of Mary E. Hazard, who writes in
"Absent Presence and Present Absence: Cross-Couple
Convention in Elizabethan Culture," Will is the "fictive
author" whose tale we read. Will is not Shakespeare, just
as Astrophil is not Sidney, even though partial
correspondence between poet and poet-lover may be
discerned. However, Will, a character fashioned and
empowered by Shakespeare, becomes a powerful player whose
presence dominates the text. As
the fictive author [he] is freed to enact the 
role of poet and to create the monumental 
presence of his poem. All the while, by a subtle
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twist of the paradox of absent presence, the 
historical creator of each cycle hovers as the 
real author to be more or less identified with 
the fictive sonneteer as the maker of the 
monument. The ambiguity of the degree of 
identification between the poet and his persona 
defies resolution whether the trope enacts absent 
presence, present absence, or some chiasmic 
middle state between the two. Certain it is, 
though, that the [text] is an enduring fullness 
of presence.
("CCC" 4)
In disclosing his technique for translating absence into 
presence, Will who is the “fictive sonneteer” shares a 
close, albeit “ambiguous," kinship to his creator 
Shakespeare. The reader witnesses a fluctuating textual 
interplay between creator and persona, akin to that which
exists between Sidney and Astrophil.1 Poet is not poet-
lover, but they function together within a dynamic 
relationship that aesthetically acts upon the reader.
Joel Fineman's text Shakespeare's Perjured Eve offers
relevance to this and other issues that will be raised in
this chapter. Regarding the dynamic relationship between
poet-lover and poet which incites a dynamism between text
and reader, Fineman comments:
Poetry has an energy, an energeia, and an 
enargia, that animates poetic imitation. Poetry 
is not simply a verisimilar imitation of the 
real, nor is it a sermonizing rehearsal of the
ideal; it is instead a lively and an enlivening
representation of the real through the ideal.
(SEE 91)
My study presumes the opposite: it argues for a
representation of the ideal, that which is desirable,
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through the real. But, like Fineman, I, too, recognize a 
force, an energy, that necessarily attends any 
hermeneutically successful reading of a poem. It is the 
poet who provides the energeia, the Aristotelian term that 
suggests actualization or "verisimilar imitation," but he 
also must, according to Fineman, create enargia, a clarity 
or vividness that also is necessary to engage a reader 
successfully. The reader's level of textual comprehension 
is directly proportionate to the writer's rhetorical, 
grammatical, literary, and creative skills (energeia 
combined with enargia). The two authorial "energies"
(which comprise the various skills of the writer) 
determine, in great part, any meaning that is gleaned by 
the reader.
We saw evidence of these aesthetic functions in 
Sidney's Astrophil and Stella. As Sidney incorporates both 
energeia and enargia, he creates a text of multiple absent 
presences. On the rhetorical level Sidney, as author, is 
absent from the text when the reader enters into dialogue 
with him; conversely, the reader is likewise absent from 
the poet when he creates the text. On the literary level, 
as depicted in the drama of Astrophil and Stella, the poet- 
lover 's source of inspiration, whom he deems to be Stella 
rather than God, is physically absent, but creatively 
evident, as he put words to paper. She, too (though not by 
death), removes herself from the writer's physical presence
194
before she can become a character in his drama. As a means 
of communicating this personal drama to his reader, the 
poet Sidney allows his persona Astrophil to become his own 
voice, both absent and assumed, in order to "speak" to the 
one on the opposite side of the text.
I have argued in the previous chapter that Sidney's 
poet-lover Astrophil has, by the end of the sonnet 
sequence, successfully, albeit tentatively, empowered his 
art. Through an emotionally painful and- frequently 
retrogressive process, he finally manages to follow the 
mandate of his Muse to "looke in Thy heart and write." 
Astrophil ostensibly begins with his looking outside 
himself, specifically to Stella, for inspiration. When she 
physically (and permanently) removes herself from his 
presence, he necessarily has to look elsewhere in order to 
continue his poetic profession. Forced to do so because of 
the circumstances of a thwarted relationship, he looks into 
himself, to his "heart," the emotional and artistic 
cauldron of creativity that will enable him to craft her 
absent presence into a viable entity within his poetry.
At the conclusion of the sequence, the reader senses 
that the poet-lover, now as consummate artist but still 
somewhat reticent persona, has begun to transcend his 
actual situation with Stella. Reconciling himself to move 
beyond the personal failure, "using mine owne fiers might," 
he has tentatively resolved to control, even to restructure
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if necessary, his emotional relationship with his beloved 
Stella. And he will do this through his words, the 
artist's most powerful weapon "that works in me [to] 
prevaile" (#108). Recognizing himself as a player in the 
struggle between emotions and art, Astrophil hands over the 
personal relationship he desires with Stella and yields 
himself to the artistic power that resides within. He thus 
moves rather quietly into his poetic world without Stella, 
resigned to reclaim something worthwhile from the ashes of 
their love. And he will do this from his writer's 
perspective in the rhetorical triangle of 
writer/text/reader.
Although Shakespeare continues the sonnet tradition of
Petrarch and Sidney, he significantly reformulates it for
his own artistic purposes. Commenting on Shakespeare's
variation of the convention, Fineman says
that Shakespeare's sonnets— both the sonnets to 
the young man and the sonnets to the dark lady—  
markedly distance themselves from the tradition 
of idealizing poetry and poetic idealization that 
they inherit and to which they regularly refer. 
Shakespeare's young man sonnets 
characteristically imply that the poetics of 
praise they explicitly employ is somehow old- 
fashioned and exhausted.
(SEE 187-88)
Noting especially Fineman's assessment that Shakespeare 
offers his sonnets as a refashioning of the tradition that 
was "exhausted" and obsolete, we can observe some 
distinctive differences between his persona and Astrophil.
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Although idealization may be a part of the relationship 
between Will and his Fair Friend, it is not the whole of 
the relationship. Departing from tradition, Shakespeare 
quite graphically relates the side that conflicts with the 
ideal. A major complication is in the form of the Dark 
Lady who confuses not only Will but who also complicates 
his relationship with the Fair Friend.
In the middle of this conflict and confusion is 
Shakespeare's persona who, unlike Astrophil, exudes 
authority rather than resignation. Giving significantly 
greater weight to the poet-lover's artistic power than does 
Sidney, Shakespeare creates a persona who frequently 
asserts that power grandiloquently, evidenced most 
noticeably in the eternizing sonnets directed to Will's 
Fair Friend: "So long as men can breathe, or eyes can
see,/ So long lives this, and this gives life to thee" 
(#18). Shakespeare's poet-lover, with flamboyance and a 
pre-Romantic idealism, presents his art as a tangible means 
for defying "old time," the ravager of youth and beauty 
(#19). So long as the printed poem survives, Shakespeare's 
persona asserts that his beloved will remain forever young 
within the created text. Hazard describes this dynamism as 
"the presence of the book which is created from the pain of 
nothingness and which materializes the paradoxes of absence 
and presence" ("CCC" 5). Through the gift of aesthetic 
perpetuity, the poet reifies the paradox of present-though-
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absent. That art (a poem) is the physical entity that the 
artist leaves to his readers as evidence of artistic 
immortality— both for his beloved and for himself.
Specifying that tendency to which Sidney alludes in 
the concluding sonnet of his sequence, Shakespeare's Sonnet 
19 compares the process to that of the "long-lived 
phoenix." Pitting the power of his pen against the 
ravaging, debilitating effects of time, the poet-lover 
writes:
Devouring Time, blunt thou the lion's paws,
And make the earth devour her own sweet brood. 
Pluck the keen teeth from the fierce tiger's 
jaws,
And burn the long-lived phoenix in her blood.
Make glad and sorry seasons as thou fleet'st,
And do whate'er thou wilt, swift-footed Time,
To the wide world and all her fading sweets,
But I forbid thee one most heinous crime,
Oh, carve not with thy hours my love's fair brow, 
Nor draw no lines there with thine antique pen. 
Him in thy course untainted do allow 
For beauty's pattern to succeeding men.
Yet do thy worst, old time. Despite thy 
wrong,
My love shall in my verse ever live young.
The poet-lover cannot halt the ravages of time in his 
corporeal world any more than the mythical phoenix could 
prevent his burning to ashes. However, the poet, like his 
mythical counterpart, has a means for combatting total 
annihilation of the mortal self. He has his words on the 
printed page.
Circumventing boundaries of time and place, the words 
of the poet are perpetually reborn in the minds of his
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readers. Like the phoenix who repeatedly consumes itself 
in fire, then rises from smoldering ashes to new life, the 
words of the poet are consumed and put away by one reader 
only to be given life by another. The cycle is one of 
continual flux. Since flux connotes fluidity and vitality, 
the text of the poet becomes his aesthetic and literary 
means of countering mortality. The phoenix is, as Stephen 
Booth reminds us in his notes on Shakespeare's sonnets, "a 
symbol of immortality" (S£ 162). Although the poet's overt 
premise may be to eternize his beloved, his fundamental 
purpose, according to Jacques Maritain, is, much like the 
mythical phoenix which eternizes itself, to beget "the 
offspring of his [own] soul and his [own] spirit" (87). 
Sidney may be credited for recognizing the poet as maker 
(Defense 615), but Shakespeare is one of the first British 
poets who daringly unleashes and unashamedly proclaims the 
creative power of the artist. Through his created matter, 
which is the poem, the poet additionally creates 
communication with his readers.
And it is through this aesthetic communication that 
Shakespeare, more specifically than Sidney, explores the 
role of the writer as creator. In the triangular 
relationships within the rhetorical situation joining 
text/reader/writer and in the literary exercise engaging 
reader/persona/creator, Shakespeare's persona commands a 
remarkably vivid presence. Using his persona Will who is
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poet-lover, Shakespeare focuses on the stance of the 
writer/creator of a literary work as he manipulates his 
•'voice" to elicit a response from his readers. As a result 
of this endeavor, the persona of Will becomes the primary 
"character."
Not a character in the traditional sense of one who is 
presented through direct exposition, he nevertheless is "a 
distinct psychological entity" (Weiser, MS 45). His story 
(if we can presume to call it that) catalogs his emotional 
responses to the changing relationships he experiences with 
two significant others in his life, his Fair Friend and his 
Dark Lady. Presumably created neither to expose a life 
that parallels that of the author nor to expound an 
esoteric theory of human emotions, Shakespeare's persona 
plots the realistic struggle of one who is seeking the 
ideal but who is bombarded by the destructive tendencies 
attending everyman.
Cautioning readers in their perusal of Shakespeare's
Sonnets. C. L. Barber argues that we should:
read the poems not as tantalizing clues [that 
point to Shakespeare's personal life] but as 
expressions of man's experience. When we do so, 
we find that, though they do not tell a story, 
they do express a personality. They are gestures 
of love, concern, disappointment, anger or 
disgust, profoundly and candidly conveyed.
("ESS" 6)
Human emotions and the inherent conflicts that emanate from 
"man's experience" provide the material for Shakespeare's
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collection of sonnets. The poet draws upon his social 
milieu in the structuring of his art. His persona may, in 
part, be self-reflexive, but we should be ever-mindful that 
the persona who speaks from the text is an aesthetic 
creation who approximates psychic reality— replete with its 
hope, its joy, its anger, its jealousy, and its 
frustration. Frequently paradoxical and illogical (at 
times even ludicrous), these psychological confusions are 
the elements which define human experience.
We also need to remember that a cultural practice of 
Renaissance experience was that of intimate non-sexual, 
male-to-male relationships. G. Wilson Knight takes up this 
discussion in The Mutual Flame where he asserts "that the 
terms 'friend' and 'lover' were in Elizabethan England 
interchangeable" (ME 24). Developing from the premise that 
Will's relationship with the Fair Friend is one of intense 
passion, but not necessarily one of homosexual passion, I 
will argue that the difficulties of Shakespeare's poet- 
lover are similar, in kind, to those emanating from 
traditional friend-to-friend relationships which are driven 
by love.
Like W. Thomas MacCary, I disagree with Joseph
Pequigney's homosexual reading of the relationship between
2Will and his Fair Friend. In his review of Pequigney's 
book, MacCary calls into question Pequigney's
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claims that Shakespeare claims that he had sexual 
relations with another man which were satisfying, 
gratifying, even purifying. This seems a gross 
misinterpretation. Whatever the Sonnets 
are . . . they are not a paean to the carnal 
pleasures of homosexual passion.
(229)
Will's passion for the Fair Friend is real; it is the 
catalyst for the creativity that allows him to become poet- 
lover. Certainly not all of Shakespeare's readers will be 
poet-lovers, as is Will. But presumably all of his readers 
do experience intense, even passionate, friend-to-friend 
relationships that bespeak the same kinds of problems as 
those vocalized by Will. These problems, what Barber 
refers to as "gestures of love, concern, disappointment, 
anger or disgust" ("ESS" 6), create a point of identity 
between reader and players in the text. Because 
Shakespeare's readers should be able to relate (at least at 
some rudimentary level) to these typically human "gestures" 
set forth by the writer, they should likewise be able to 
bridge the gap between text and reader as they witness the 
musings of his persona Will.
This chapter will attempt to show how the writer uses 
his very human persona to engage the reader. The ensuing 
relationship, made possible through the literary text, 
branches off from the original rhetorical triangle of 
text/writer/reader. This literary triangle of 
reader/persona/creator affirms the writer's skill as he 
strives intellectually, spiritually, and emotionally to
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"speak" to his readers. Employing sound rhetorical, 
creative, and literary principles (energeia and enargia), 
he wields his art through a textual medium that will allow 
him to communicate with his readers. Through his aesthetic 
endeavor, which is his poetry, he thus presumes to forge 
rhetorical relationships with readers in perpetuity— or for 
as long as "this [poem] with thee remains" (#74).
The Shakespearean passages that I employ to support my 
premise will be from Stephen Booth's Shakespeare's Sonnets, 
and I will rely heavily on the editorial comments made by 
Booth in his definitive work on Shakespeare as sonneteer.
I readily concede that misinterpretation is potentially 
inherent with any reading of a work which has the 
complexity and magnitude of these 154 sonnets.
Referring to the problematic nature of Shakespeare's
sonnet-sequence, Robert Crosman says that it is "difficult
to read" ("MLNA" 476), while Knight recognizes that the
sequence raises one "difficult subject" after another fMF
34). Booth clearly expresses, and provides partial
solution, for this rhetorical conundrum:
Is it not an editor's aim to make a modern 
reader's experience of the text as like as 
possible to that of the audience for which it was 
written? Whenever an editor modernizes a text, 
he risks distorting it; whenever 'the plain 
reader' looks at an unmodemized Renaissance 
text, he risks distorting it; since one of 
them must stick his neck out, it should be the 
one who is trained and paid to do it. No editor
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is likely to succeed perfectly in accommodating a 
modern reader and a Renaissance text to one
another, but that is no reason to do nothing.
(££ 448)
As Booth warns, we must recognize from the start that we 
who are modern readers of a Renaissance text will not 
achieve plenitude; we will not even approximate the 
understanding achieved by Shakespeare's contemporaries. 
However, we still might engage in some level of meaningful 
discourse.
We are once again reminded of Kenneth Burke's h  
Grammar of Motives, a text that emphasizes the reductive 
quality of language, especially a language such as our 
English which has significantly evolved through the 
centuries. Because the language of the British Renaissance 
is different, connotatively and idiomatically, from that
which we know and use, the applications that I make
necessarily will risk distortion and reduction. As much as 
possible, though, I will rely on the erudite comments of 
Booth to temper that distortion so that it does not 
blatantly disregard the nuances of Shakespeare's language.
Inherent in my analysis is the assumption that 
Shakespeare's sonnets are indeed a sequence, although some 
scholars dispute such a premise. One such critic is 
Hallett Smith whose The Tension in the Lvre argues 
otherwise. Commenting on some of the differences that he
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feels separate Shakespeare from his British predecessors,
Smith writes:
In other collections of Elizabethan sonnets, most
of which can be called sequences with better
justification than this one can, the beautiful 
person celebrated is a woman. . . . First of all, 
the Fair Friend has one quality in common with
the heroines of Elizabethan sonnet cycles
addressed to women: he is beautiful. But unlike
the ladies of the other sonneteers, he loves the 
poet.
(TTL 15-16)
I concur with Smith here on every point but the first one 
in which he argues that Shakespeare's work should not
really be referred to as a sonnet sequence. Although
Shakespeare may have written his sonnets over a period of 
several years and although they may have been written 
exclusively for friends rather than for the court, they 
nevertheless fulfill the determining criterion for a sonnet 
sequence: they deal with a singular subject, specifically
with the subject of love. The 154 sonnets plot the poet-
lover 's literary movement from love to ,rlovelc (lust) and
back to love. Love, in its various contextual and 
relational meanings, is thus the aesthetic theme that 
unifies the whole.
Shakespeare deviates otherwise from the sonnet 
sequence convention. Unlike Petrarch's and Sidney's 
sequences, both of which focus on a singular, recognizably 
unattainable relationship between the poet-lover and his 
beloved, Shakespeare relates, as Smith argues (TTL 15-16),
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two opposing relationships. One is the ideal relationship, 
which is realized, between Will his beloved Fair Friend? 
the other is the physical relationship, which is 
consummated, between Will and his Dark Lady. Departing 
from both Petrarch and Sidney, Shakespeare does not keep 
the relationships of his poet-lover in abeyance; Will 
interacts fully with both his beloved and his mistress. 
Smith sees these two disparate relationships as one of 
Shakespeare's weaknesses. Arguing that the Renaissance 
bard focuses on dual relationships which are staggered (and 
I paraphrase) between an unrelated opening and an 
irrelevant ending, Smith concludes that Shakespeare writes 
a collection of "lyric poems, love poems associated in a 
loose way with two traditions, the Petrarchan love sonnet 
and the epigram tradition" fTTL 22).
I respectfully disagree. Shakespeare does not, as 
Smith would have us believe, treat two separate subjects 
apart from an equally separate beginning and ending. The 
two relationships (Will and the Fair Friend/Will and the 
Dark Lady) are important in Shakespeare's collection, but 
they do not provide separate foci within the sequence. 
Instead, they are the poet-lover's personal examples that 
elucidate the focus, which is love. As a preamble to the 
virtues of love, the procreation sonnets accuse the friend 
of narcissism and then instruct him to think of someone 
other than himself. Sonnet 10 contains what Booth
206
describes as "the first point in the 1609 sequence where 
the speaker implies close personal friendship between 
himself and the young man he is addressing" (£§ 149). The 
poet, already concerned and loving, urges him to "Be, as 
thy presence is, gracious and kind" (#10). As the 
persona's love for his Fair Friend grows to maturity, the 
power of that love is progressively more evident.
Even the concluding Cupid sonnets, which are usually 
viewed apart from the first 152, describe the power of 
pure, virginal love. I respectfully acknowledge Booth's 
reminder that Sonnets 153 and 154 are versions of the 
epigram, an extended conceit. However, since Shakespeare's 
two epigrams continue the subject of love, I think we dare 
not dismiss them as inconsequential to the rest of the 
sequence.
Michelle Burnham is one of the few critics who shares
my view of the concluding two sonnets. In "'Dark Lady and
Fair Man': The Love Triangle in Shakespeare's Sonnets and
Ulysses.» she writes:
Sonnets 153 and 154, dismissed by many critics as 
poor imitations of a generic style, offer a 
distanced and traditional perspective on the love 
Shakespeare has presented so personally in the 
preceding poems. In both sonnets, the poet is 
seeking a cure for the passion he feels for his 
mistress in the mythical waters of a seething 
bath.
(47)
Burnham's essay, whose purpose is to show a correlation 
between Shakespeare's poet/Dark Lady/Fair Man triangle and
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Joyce's Leopold Bloom/Molly Bloom/Blazes Boylan triangle in 
Ulvsses. goes in an entirely different direction from the 
argument that I propose. However, our assessments conflate 
at the reading of Shakespeare's concluding sonnets. Love, 
which is described therein, has a regenerative quality that 
can quench the "heart-inflaming brand" of even the lusty 
Cupid, transforming his passion into "healthful" love. 
Though some (even most) critics discount Sonnets 153 and 
154, I counter that these sonnets show that the cupiditas 
of Cupid is tamed by virginal caritas. By including the 
last two sonnets, Shakespeare brings love full circle.
Love in its manifold complexities, then, is the 
singular subject that links the various sonnets, thus 
suggesting the conclusion that cumulatively they can indeed 
be viewed as a sonnet sequence. The different segments 
within the work suggest that the persona recognizes that 
human experiences are frequently treacherous, subject to 
inescapable detours of lust. Quite matter-of-factly, 
Shakespeare, through his literary sequence, exposes various 
emotional junctures along the road of humanity. The 
journey that he describes begins in impassive instruction 
(the procreation sonnets 1-17), then moves into an ideal 
loving relationship (the Fair Friend sonnets 18-126), only 
to be sidetracked by unabashed lust (the Dark Lady sonnets 
127-152), which is quelled by the purity of selfless love 
(the Cupid sonnets 153-54). Shakespeare seems careful to
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avoid moral judgments and self-righteous comments, even in 
the Dark Lady sonnets. Weiser significantly notes that 
"the speaker does not attack inconstancy itself; that 
blemish is as basic to mankind as time is to physical 
nature" (M£ 20). Neither judge nor accuser because he 
would be one of those judged and accused, the speaker 
simply shares his quest to understand this particular 
avenue of the human pilgrimage.
Shakespeare's sonnets develop through the persona's 
involvement with the various kinds of love? the partitive 
sections delineate the vacillations of emotions as he 
visceraliy reacts to each kind. Unlike Sidney, whose 
sequence highlights the effects of Stella's absent presence 
on Astrophil, Shakespeare focuses on the absent presence of 
the writer as he communicates with his reader. The absent 
presences of the Fair Friend who inspires the lover as poet 
and the Dark Lady who arouses the lover as man are clearly 
evident as characters within the loosely woven narrative; 
but they function primarily to elucidate the absent 
presence of the poet-lover who is artist, verbally exposing 
the many shades of what is referred to as "love."
The poet establishes the subject of his verse rather
clearly in Sonnet 76;
Oh know, sweet love, I always write of you,
And you and love are still my argument.
So all my best is dressing old words new,
Spending again what is already spent.
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For as the sun is daily new and old,
So my love still telling what is told.
(11. 9-14)
This passage reveals most of Shakespeare's referents to the 
word "love." The term of endearment "sweet love" seems to 
suggest a person, namely "you" who is his Fair Friend. He 
is an integral player in the subject of "love" which 
comprises Will's "argument." As Booth rightly assesses, 
Will's argument (or "topic") is "colored by the sexual 
senses" (§£■> 265). However, the narrator allows for 
additional ramifications of the topic of love.
Incorporating the metaphor of changing clothes, Shakespeare 
suggests that this is an age-old subject that changes while 
being ever the same, one that fluctuates between constancy 
and infidelity. His story likewise will contrast changes 
that separate ideal love (caritas) from common lust 
(epithumia). Most of humanity aspire to the first, but 
they frequently succumb to the latter. And even more 
frequently, they tend to confuse one with the other, 
referring to the disparate acts by the same verbal 
expression "love."
G.B. Harrison's editorial punctuation, which differs 
slightly from Booth's, provides a possible clue in Sonnet 
151 that lends support to the contrasting meanings of the 
word "love." In this, the bawdiest of all the Dark Lady 
sonnets, he places quotation marks around the word "love": 
"No want of conscience hold it that I call/Her 'love' for
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whose dear love I rise and fall." If we assume that 
Harrison correctly punctuates the Shakespearean text, love 
in this context is not love in its pure state. Booth 
supports such an assessment, commenting that "'rising and 
falling7 is singularly appropriate to the poem7s theme of 
involuntary lust? the point is that it is not a metaphor" 
(529). This kind of love, then, is not caritas; rather, it 
is eros combined with epithumia. It is unabashed and 
uncontrolled lust. This kind of love has no redeeming or 
enduring quality; it lasts only for the moment of passion.
What Shakespeare7s persona seems to admit in this 
sonnet (#76) is that this temporal "love" battles the ideal 
love that is desired by Everyman. Will suggests that, like 
himself, each individual determines the outcome of the 
emotional war within. He can allow unbridled passion to 
destroy that which is good, or he can temper that passion 
and elevate the good. Shakespeare thus reflects his 
knowledge of both Aristotelian and Neo-Platonic teachings. 
His sonnet sequence reveals a bipartite division of the 
soul, man7s inner being. That which is uncontrollably 
passionate is the irrational side that determines emotions 
and bodily drives— both which frequently (perhaps even 
usually) defy explanation. Opposite that confusion is the 
rational side that houses the theoretical analysis and the 
practical understanding— intellectual gifts presumably 
granted the poet. These analytic and perceptive skills
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then enable him to translate and conceptualize that 
understanding into poetry.
Fineman prefers to link Shakespeare's classical
influence to the Neo-Platonists rather than to Aristotle.
Noting the difference in genders between the beloved and
the "loved," he argues that Shakespeare reflects
the Neo-Platonic tradition of the double Venus, 
with the young man taken to be the image of 
spiritual and intellectual desire as opposed to 
the dark lady's embodiment of the material 
corporeality of lust. This would give a proper 
philosophic context to the different genders, 
since for Renaissance Neo-Platonism, the love of 
man for woman is more vulgarly appetitive than 
that of man for man.
(SEE 57)
Shakespeare's persona does respond viscerally to a "double 
Venus," to both of his "loves." The Fair Friend who is his 
beloved represents, as Fineman argues, the "spiritual and 
intellectual desire" of the man who is poet, and the Dark 
Lady who is his mistress represents, as Fineman argues, the 
"material corporeality of lust" of that poet who is also 
man. Neither plenitude for the reader nor complete 
integration for the poet, the split states (love/lust, 
male/female, true/false) suggest brief, but powerful, 
points of identity between reader and writer.
Whether Freudian, Aristotelian, or Neo-Platonic, or a 
combination of numerous psychoanalytic theories,
Shakespeare comments on the dual natures of humanity. 
Clearly Aristotelian, however, is the persona's rational
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approach to both of his "loves." Like Aristotle, 
Shakespeare attempts to rationalize passion, even the 
passion that causes the Fair Friend to yield to the 
seduction of Will's mistress (Sonnet 42, which later will 
be discussed in greater detail.) Shakespeare departs 
rather significantly from the Petrarchan-Sidneian model in 
that he approaches love more rationally, much more 
realistically, perhaps even more matter-of-factly than do 
his predecessors in the sonnet tradition.
The sonnet-sequence tradition itself contributes to a
widening of the gap between writer and reader because this
literary convention is no longer in vogue. This gap may
necessarily have widened through time, but it does not
preclude a relationship between reader and writer. In his
text that explores the mind of Shakespeare's persona,
Weiser describes one means whereby Shakespeare bridges the
gaps of time and distance that separate reader/writer and
reader/persona. He argues that Shakespeare creates a
persona of universal appeal, something that Sidney fails to
do with his Astrophil:
Neither does [Shakespeare] quite achieve an 
autonomous, sharply defined character like 
Sidney's Astrophel. The Shakespearean . . . 
sonnets center on what occurs in the speaker's 
mind. He has neither a local habitation nor a 
name [other than the generic Will] and thus 
becomes an Everyman confronting the most primary 
sorts of human experience.
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This poetic Everyman serves no preconceived 
morality but is content to demonstrate certain 
qualities of thought and feeling.
(MG 14)
According to Weiser, then, because Will as a character 
within his own script is not clearly defined, he becomes a 
"poetic Everyman." Because we cannot create a personality 
profile for him, his experiences are offered as typical 
experiences shared by those who read his text. In their 
typicality, they assume a kind of actuality about the 
individual reader in her world.
Weiser recognizes this sense of credibility throughout 
Shakespeare's sonnet sequence. According to him, it 
"enacts a process of tangible experience. . . . The speaker 
is not writing about time and change as abstract ideas but 
primarily about his own response to those ideas" (MG 13).
To varying degrees, then, Will's journey is one that is 
taken by all of humanity. The reader observes him 
viscerally reacting to two emotionally and physically 
influential people in his life, his beloved Fair Friend and 
his seductively enticing mistress. Although the 
circumstances may initially seem ludicrous, his responses 
to the disparate individuals within those situations are 
anything but far-fetched. Rather than nebulous, 
unbelievable reactions, his are plausible emotional 
quandaries.
214
In "Making Love Out of Nothing at All," Crosman 
borrows the French term "autofiction" to describe how 
Shakespeare's sonnets project something other than fiction. 
He argues that since they have the "feel of ad hoc, of the 
day-to-day repetitions, misdirections, and incompletions of 
'real life' as opposed to fiction," they require a "generic 
term" ("autofiction") to better describe what they 
accomplish ("MLNA" 472). Shakespeare's "story," though not 
factual, narrates a view of reality since "we seem to be 
living it as our own" ("MLNA" 473). Will's confusions, 
temptations, and emotions, at least temporarily, become 
those of the reader as she relates to the text.
These multiple quandaries reflect life's paradox of 
one who desires the ideal but who is enticed by that which 
is less than ideal— the conflicting states that comprise 
human nature. Will describes this emotional paradox as one 
breathlessly— and willingly— running into the clutches of 
Hell:
Mad in pursuit, and in possession so,
Had, having, and in quest to have, extreme,
A bliss in proof, and proved, a very woe.
Before, a joy proposed, behind, a dream.
All this the world well knows, yet none knows 
well
To shun the Heaven that leads men to this 
Hell.
(#129)
Separated from his beloved when in the arms of his 
mistress, the speaker admits here that his lust for her 
adversely impacts his relationship with his Fair Friend.
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Lust, that imprudent affection which is counter-productive 
to love, spiritually alienates the poet-lover from the 
absent presence of his beloved. If his love for the 
beloved, both in his presence and through his absent 
presence, is that which inspires Will's creativity, then 
lust becomes that which impedes his art. Nevertheless, he 
periodically puts that mutually beneficient relationship 
behind him and succumbs to illicit passion.
This passage is reminiscent of the Pauline admission, 
"For that which I do I understand not? for what I would, 
that do I not, but what I hate, that do I" (Romans 7:15). 
Unlike his predecessor Sidney who incorporates spiritual 
dogma into his poetic theory, Shakespeare does not overtly 
espouse Christian beliefs. His poetry, however, suggests a 
working knowledge of Scripture. Like the conundrum voiced 
by Paul, Shakespeare's persona admits to a weakness of the 
spirit, one that leads him "to this Hell," his carnality, 
which is his relationship with the Dark Lady. Periodically 
unable to quell his sexual appetite, he submits to reckless 
passion. Through the persona of Will, the reader thus 
witnesses the basic struggle of humanity: the ongoing
battle between the antinomical life-giving sources of human 
nature— the spiritual and the physical which are manifest 
through ideal love (caritas) and common lust (a combination 
of greed, which is epithumia, and intense sexual drive, 
which is eros or cupiditas).
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The final section which is addressed to the Dark Lady
is the one that is the most often viewed as unbelievable,
perhaps even preposterous, as it explores Will's emotional
confusion in his relationship with his mistress. Fineman
explains part of the reader's difficulty:
because the literary tradition of the sonnet as a 
whole and the sonnets to the young man in 
particular both regularly and regulatively assume 
that love and praise self-consciously entail each 
other, the sonnets addressed to the dark lady 
present themselves as something strange— as 
something more outspokenly peculiar, more 
explicitly unusual, than anything we might 
associate with the troubled tonalities sounded by 
the epideictic sonnets addressed to the young 
man.
fSPE 54)
Because the reader is thrust from a poetry of praise of the 
young man to a poetry of dispraise for the Dark Lady, she 
is understandably— at least initially— confused. Confusion 
can be abated if she keeps in mind that as in the Fair 
Friend section, the focus of the Dark Lady section, too, is 
on Will as he relates to his mistress and struggles with 
her control over him. As Smith argues, "The real subject 
is not the Dark Lady/ but the poet's uncontrollable 
feelings about her" (TTL 53). Shakespeare's sequence 
certainly raises more than one "real subject" about the 
condition of human nature, but control, or the lack 
thereof, is indeed a central issue. Because of unabated 
lust for the Dark Lady and a seemingly insatiable greed to
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fulfill that lust, the poet-lover perceives himself and the 
object of his affections differently in Sonnets 127-152.
In these sonnets, he plummets into the arms of the
Dark Lady as if he is powerless to stop himself, yet
knowing all the while the falsity of their relationship:
When my love swears that she is made of truth,
I do believe her though I know she lies,
That she might think me some untutored youth, 
Unlearned in the world's false subtleties.
Therefore I lie with her and she with me,
And in our faults by lies we flattered be.
(#138)
Based solely on physical attraction and sexual 
satisfaction, this relationship is awash with lies— his to 
her, hers to him, and the two "lying" together.
Booth describes the rhetorical and syntactical means
whereby Shakespeare reflects the confusion inherent in such
a relationship:
The fact of impossible but undeniable fusion 
manifests itself in puns (e.g. the various and 
variously contradictory significances fused 
together in the word lie), in syntaxes that 
simultaneously indicate two distinct logical 
relationships among parts of sentences. . . , in
the fact that every assertion in the poem is 
demonstrably true and also a lie. . . , and 
in the fact that every assertion in the poem 
proudly reports a satisfactory relationship (the 
tone is downright smug), and a desperate 
one. . . . The poem as poem is like the 
relationship it describes; every quality or 
identity the poem has or presents is fused 
with its opposite.
(SS. 477)
In this assessment of Sonnet 138, Booth describes the 
genius of Shakespeare as sonneteer: he manipulates the
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language so that it supports those emotional situations 
which he describes. Specifically in this sonnet, 
Shakespeare crafts his language so that it reflects the 
desperate condition of the poet-lover who struggles in his 
relationship with the Dark Lady. As he strives with the 
emotional tension emanating from the destructive 
relationship, he necessarily incorporates puns that reflect 
the resulting negativity, the personal confusion that he 
experiences.
Will's relationship with the Dark Lady, which is based 
solely on lust, seems necessary to this sequence in order 
to typify the struggle between lust and love. Perpetuation 
and immortality are not significant themes in the Dark Lady 
section, as they were in the two previous sections; rather, 
the unifying theme is momentary pleasure, the "love" that 
is "Enjoyed no sooner but despised straight" (#129). The 
terms "enjoyed" and "despised" are polar opposites, terms 
which connote Will's inherent struggle. Booth explains the 
warring dichotomy:
'To enjoy lust' is to exercise it, to take 
sexual possession of the object lusted for. Here 
one's understanding of 'Enjoyed' is necessarily 
colored by the fact that 'to enjoy' was commonly 
used specifically to mean 'to use sexually,' 'to 
take sexual possession of.' The word thus says 
^made happy,' 'satisfied,' and, by synesis, 
introduces the person 'enjoyed' as an extra 
inferential object of both 'Enjoyed' and 
'despised' (once lust is satisfied, the person 
driven by it despised himself, the passion, and 
the person desired and seized).
(S£ 444)
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Fulfilled lust# as Booth implies, is frequently more 
destructive than unfulfilled lust. It has the potential 
for serious harm, especially to the poet-lover. When the 
poet-lover's rational thought-processes are overpowered by 
the sexual energy that dominates such a relationship, even 
his creativity suffers.
Laurence Lerner, in "Ovid and the Elizabethans," 
recognizes a strong Ovidian influence in the way that 
Shakespeare and other Elizabethan writers depict 
relationships controlled by lust:
Sex, generation and death are clearly the 
areas of human metamorphosis, and these are the 
themes of the Elizabethan epyllion. A story of 
sexual love can include or (more probably) end 
with happy fulfilment; it is more likely to 
contain frustrated, sublimated or perverted sex. 
This need not mean that the story itself is 
perverted: it is the nature of narrative that
fulfilment can be implied through the treatment 
of shortcomings and indirection.
(128)
If, as Lerner notes, Will's feelings for his Dark Lady 
cause him to be "frustrated," and if, as Booth suggests, 
Will comes to despise himself because of his lustful 
actions, he most probably will encounter difficulty in 
writing. The frustrations are evident in creative 
"shortcomings and indirection"; the result is that he 
weakens both his energeia and his enargia. To write, a 
poet must spend hours in solitude, hours in which he might 
share ideas, thoughts, and experiences with a future 
reader. Despising the self correlates to despising those
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actions which define the self, which, for the poet-lover, 
is the creative process. And when the lustful 
entanglements compromise the creative process, the work 
itself is necessarily compromised.
Weiser comments on the way that poetic integrity (or 
the lack thereof) is manifest in the poem. He explains 
that the intermittent clumsy style and frequently 
uninspired diction in the Dark Lady section prove that the 
poet-lover's artistic powers indeed are stymied because of 
his relationship with the Dark Lady. Analyzing Sonnet 138 
("When my love swears that she is made of truth"), Weiser 
comments that "The results of this shift [from Fair Friend 
to Dark Lady] are felt in the unimaginative texture of the 
poem's language. Its diction is everywhere colloquial and 
threadbare, while figurative expressions have been entirely 
excluded" (MS 151).
I heartily agree that this sonnet exudes clumsiness as 
it continues: "I do believe her though I know she lies,/
That she might think me some untutored youth,/ Unlearned in 
the world's false subtleties." However, I do not think we 
dare go so far as to say that "figurative expressions have 
been entirely excluded" in the Dark Lady sonnets, to the 
point that "their speaker is no longer in control of his 
imaginative powers" (Weiser, M£ 184). Indeed, Sonnet 130 
("My mistress' eyes are nothing like the sun") abounds with 
figurative language. But I can agree that the texture and
221
the diction are highly altered in most of the Dark Lady 
sonnets. Might not the poet-lover purposefully offer this 
recognizable difference as the literary means to shore up 
his argument that ideal love (caritas) is beautiful, 
productive, and fertile while common lust (epithumia 
combined with eros or cupiditas) is deceitful, destructive, 
and barren? The intermittent cessation of his creative 
power might be, as Barber suggests, "the broken lines made
by Eros" ("ESS" 26). Will's poetic lines that depict
physical pleasure are offered in sharp contrast to the 
fluid "line" that describes "the better part of me" (Sonnet 
74), which is the burst of poetic genius that results from 
his relationship with his Fair Friend.
Shakespeare is not the only British writer to explore 
the harsh realities of lust fulfilled. Chaucer certainly 
does in Troilus and Criseyde as does Milton in Paradise 
Lost. Especially Milton's text graphically depicts the 
extreme outcome of love gone awry— of love completely 
subsumed by lust. Milton's agenda, which was to "justify
the ways of God to men" (1.26), is markedly different from
that of Shakespeare in his sonnets. Avoiding theological 
solutions, Shakespeare develops his sonnets from the 
assumption that lust is an unavoidable expression of human 
nature. Will regularly encounters temptation— both from 
the Dark Lady who would lead him astray sexually and from
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the Fair Friend whose actions with another could compromise 
him spiritually.
Sonnet 32 introduces a rival poet who vies for the 
patronage of Will's Fair Friend. This rival, and perhaps 
"better" poet, may be more skilled in the implementation of 
his art, but he lacks something that Will views as 
necessary to the artistic process: his artistic endeavors
do not exemplify the love of poet for his beloved. Since 
this love is manifest in the words themselves, the reader 
will recognize and share in the loving process as she 
enters into the text. Will repeatedly contends that his 
poems to the Fair Friend will endure the test of time 
because they are a witness of love rather than a mere 
artistic exercise in what he refers to as poetic "style."
Shakespeare thus approaches the art of literary 
creation in a bold manner, suggesting that an aesthetics of 
love operates separately from theology and that the artist 
functions independently from his Creator. Continuing the 
practice of Chaucer and Wyatt who significantly rely on 
diction and metaphor to exhibit their poetic prowess, 
Shakespeare creates a persona who differs from that of 
Astrophil. Whereas the poet-lover in Astrophil and Stella 
begins to claim full control over his literary creation 
only at the conclusion of the sequence, Will asserts his 
power early in his work: "All in war with Time for love of
you,/As he takes from you, I engraft you new" (#15). Booth
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argues that Renaissance readers of Shakespeare's early text 
might have had difficulty discerning his use of "engraft" 
in this passage, since the word can mean both "writing 
verse and urging the young man to marry" (SS 158).
However, as modern readers who have the advantage of 
reading Shakespeare's work backwards, we can perceive the 
meaning quite clearly in this couplet: the poet professes
his literary ability to perpetuate the beauty and the youth 
of his beloved Fair Friend through his written words.
Although ambiguous meanings can be gleaned from many 
of Shakespeare's lines, as Anne Ferry argues in The 
"Inward" Language, I would counter that those passages in 
the sequence that relate to the power of the artist are the 
most straightforward, the most unambiguous of the 
collection. Through his persona Will, Shakespeare lauds 
the eternizing power of the artist. His premise is that 
the poet's talent with the written word can achieve what 
mortality cannot: a viable presence that speaks to a
reader centuries after the literary "death" of the persona 
and the physical death of the writer. Most probably it is 
Sidney's allegiance to his Divine Maker that causes him to 
tiptoe tentatively in this area that Shakespeare boldly 
treads. Unlike Sidney's Astrophil, Shakespeare's poet- 
lover never yields submissively to his artistic ability. 
Even as Will claims and maintains a powerful presence 
within his poetic medium, however, a paradox is evident:
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he does not manage to control his personal relationships 
with his Fair Friend, with his Dark Lady, or with the two 
of them linked together with him in what seems to be at 
least an emotional menage k trois.
This is the tension that dominates the sequence as it
points up the weakness and the vulnerability of the poet-
lover while it simultaneously reflects the inadequacy of
his language to express those human characteristics.
According to Waller:
Shakespeare's sonnets see the nature of the self 
as intimately bound up with sexuality. But 
nowhere among earlier collections are the 
extremes of erotic revelation offered in such 
rawness and complexity or with such obsessive 
anguish over the glorious failure of language to 
constitute or reassure the vulnerable self. They 
are a unique imaginative proving-ground where the 
feelings about love and the language 
traditionally used to capture them intermingle 
with and contradict each other.
fEPSC 221)
The intermingling contradictions of self/other, Fair 
Friend/Dark Lady, love/lust, vulnerability/recklessness, 
poetic art/uninspired words pulsate throughout the 
sequence. These antinomical impulses dominate the text.
As we explore these in relation to Shakespeare's poet-lover 
Will, we can begin to see the power that the writer of a 
text grants to his created voice.
Will's self-admonishing plaint, "O let me true in love 
but truly write” (Sonnet 21), may be, as Ferry says, a 
"deliberate echo of the opening of Astrophil and Stella”
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(IL 170), but Shakespeare filters the echo through his own 
perception of the poet-lover. The primary difference is 
that Astrophil has to be instructed by his Muse to "looke 
in thy heart and write'1 (#1), while Will seems to suggest 
that the power comes from himself. Because his Muse is 
either "sick" (#79), "tongue-tied" (#85), "resty" (#100), 
or "truant" (#101), Will is compelled to find inspiration 
elsewhere. Early in the Fair Friend section, he leads us 
to believe that his beloved assumes the role of Muse. In 
Sonnet 38 he instructs his friend: "Be thou the tenth
Muse, ten times more in worth/ Than those old nine which 
rhymers invocate."
Later sonnets, however, shift the source of poetic 
power from the friend to the poet's own artistic genius as 
the two (poet-lover and beloved) are spiritually meshed 
together. The poet claims, "You still shall live— such 
virtue hath my pen" (#81). Booth sees this as a pivotal 
sonnet, one in which the speaker first realizes the 
significance of his role in relationship to his Fair 
Friend, recognizing and asserting his poetic ability as the 
means through which that relationship might be perpetuated.
Paradoxically by giving that love away, specifically 
by using his talent to write verse about his beloved, he 
increases the value of that love:
Farewell, thou art too dear for my possessing,
And like enough thou know'st thy estimate.
The charter of thy worth gives thee releasing,
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My bonds in thee are all determinate.
For how do I hold thee but by thy granting?
(#87)
Shakespeare's persona here hints that the artist's paradox 
is comparable to that which is experienced by the 
Christian: "He that findeth his life shall lose it? and he
that loseth his life for my sake shall find it" (Matthew 
10:39). As artist who "releases" his love to the printed 
page and thereby increasing the "worth" of that love, he 
necessarily must "lose" or give away that same love so that 
others may share in that which is too "dear" for one 
individual to hold selfishly to himself.
Much like Sidney's Astrophil, who presumes to couple 
love with his "erected wit" in order to glean understanding 
of self, world, and creator, Shakespeare's poet-lover also 
links love with an art that might be beneficial to his 
readers. As Shakespeare's persona perpetuates his 
relationship with his beloved through the poetic medium, he 
leaves a trace of common human experience: love that
produces something worthwhile, which here is a work of art. 
He allows the love that is in his heart to produce the art 
that subsequently offers an understanding of the individual 
and his confusing world.
I disagree with Ferry who says that "Neither [Sidney 
nor Shakespeare] can truly name what is in the heart; he 
can only call it 'love,' which means everything and 
nothing" (IL 208). Shakespeare quite successfully defines
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love. He plots and differentiates its various meanings, 
showing the positive and negative results of each: ideal
love is productive and fosters creativity; pure lust is 
destructive and maligns creativity. Under the umbrella of 
love, Shakespeare relates a poet-lover who wields a power 
that is greater than that of one who simply adheres to the 
structure of a literary convention, which here is the 
sonnet sequence.
Drawing from his own literary palette, Shakespeare 
does not color within the prescribed lines of the sonnet 
tradition. Instead, he dares to explore unusual and, 
perhaps to early seventeenth-century readers, shocking 
possibilities. Specifically, he relates two relationships, 
one in which the beloved is his male friend and the other 
in which the "loved'1 is his mistress. He thus fashions a 
work of art that exemplifies universal truths about complex 
human relationships— relationships which can either soar in 
love or languish in lust. And in the midst of these truths 
about man in his frequently confusing emotional world, he 
recognizes and heralds the power of the poet— the power 
that compensates for personal disappointments and tangled 
relationships in the poet-lover's life.
In relating that life, Shakespeare significantly 
departs from earlier sonnet-sequences: Will's beloved does 
not stand aloof and removed as do Laura and Stella, the 
objects of Petrarch's and Astrophil's love. Instead,
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Shakespeare depicts a reciprocally loving relationship? the 
Fair Friend is the beloved young patron willingly 
supporting Will, the older and wiser acclaimed artist.
Their relationship suggests overtones of the pederastic 
convention of Greek society in which the primary goal was 
to effect reciprocity between a wise mentor and his willing 
interlocutor. Several sonnets early in the middle section 
affirm this reciprocity, which is mutuality of their love: 
"Thou gav'st me thine [love and perhaps money], not to give 
back again" (#22). "Then happy I that love and am beloved/ 
Where I may not remove, nor be removed" (#25). Especially 
Sonnet 25 contains a bit of bravado in its claim that the 
relationship will remain static in its bliss, because we 
know that he and his beloved part for a time.
The separation and the beloved's ensuing indiscretion 
cause their relationship to fluctuate with the passage of 
Time, but here in Sonnet 22 the poet-lover unequivocally 
establishes that his relationship with the young man is 
mutually beneficial to each of them. As such, their union 
is grounded in reciprocal love; it is one that will grow 
and mature in spite of the ravages of Time and the hurt of 
deception. This reciprocity, according to Barber, is 
"expressed with an unparalleled fullness and intensity. It 
is love by identification rather than sexual possession" 
("ESS" 18). Because he is not above reproach, because he 
too cannot resist temptation, Will identifies with his Fair
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Friend's infidelity. As he sees the similitude in their 
physical drives, he also recognizes their like-mindedness 
in spirit. Deeming their like-mindedness the more 
important of the two because it unites rather than 
separates, he refrains from judging his friend's 
indiscretions.
Differing with J.W. Lever who, in "The Poet in 
Absence," suggests that the sonnets of separation "show a 
slackening of tension" (77), I suggest that they reveal a 
heightening of tension. This heightening, caused by 
physical separation, enables emotional growth, which then 
allows transcendence— for the poet-lover and for his 
readers. By distancing himself from his beloved Fair 
Friend, he can more clearly assess their relationship. The 
result is that the poet-lover achieves a maturity not 
previously indicated. A new level of being, what Knight 
refers to as some point of "higher integration" (ME 28), is 
noted especially in the poet-lover's painful response to 
his knowledge of the sexual commingling of his "two loves."
Even after the Fair Friend succumbs to the seduction 
of Will's mistress, Will refuses to discard what he comes 
to know is a meaningful relationship with his friend.
After the betrayal, we can envision his own words of an 
earlier sonnet echoing in his brain:
And loathsome canker lives in sweetest bud.
Authorizing thy trespass with compare,
Myself corrupting salving thy amiss,
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Excusing thy sins more than thy sins are?
For to thy sensual fault I bring in sense—
Thy adverse party is thy advocate—
(#35)
In this complicated sonnet, the first to indicate a breach 
in Will's relationship with his Fair Friend, Will assumes 
the role of advocate rather than of accuser. Although he 
does not explain here the "sins" committed by the Fair 
Friend, the reader senses that Will dismisses them as a 
generally accepted imperfection of humanity— one that 
certainly Will himself shares with his friend. This 
imperfection is as common to humanity as the cankerworm is 
to the fragrant rose. Just as the cankerworm "consumes the 
bud from within’? (Booth, ££ 190), so the dalliance of lust 
can erode love between individuals. The Dark Lady sonnets 
later will affirm that this flaw, which leads to the 
friend's "sins," is epithumia, the unharnessed lust that 
causes one reach out for that which he desires and does not 
have— be it fame, financial gain, or a friend's mistress. 
Because Will is human, he is hurt by his friend's 
duplicitous actions.
In true Aristotelian fashion, Will seeks a logical 
explanation, an acceptable and convincing means, to 
overcome the betrayal. Specifically, he tries to 
rationalize the Fair Friend's sexual indiscretion with his 
Dark Lady, depicting himself to be above the counter­
productive reaches of jealousy: "Loving offenders, thus I
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will excuse ye:/Thou dost love her, because thou know'st I 
love her" (#42). At this point in the sequence, we are not 
convinced of his claim to be above jealousy; however, his 
statement becomes more credible when he returns from a 
three-year separation from his beloved. That time of 
absence from his beloved hones his artistic skill, as 
evidenced in the later sonnets to his Fair Friend.
Barber comments on the intervening "tortuous sonnets,"
the ones that refer to Will's being wronged by his beloved
and his mistress:
Indeed, bitter as these sonnets are, they express 
a response to the humiliation life has brought 
which moves in the direction of art. Most men 
would bury the event in silence, or else turn 
injury into anger. Shakespeare turns injury into 
poetry. The very act of writing about the 
betrayal is a kind of acceptance of it.
("ESS" 23)
Having matured in his love, having reached a new level in 
both his love and in his art, Will manages to forgive the 
friend's sexual indiscretion and subsequently to allow that 
indiscretion to become a statement within his art. He then 
seeks "To give full growth to that [love] which still doth 
grow" (#115). These sonnets are generally viewed as the 
most successful in the series.
In them, he idealistically proclaims that neither 
Time, nor separation, nor betrayal can kill that love which 
is true. Those adverse forces may temporarily affect such 
a love, but they are powerless to quench it. What happens
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to the poet-lover in the interim imposed by Time, 
separation, or betrayal is that his love is refined to a 
higher level of selflessness. This is not an irrational 
kind of selflessness that blinds Will to the truth about 
his beloved; rather, it is a painfully honest selflessness 
that allows him to see his beloved's imperfections while 
recognizing that they pale through the lens of love. He 
writes; "My love is strengthened, though more weak in 
seeming?/ I love not less, though less the show appear" 
(#102). Having reached a new plateau in his love for his 
friend, he can more critically assess their reciprocal love 
for the other.
By making himself vulnerable to love, and thus 
vulnerable to hurt, he grows as both poet and lover. The 
tension in this paradox of love is frequently that which 
fuels the greatest artistic productivity. Because of its 
value to the poetic process, the poet (such as Will) must 
be willing to experience love in all its confusing 
possibilities. The outcome of love, as with all human 
relationships is, as Waller assesses, "unpredictable and 
risky. . . . And yet without vulnerability and contingency, 
without the sense of being thrown into the world, . . . 
there can be no growth" (EPSC 229).
Weiser's terms "vulnerability and contingency" 
correlate to "novelty and contingency" in the argument made 
by Hall in Word and Spirit. Discussing the "historical
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consciousness," which emanates from the psychic world-view,
Hall writes that the:
future becomes present as that which has really 
not yet happened, as an awesome realm of 
possibility and contingency. The historical 
sense of future brings with it a sense of reality 
to novelty and contingency. In this 
consciousness, reality is no longer imagined to 
be complete and self-contained, closed and fixed, 
static and eternal. Now the world is pictured as 
essentially open, developing, unfolding, from its 
original creation to ever new creative 
possibilities.
(H£ 31)
Separation from his beloved allows Will, the historically 
conscious poet, to recognize that his relationship with his 
beloved is not doomed by the indiscretion with the Dark 
Lady. Because he can perceive both the present and the 
past while simultaneously envisioning the future, he can 
assess that theirs is a relationship in flux. Though it 
may be "unpredictable and risky" (Weiser, MS 229), their 
relationship is worth salvaging because it ultimately is 
good and productive, opening up "to ever new creative 
possibilities" (Hall, 31). And it is through those 
"creative possibilities," through his poetry, that Will 
works to salvage his relationship with his Fair Friend.
This rescue process is not carried out while he looks 
through rose-colored glasses. On the contrary, he 
critically examines his relationship with his beloved. He 
then employs "the skills of the perfumer, the alchemist, 
[and] the flatterer" as the means whereby he will transform
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actuality into art; afterward, he supplies ’’the colors of 
the dyer and the rhetorician," leaving his readers poetic 
evidence of a relationship that is good in spite of its 
precariousness (Ferry, XL 41). Continuing the image of 
"loathsome canker" first provided in Sonnet 35, Will 
compares the Fair Friend's betrayal to "a canker in the 
fragrant rose" (#95). And, like the perfumer who distills 
the "sweetest odors" (#54) from the petals of those 
corrupted roses that fall off the vine, the poet-lover uses 
his art to transform his imperfect beloved and his culpable 
mistress into something worthwhile— either a poetry of 
praise for that which is beautiful or a poetry of dispraise 
for that which is unattractive or cankered.
For the poet-lover, this distilling process is his 
art. As he yields both to love and to art in order to 
perpetuate his beloved, the poet-lover achieves another, 
perhaps an even more desired end; he likewise immortalizes 
himself. Barber comments on this process:
Loving by identifying with the person loved 
can have a special scope for Shakespeare which it 
does not have for people who are not poets, 
because he can realize his friend's beauty and 
value in words. To realize the relationship by 
turning it into poetry gives a fulfillment which 
actually is physical, in that the poem, as 
utterance, is a physical act. That the writing 
of a sonnet provides a kind of physical union 
with the friend explains at least in part, I 
think, the recurrent emphasis on the sonnets as 
rescuing the beloved from death. . . . But the 
sustaining reality in the theme of immortality is 
that the poet, in the act of writing the poem,
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experiences a lover's sense of triumphing over 
time by becoming one with great creating nature 
as embodied in another being.
("ESS" 18-19)
Somewhat as perfume, which perpetuates the odor of the 
living physical rose, the printed poem immortalizes the 
relationship between the poet-lover and his beloved. 
Additionally, the relationship between poet-lover and his 
art is akin to the correspondence between a rose and its 
distilled perfume: the rose is a physical, concrete
presence whose qualities are transformed into an absent, 
albeit intangible yet noticeably viable, presence of 
fragrant ftimes.
It is through this distillation process, through a
kind of metamorphosis of the corporeal self into the
written word, that the artist textually confronts the
reader and thus perpetuates the authorial self. R.S. White
does not directly address Shakespeare's Sonnets in his
essay "Metamorphosis by Love in Elizabethan Romance,
Romantic Comedy, and Shakespeare's Early. Comedies," but
some of his conclusions apply to them as well. Crediting
Shakespeare with patterning emotional flux after Ovid's
Metamorphosis. White assesses the role of love in
Elizabethan writings:
love precipitates a transformation that is first 
and foremost internal, a change of feelings so 
drastic that it causes a noticeable alteration in 
conduct. The change may be reflected externally, 
either involuntarily in a change of shape or form 
(on the model of Ovid's Metamorphosis  ^f or
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voluntarily, as when a lover disguises himself in 
order to place himself closer to his beloved. To 
the sufferer, the process may be sudden or 
gradual, conscious or unconscious, violent or 
unobtrusive, welcome or terrifying, morally 
acceptable or repulsive. Change caused by the 
emotional shock of love holds equally a threat 
and a hope. It shows that we are capable of 
growth by adapting to new emotional pressures, 
but the growth is at the expense of shedding an 
old identity, painfully acquiring a new 
dependence upon another person.
(15)
For Elizabethan writers, love is dynamic, effecting visible 
changes in the individual. White calls it a "magnetic and 
mysterious force" which, if it is caritas rather than 
cupiditas, can result in positive emotional growth for the 
lover, or poet-lover. Unfortunately, the positive will be 
sustained only temporarily.
Shakespeare goes on to say that when (not if) the two 
loving partners disappoint and betray the other, their 
relationship will endure because it is bound by mutual 
love:
That you were unkind befriends me now,
And for that sorrow which I then did feel 
Needs must I under my transgression bow,
Unless my nerves were brass or hammered steel.
For if you were by my unkindness shaken,
As I by yours, y'have passed a hell of time,
And I, a tyrant, have no leisure taken 
To weigh how once I suffered in your crime.
0 that our night of woe might have remembr'ed 
My deepest sense, how hard true sorrow hits,
And soon to you as you to me then tend'red 
The humble salve which wounded bosoms fits!
But that your trespass now becomes a fee?
Mine ransoms yours, and yours must ransom me.
(#120)
237
This sonnet# which Booth describes as a "paradox of 
beneficial ill" (S£ 404), incorporates a medical metaphor 
to describe the potentially rejuvenative benefits of a love 
which ultimately yields good. The sonnet tells of two who 
have each been wronged by the other. Fortunately# however, 
the "humble salve," which is the healing balm of selfless, 
reciprocal love, enables forgiveness to discount the 
trespasses. In Sonnet 154, he will call this same salve 
the "healthful remedy" that repairs even the most lustful 
heart— that of Cupid himself. Since the relationship 
between Will and his beloved is one of reciprocity, one 
that is grounded in love, Time may alter but it cannot 
destroy the substance of their feelings.
To convince his reader of the validity of his words, 
Shakespeare calls into play the Aristotelian principle of 
the poet (speaker) whose ethos (character) is an integral 
part of the rhetorical (artistic) process (Rhetoric 2.1. 
2-3). Shakespeare's medium is art, rather than judicial 
deliberation or pure persuasion, but the writer's role is 
equivalently significant in aesthetic communication as in 
other forms of rhetoric. The artist's poetic "dialogue" 
with the reader reflects not only the emotional tension 
between the characters within the drama, but the text 
likewise says something notable about the poet himself.
Fineman comments on this connection between 
Shakespeare and Aristotle:
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As early as Aristotle, however, it is recognized 
that the rhetorical magnification praise accords 
its object also rebounds back upon itself, 
drawing attention to itself and to its own 
rhetorical procedure, drawing attention, that is 
to say, to its own grandiloquent rhetoricity.
(SEE 5)
As Shakespeare's Will writes sonnets in praise of his male 
beloved and sonnets in dispraise of his female lover, the 
text necessarily "rebounds” back to the self who composes 
those sonnets. As Shakespeare's persona lauds the creative 
power of the artist, he thus magnifies the true legacy of 
the poet-lover, which is that "a man's [own] spirit can be 
preserved in poetry" (Barber, "ESS" 19). Through his 
words, he can distill and fashion for perpetuity that which 
he would have them know about himself, his beloved, his 
mistress, and their complex interwoven relationships. And 
the knowledge that he shares with his readers is that which 
is perceived, filtered, and then crafted through his 
creative powers that lend a quality of immortality to that 
which rises from the printed page.
In analyzing the concluding line of Sonnet 65 ("That 
in black ink my love may still shine bright"), Weiser 
argues that for the poet-lover, "belief in poetic 
immortality is an act of faith. The speaker has retained 
that faith despite" (MG 71) the overwhelming disappointment 
that accompanies his relationship with his Fair Friend. 
Taking Weiser's faith-act analogy a step farther, I would 
add that "belief in poetic immortality is an act of faith"
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for the beloved of whom the poet-lover writes and the 
reader for (and to) whom the poet-lover writes. As the 
reader encounters both poet-lover and beloved through the 
printed word, she affirms that both continue to live, at 
least for a time, through the intellectual and emotional 
responses that are elicited by the persona who "speaks" 
from the text.
Sonnet 116, perhaps the one most easily recognized and
the one most frequently quoted from the sequence, expresses
the levels of love, art, and perpetuity that Will gains
through his literary journey into love:
Let me not to the marriage of true minds 
Admit impediments. Love is not love 
Which alters when it alteration finds,
Or bends with the remover to remove.
0 no, it is an ever-fixed mark
That looks on tempests and is never shaken;
It is the star to every wandering bark,
Whose worth's unknown, although his height be 
taken.
Love's not time's fool, though rosy lips and 
cheeks
Within his bending sickle's compass come.
Love alters not with his brief hours and weeks, 
But bears it out ev'n to the edge of doom.
If this be error and upon me proved,
I never writ, nor no man ever loved.
Booth suggests that this is one of the few Shakespearean
sonnets that we might take at face value (S£ 389). Weiser
more specifically argues that Shakespeare's "use of
negative definitions [of love] constitute an experiential
test by which to recognize false changing love" (HQ 79).
Capitalizing on Weiser's reference to "test," we can
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extrapolate that the poet provides the litmus paper, his 
printed poem, whereby his readers might judge the quality 
of love his persona exhibits through each of his 
relationships.
As an additional benefit to the reader, she can then 
apply these same principles to her own experiences, 
allowing the writer of the aesthetic text to touch her 
life, which is her reality, in a personal, tangible way.
In contemplating the art that reflects life, she 
simultaneously reinforces the relationship between text, 
writer, and self as reader. Perhaps not an overtly 
conscious act, the reader nevertheless affirms this 
productive dialogue with the writer whenever she picks up a 
text to read it. As Booth suggests, the lines that she 
reads may not even require explanation in order to effect a 
result (£S 389). Because words have an almost inexplicable 
ability (what Gorgias called "magic") to empower their 
"beholder" to interpret and apply those same words to her 
personal life, they establish a corporeal link between 
reader and writer.
An equally powerful link is the one between poet and 
his text, between poet and the words that he leaves to his 
readers. The poet's words become his textual legacy to the 
world? or, as Sidney would say, his poetry becomes his 
"epitaph." The concluding couplet of Shakespeare's Sonnet 
116 ("If this be error and upon me proved,/ I never writ,
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nor no man ever loved") affirms not only the relationship 
between the poet-lover and his beloved, but it also 
provides evidence of the love between them. Shakespeare 
thus echoes Sidney's imperative "that while you live, you 
live in love, and never get favor for lacking skill of a 
sonnet" with its inherent promise "and, when you die, your 
memory [will not] die from the earth for want of an 
epitaph" (Defense 624). Shakespeare's sonnet sequence 
provides evidence that his poet-lover follows Sidney's 
instruction to "live in love" so that he might use his 
skill with words to carve his epitaph, which is the poetry 
he leaves behind.
The chisel that the poet uses to carve such an epitaph 
is necessarily paradoxical; in order to assess the 
emotional fluctuations that threaten the rational 
equilibrium of humanity, he necessarily must expose 
humanity as it exists— the pure alongside the impure.
While Shakespeare plots Will's emotional journey in this 
sequence, we see an individual who applies this test to his 
own life as he struggles between ideal and sexual realms of 
love. Evidence of this struggle is manifest through the 
conflicting, and more frequently ambiguous, ranges of 
Will's emotions in the sequence. Here in Sonnet 116, the 
vision of love is that of the ideal relationship.
And feelings (pathos) become the emotional barometer 
by which the reader might determine the force, the quality
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of love within the relationships that Will describes. I 
cannot agree with Katharine M. Wilson's thesis in 
Shakespeare's Sugared Sonnets that Shakespeare presents his 
collection of poems as a parody of the sonnet sequence 
tradition. (How can we possibly view Sonnet 116, one often 
quoted in the exchange of marriage vows, as parody?) She 
argues that "he reduced the whole thing to the absurd" (SSS 
82). Striving (I feel rather unsuccessfully) to support 
her own argument, Wilson says that "Shakespeare has taken 
the sonnet talk seriously, and by playing with it made it 
nonsense" (SSS 96). Granted, parody can be found, 
especially in many of the Dark Lady sonnets, but it does 
not dominate every sonnet as Wilson would have us believe. 
Neither does parody necessarily make that which is parodied 
"nonsense." Perhaps Wilson's emphasis on parody in 
Shakespeare's sonnets might better be accepted if we 
approach her thesis as one that ignores a problem in 
semantics.
In his analysis, one that we can use to refute 
Wilson's claim that the sonnets can be reduced to parody, 
Fineman protests that semantically "parody" is the wrong 
term to apply to many of Shakespeare's sonnets. Fineman 
offers an alternative expression to describe more 
accurately what Shakespeare does in Sonnets 127-52. He 
substitutes the phrase "a poetry of praise paradox" fSPE 
86) to denote the Dark Lady sonnets which most seem to mock
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the convention that they represent. Less pejorative than 
the term "parody," which can (though it does not always) 
connote something as degrading as ribald mockery, Fineman's 
terms more precisely suggest Shakespeare's possible motives 
for writing the Fair Friend and the Dark Lady segments 
within the sequence: to delineate the various levels of
love. Can we possibly conclude, then, that even the Dark 
Lady sonnets are, as Wilson argues, "nonsense"? Some, such 
as Sonnet 130, quite obviously are sonnets of dispraise 
(far from "nonsense") or, as Fineman says, poems of "praise 
paradox."
In the famous blazon that begins "My mistress' eyes 
are nothing like the sun" (#130), Shakespeare does indeed 
seem to mock the laudatory descriptions that previous 
sonneteers render of their beloveds, but Shakespeare makes 
a very serious statement in the Dark Lady sonnets, 
beginning with Sonnet 130. Viewing the Dark Lady sonnets 
cumulatively, the message seems unmistakably clear: lust
is common to humanity. Because it inhibits true 
relationship and creative power, it would best be avoided. 
But the poet-lover does not follow what his own work seems 
to suggest. As a result, he pays the price of twenty-six 
Dark Lady sonnets that fail to expose a redeeming 
relationship. What he does is to implicate himself as one 
guilty of lying and deceit: "For I have sworn thee fair:
more perjured eye,/ To swear against the truth so foul a
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lie I" (#152) He thus identifies himself with that which 
the majority of the sonnets would have us believe he would 
prefer to avoid.
The terms he uses to describe the Dark Lady suggest 
that she is one whom a rational being ought to resist: she
is "false" (#127), "Savage, extreme, rude, cruel, not to 
trust" (#129), and "tyrannous" (#131). Her sexuality and 
seduction "torture" (#133) him into a kind of "Hell"
(#129). They give him "pain" (#141), but he plays along 
with her game of love, thus revealing the recognizable 
power of the sexual appetite over the rational part of the 
individual. The contrast is blatant: the love of the Fair 
Friend is virtue that empowers the poet, and "the moral 
blackness of the Dark Lady is promiscuity" (Smith, TTL 51) 
that inhibits the poet. The destructive force of his lust 
for the lady is thus pitted against the productive quality 
of his love for his Fair Friend. This conflict enables 
Shakespeare's poet-lover to analyze those which are the 
strongest, the most powerful, of all human drives— love and 
its physical craving, lust.
If we were to dismiss all 154 of Shakespeare's sonnets 
as an exercise in parody, which Wilson would have us do, I 
fear that we would radically reduce the greatness of 
Shakespeare's talent. The questions that Will raises 
throughout the sequence are legitimate concerns of all 
rational creatures: How can I perpetuate myself and thus
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combat the onslaught of Time? How do I maintain a loving 
relationship? How do I rise above lustful liaisons? How 
do I redeem myself and restore my productivity once I 
succumb to lust? Shakespeare may sometimes proffer 
solutions that initially seem ridiculously parodic, but his 
questions demand serious consideration.
Russell Fraser agrees, but, in "Shakespeare at
Sonnets," he cautions readers not to expect to glean
immediate solutions to any of life's problems:
Shakespeare's questions have answers, but readers 
who take thought won't speak them too 
quickly. . . . His multilayered performances 
don't preclude meaning, though; and the sonnets—  
never mind how much trouble they give— aren't 
conundrums. But Shakespeare's meaning is 
comprehensive like the life his poems describe.
(427)
Meaning resides in Shakespeare's Sonnets. but only if the 
reader approaches them with the desire necessary to find 
that meaning. I would thus qualify Russell's assessment: 
meaning is potentially comprehensive for the reader. It 
comes to the reader directly proportionate to the manner in 
which she receives and processes those subjects that 
Shakespeare discusses— time, change, and procreation. As 
she, the willing reader, "lovingly" analyzes the results of 
positive love (caritas) and negative love (cupiditas) on 
the regenerative, redemptive, procreative, epitaphic 
aspects of life, she can hope to address similar situations 
in her own reality.
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Shakespeare's sonnets do not suggest closure? the 
sequence does not assure readers that virginal love will 
forever assuage desires of lust. Rather, the four 
different sections highlight and magnify those which are 
spiritually and physically significant aspects of the human 
condition— the alternating states of love and lust. As 
Fineman observes, we witness the poet-lover in his ongoing 
struggle "between his ego and his ego ideal" (SPE 25). On 
an ascending scale reminiscent of Plato's upward movement 
to the Ideal, an ego must be versed in duty to community 
and social continuity (procreation section), must be 
instructed in pure love (Fair Friend section), must be 
warned against lust (Dark Lady section), and must be shown 
a better way (Cupid section). As the sonnets depict an ego 
struggling with his humanity, a struggle with which modern 
readers might identify, Shakespeare provides a litmus test. 
This litmus test allows the reader to assess the talent of 
the poet-lover as his struggle becomes his poetry; it also 
provides positive and negative guidelines to judge love, 
the greatest of human emotions.
We may tend to be as confused at the ending of the 
sonnet sequence as we were at the beginning, as we share in 
Will's conundrum of human nature. Because confusion is 
inherent in the conflict between opposing forces within the 
human condition, between the physical and the spiritual, 
between lust and love, between the concrete and the
247
abstract, between presence and absence, complete resolution 
is impossible. However, because confusion also provides, 
as Heraclitus might say, the tension that leads to 
understanding, we can be comforted by those brief moments 
of discernment that come as we journey with the poet along 
the textual highway of love. In the words of Heraclitus: 
"The counter-thrust brings together, and from tones at 
variance comes perfect attunement, and all things come to 
pass through conflict" (Fragments LXXV). For the interim 
allowed by the reading experience, the reader travels 
alongside the absent presence of the author— accepting, 
refuting, or ignoring the observations that he makes and 
the premises that he offers.
Along the way, the writer temporarily asks his reader 
to perceive through the "eyes" of his persona. As she 
responds affirmatively, they become passengers together in 
the literary vehicle, which is Shakespeare's poetry.
Because of impassable gaps in language, in thought, and in 
perception, the reader cannot hope to achieve Heraclitean 
"perfect attunement" with all that the writer sets forth. 
Nevertheless, as the reader engages the various literary 
elements, one of which is the writer's persona, she will 
allow herself at least to approach rhetorical nexus with 
the writer. Together, through the operation of the 
persona, the writer and reader thus affirm the triangular 
relationship that emanates from the original rhetorical
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triangle of text/writer/reader. The separate literary 
triangles (text/writer/empowerer, text/reader/character, 
writer/reader/persona) fully overlay and expand the 
original rhetorical triangle (text/writer/reader), which is 
the basis for all communication.
Like the personae of Sidney and Shakespeare, 
Dickinson's poet-lover offers a plenitude of meaningful 
communication to her willing, responsive, and responsible 
reader. As this nineteenth-century writer necessarily, and 
successfully, engages the triangular operations between 
writer/text/reader, she further experiments with absences 
in the communication process. The result is that she 
explodes the "circumference" of rhetorical and literary 
boundaries, carrying her reader along with her into the 
poetry of modernity.
Chapter 6
Emily Dickinson's Absent Presence 
and
Some Concluding Remarks
Exploring the absent presence in Sidney's Astroohil 
and Stella and following it through Shakespeare's Sonnets 
might readily be.acknowledged as a logical critical 
endeavor. Certain similarities pervade both writers and 
their works. Sidney and Shakespeare were near­
contemporaries in the British Renaissance; each wrote in 
the sonnet-sequence tradition; each created and sustained a 
persona, a singular voice, who maintains a viable presence 
in the sequence; and each heralds the power of love. 
Sidney's Astrophil, toward the end of the sequence, begins 
to recognize that he can use his art to transform and 
redeem his unrequited love for the absent Stella. Their 
relationship may have failed, but his art ultimately will 
triumph as future readers affirm his experience through the 
written text. For Will, too, love is fundamental. It is 
that which overcomes disappointment in relationships and 
ensures perpetuity for both poet and beloved.
Although Sidney and Shakespeare elucidate the idea 
differently, each sequence admits to a powerful absent 
presence that motivates the writing and controls the 
development of the poetic program. And although
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Shakespeare does not pen a critical treatise comparable to 
Sidney's The Defense of Poetry, he does manipulate the 
voice of his persona to interpolate some of his own views 
of poet and poetic process. Moving from the sonnet- 
sequence of Sidney to that of Shakespeare thus suggests a 
logical progression. However, the transition from 
Shakespeare and his Sonnets to Emily Dickinson and her 
poetry may seem to be an unjustifiable leap. As I continue 
to develop the idea of the absent presence in this chapter 
with selected poetry of Emily Dickinson, I will not call 
upon my reader to "willingly suspend disbelief" in order to 
accept my premise. Rather, I will provide evidence to show 
that the same absent presence that runs through the sonnet- 
sequences of Sidney and Shakespeare similarly pervades a 
large portion of Dickinson's poetry.
As with Astrophil and Will, Dickinson's poet-lover is 
dually impelled by love: love for her absent beloved
provides a subject for the poetry, and love for 
communicating with her absent reader motivates the writing 
of that poetry. For Dickinson, even more than for Sidney 
and Shakespeare, love at various levels (poet- 
lover/beloved, poet-lover/reader, reader/poet, poet and 
reader/written word) is powerful. Love is that which 
allows transcendence by text; it is that which enables at 
least a temporary convergence between a reader and a writer
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who are separated by time and place. Love is that which 
fosters an absent presence out of an absence.
An obvious obstacle in including Dickinson and her 
poetry in a study such as this in which author and selected 
works are to be analyzed in one relatively brief chapter is 
that her corpus is so extensive. As it is compiled and 
edited by Thomas H. Johnson, Dickinson's body of poetry is 
comprised of 1775 poems. Additionally, she leaves 
substantial correspondence to family, friends, and 
associates, affirming that she not only dutifully adhered 
to, but masterfully performed, the accepted social custom 
of maintaining epistolary communication with family and 
friends. Cumulatively, her poetry and correspondence point 
to a complex author who seriously and thoughtfully fashions 
her art, and just as seriously and thoughtfully composes 
her every word to others. Dickinson's letters are 
important for any study of her poetry because they reveal 
insights into both her personal life and her professional 
concerns.
Perhaps even more significantly, her letters seem to 
be a kind of creative training ground for the poet-in- 
process. Developing the thesis that "poems had become 
letters to Dickinson and letters, poems," Paula Bennett, in 
her essay "Spectral Presence in Emily Dickinson's Letters," 
questions Johnson's reasons for editing Dickinson's poetry 
separately from her letters. She suggests that, in doing
252
so, he did the poet (and her readers) a tremendous 
disservice in "splitting the poems from the letters"
("SPEDL" 76, 77). I wholeheartedly agree. Because we 
cannot easily view the letters alongside the poetry, our 
task of interpreting the poetry and assessing the 
methodology of the poet Dickinson is made more difficult.
Judith Farr convincingly develops the idea that 
Dickinson's poetry and letters are the same art. Building 
her argument on Dickinson's tendency to revise both poetry 
and letters, Farr writes in The Passion of Emilv 
Dickinson: "Dickinson usually made drafts of her letters,
which she clearly regarded as artistic efforts, like the 
poems" (199). Through this exercise in "Writing letters 
that scan, enclosing poems in letters, composing poems that 
are letters, revising and rerevising both, Dickinson did 
not always sharply distinguish between the uses of her art" 
(PEP 16). If, for Dickinson, letters and poems are textual 
outpourings of at least a similar art, any careful study of 
Dickinson's poetry demands looking into her letters.
Hence, I will frequently refer to Johnson's Emilv 
Dickinson: Selected Letters.
We dare not take any of her letters at face value 
because, as in her poetry, she frequently assumes poses, 
creating a persona other than herself. An early writing to 
T.W. Higginson reveals the assumed self that she wants her 
preceptor and professional advisor to see:
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I have a Brother and Sister— My Mother does not 
care for thought— and Father, too busy with 
Briefs— to notice what we do— He buys me many
Books— but begs me not to read them— because he
fears they joggle the Mind.
(25 April 1862)
No extant textual evidence supports the claim that
Dickinson's mother did not care for thought or that her
father gave her books then implored her not to read them
for fear of the intellectual damage they might cause.
Instead of describing the actual relationship she had with
each of her parents, she creates an alternative role for
herself as daughter. Dickinson thus experiments with an 
assumed stance. Although she apparently aimed for 
plausibility, she gambles (and "gambols") on pity as a ploy 
that will subsequently elicit the desired emotive response 
from her reader Higginson. Providing a critical window 
through which we can observe the poet's creative telos, 
Dickinson's letters, at least in part, reveal the poet as 
she designs and redesigns the textual absent presences that 
she wants us, her readers, to see.
Poem 724 describes her thoughts on this ability to
create personae. She compares it to the creation of life:
It's easy to invent a Life—
God does it— every Day—
Creation— but the Gambol 
Of His Authority—
Later lines in the poem comment on creative omnipotence,
which allows God at will to "Proceed— inserting Here— a
Sun/There— leaving out a Man— ." The Renaissance play
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between Sun and Son (of God), who is spiritually present 
though physically absent, suggests that Dickinson is 
capitalizing, albeit playfully in this poem, on the idea of 
absent presence. Extending the analogy to her personal 
role in poetic inventiveness, the poet concludes that she, 
the writer, like God, can also "invent a Life" of absent 
presence— even for herself in her letters. The image is 
that of the poet who, again like God, methodically, 
purposefully, willfully, and sometimes teasingly frames her 
text.
Like Bennett and Farr, Paul J. Ferlazzo emphasizes the
critical importance of Dickinson's letters. He argues in
Emily Dickinson that they are crucial to our understanding
her role as a poet who controls her writing in order to
control her audience:
Letters were, indeed, a form of magic by which 
Emily Dickinson could control her friends, could 
keep them at a suitable distance and in a certain 
relationship to her. They were the power by 
which she gained emotional and intellectual 
support in return for the devotion she offered.
(127-28)
The key words in this passage are "magic," "control," and 
"devotion." These three elements constitute reciprocity 
through the text: Dickinson devotedly (or lovingly) uses
her "magic" (with language) to "control" (or guide) her 
readers in and through the textual exchange. The result 
can be a powerful, and potentially meaningful, experience
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for the reader insofar as she responds in kind to the love, 
the power, and the "magic" of Dickinson.
"Magic" (synonymous with Dickinson's "spectral") will 
be a term that will surface periodically in the development 
of this chapter. At no time will it suggest a hocus-pocus, 
sleight-of-hand activity; neither will it refer to 
witchcraft or demonic activity. Rather, it will always 
indicate that virtually indescribable, hence "magical," 
quality of words which decidedly affects— emotionally, 
intellectually, even physically— the individual who reads 
or hears them. "Magic," as I apply it to Dickinson's 
poetry and her poetic program, is akin to the mysterious 
essence that the Greek sophist Gorgias pointed to in his 
defense of Helen: "Speech is a powerful lord that with the
smallest and most invisible body accomplished almost 
godlike works" (Encomiumf par. 8).
Richard Sewall, whose text is generally accepted as 
the standard in Dickinson biography, does not use the term 
"magic" in describing the power of Dickinson's words, but 
his comment draws a parallel that further links her to 
Gorgias. Specifically, what he recognizes as her 
materialistic view of language echoes the Gorgian concept 
of the materiality of logos that enters the body through 
the ear and works its power in the soul of the listener.
As Sewall distinguishes Dickinson's view of language from 
the Romantic "notion of winged words, message-bearing
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verses," he writes that she grants an "immediate, intimate 
power of the word, of the 'jostling' syllable or the 
malarial sentence" (LED 676). Sewall employs an 
interesting metaphor to describe the power of Dickinson's 
words: his "malarial sentence" suggests that words, like
malaria, invade the body though external stimuli. If the 
stinging of an anopheles mosquito results in chills, fever, 
and sweating, the analogy is that the reading of the word 
has comparable physical manifestations.
Gary Lee Stonum specifically addresses the element of 
power in Dickinson's poetry. His essay, "Emily Dickinson's 
Calculated Sublime," suggests that Dickinson's sublimity is 
conditional sublimity, one that is calculated so as to 
emphasize power over "wildness and divine exaltation"
("EDCS" 102). In this passage, Stonum substitutes 
"wildness and divine exaltation" for sublimity; I could 
substitute "magic." If Stonum is correct, and I think that 
he is, Dickinson always sublimates "magic" in favor of 
power because it is the poet's power that creates textual 
presence. The "magic" can come if the artist's power is in 
the text, but "magic" alone does not guarantee power; it 
does not yield an absent presence. Stonum explains that 
"Power is a word Dickinson rarely fails to capitalize; it 
belongs with presence, circumference, and a few others as 
one of the central animating abstractions in her poetry" 
("EDCS" 102). Reserving Dickinson's "circumference" for a
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later discussion, I will focus here on the pairing of power 
and presence. If, as Sewall suggests in the previous 
passage, Dickinson does view the written word as corporeal 
substance, it is a substance of potential power and of 
discernible presence.
A part of my thesis is that this corporeality of the 
written word underscores Dickinson's writings— her poetry 
and her prose. For the nineteenth-century poet who focuses 
on the small, the tiny, comparing herself to the wren and 
the daisy, the even smaller word becomes her greatest ally; 
it becomes her power. First significantly exhibiting this 
potential for verbal expression through her correspondence, 
she found prose too limiting as a medium for her talent.
She needed a tiny medium, poetry, that would allow her 
readers a widening of interpretations. The "magic11 (which, 
for Dickinson, is manifest through her poetry) resides in 
her implicitly powerful words.
Through her poems, explicitly composed as works of 
art, and her letters, incidentally shaped as works of art, 
Dickinson finds poetry superior to prose in its ability to 
work a verbal "spell" over an audience. Because her 
letters scan like verse, because they lyrically and 
aesthetically speak to her reader, they are at least quasi- 
poetic. However, in heralding the affective quality of the 
poetic word, she was not content that "They shut me up in 
Prose" (#613). Her poetic genius demanded that she enlarge
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both the scope of her writing and the sphere of her 
audience. Satisfied neither with the textual restrictions 
of prose nor the numerical limitations of personal 
acquaintances, she sought expression through poetic 
metaphor intended for people whom she did not know.
Bennett argues that "Whether poetry or letters, her writing 
was her word made flesh, concealing and revealing its 
creator in the very act of revelation" ("BMCS" 95). By 
making incorporeal thought corporeal, by "concealing" her 
real self while "revealing" her assumed self through an 
absent presence, Dickinson sought to establish 
communication with her reader. Hers was an ambitious 
aim.
The first lines of #441 characterize her aggressive 
poetic aim: "This is my letter to the World/ That never
wrote to Me." Her poetry, all 1775 individual poems, and 
her letters thus become her "letter to the World." I do 
not casually include Dickinson's letters with her poems. 
Rather, I suggest that they are alternate means whereby she 
communicates with her audience, an intimate and personal 
reader. And successful communication is accomplished, one 
reader at a time, in great part, through the diverse 
assumed personae she creates. The power of the poet 
emanates from the words of her personae. As they "speak" 
from the printed text the words that she, the poet,
259
controls, they subtly manipulate, working their "magic" 
upon her audience.
Her work thus becomes a verbal body of possibility,
one which she describes in Poem 657:
I dwell in Possibility—
A fairer House than Prose—
More numerous of Windows—
Superior— for Doors—
In that house of possibility, which is her poetry, an
absent presence, especially that of the poet who is creator
of the text, can be discerned by the reader who engages
that text. Through a careful, and caring, manipulation of
her words, the poet imparts a highly-charged absent
presence, whose vitality dominates the reading experience.
Jorge Luis Borges refers to the textual presence as "that
living voice going on and on, and it's speaking to us"
(10). Dynamic in its effect, the "voice" is reactivated
each time a reader willingly partners herself with a
Dickinson poem.
For the student of Dickinson seeking to understand how 
the idea of the absent presence functions in the writer's 
poetic and prose corpus, the task is formidable. The sheer 
volume of her work, without the complexities of her 
language of absence, can intimidate even the professional 
reader of Dickinson. Consequently, I have to establish 
parameters that will reduce my scope and limit my focus. 
Even that task is not easy. Unlike the literary corpus of
260
Sidney and Shakespeare, Dickinson's corpus does not include 
a self-contained sequence of poems that can readily be 
separated from the rest of her work. She did not compose a 
sonnet-sequence or a separate poetic series that sustains 
one clearly defined voice; neither did she create a 
singular persona who is poet-lover throughout her poetry. 
Following the pattern established in her prose, Dickinson 
creates numerous personae who inhabit and speak from her 
poetry. Having mastered the ability to create convincing 
personae for herself in her letters, she multiplies that 
talent numerous times over in her poetry.
These multiple personalities range in scope from a 
Daisy (#106) to a Dollie (#156), from a "Wounded Deer" 
(#165) to a "Nobody" (#288), from a Housewife or "wife" 
(#154, #199) to a Poet (#448), from a Sparrow (#84) to a 
"Soul" (#303), from a Morning (#232) to a cadaver (#465)—
just to name a few. She drew her personae from the world
around her, from life as she experienced and observed it, 
but she avoided specifics that might limit the 
interpretation and narrow the understanding for her reader. 
Poem 1294 explains;
Of Life to own—
From Life to draw—
But never touch the reservoir—
As a poet, the only life that she had was her own— as
daughter, sister, friend, lover, and poet. Necessarily, 
then, she draws from that life and from its ever-widening
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sphere that radiates into the lives of those around her. 
However, and this is a significant aspect of the mystery 
that shrouds any study of Dickinson, she does not ’’touch 
the reservoir,” which is her actual life. She does not 
write poems that are easily distinguished correlations to 
her personal experience. Rather, she employs her skills as 
poet to encapsulate personal experiences and auxiliary 
observations and translate them into understanding for her 
reader.
Using her powerful language, she "Distills amazing 
sense/ From ordinary Meanings— " (#448). That is, she 
takes the specifics of life and metaphorically distills 
them into general experiences. The final step in the 
process belongs to the reader on the opposite side of the 
text, as she, too, distills meaning. Utilizing the reverse 
technique of that implemented by the writer, the reader 
extracts meaning for her specific life from the general 
statement that is housed in the metaphorical language of 
poetry.
In contrast to her Renaissance predecessors, Dickinson 
may not have designed a sequence as such. However, 
physical evidence attests to the fact that she originally 
arranged certain poems into specific groupings, or 
fascicles. These fascicles were made from folded sheets of 
paper, each sheet yielding four sides for writing. She 
would assemble four to six pages together, punch holes into
262
the folded side, and string and tie ribbon through the 
holes. Apparently she rather painstakingly arranged forty 
fascicles in this manner; then she tucked them away in a 
drawer, where they lay in safekeeping until after her 
death. Unfortunately for Dickinson and even more 
unfortunately for readers of Dickinson, editors took the 
fascicles apart and rearranged at will the poetry that was 
purposely wrought and carefully grouped by this nineteenth- 
century poet who adamantly refused to have her work 
published during her lifetime. It is when we view these 
fascicles together that we can reach a somewhat remarkable 
conclusion: a large number of the fascicle poems, when
read apparently as the poet originally intended them, 
assume sequence-like characteristics. These fascicles will 
be the primary source from which I will delineate the 
operation of Dickinson's absent presence.
The process remains complex. Although original 
manuscripts show the poems in their respective forty 
fascicles, they provide little commentary to readers who 
seek to understand Dickinson's reasons for her groupings of 
the poems. William Shurr's text The Marriage of Emilv 
Dickinson: A Study of the Fascicles provides some insight 
into what the poet might have been about in the fascicles. 
Shurr rather thoroughly explores Dickinson's poetry from a 
belief that the fascicles yield a distinctive literary
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unity. He argues that, much like a poetic sequence, they
represent a unified whole:
When the poems are read as Dickinson grouped 
them, and when the groupings are read in their 
original order, what emerges is a remarkable 
unity. Most of the [fascicle] poems are 
generated by a single experience or complex of 
experiences. Each fascicle has a core of 
poems directly related to Dickinson's love affair 
and, later-, to her anomalous marriage. Other 
poems radiate from that center or relate to it in 
some discoverable way. And the fascicles as a 
whole show many of the characteristics of a suite 
or a sequence, like Shakespeare's Sonnets.
(MED 125)
Viewing them in their original arrangement, Shurr assesses 
"that about 150 of the 814 fascicle poems are love poems 
addressed to a specific individual" (MED 7). Sidney 
includes 108 sonnets in his sequence and Shakespeare has 
154 sonnets in his collection. Might we conclude (at least 
tentatively, until future research shows otherwise) that 
150 of Dickinson's poems suggest a comparatively 
substantial cluster of work detailing a poet-lover coming 
to terms with an absent beloved?
Shurr's text adopts a biographical approach, something 
which I cannot fully advocate, but he does make what seems 
to be an important observation concerning Dickinson's 
fascicles. He rather convincingly argues that we do not 
readily see the unifying thread that binds Dickinson's 
fascicle poems because we seldom find, and even more seldom 
read, her poetry as she organized it to be read. When we 
do look at the fascicles together, we find, as Shurr
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recognizes, that their unifying thread is love, a love that 
remains vital and alive in the absence of the beloved who 
is both the source and the focus of the love described.
George F. Whicher, another biographer of Dickinson, 
likewise cites love as the fulcrum of her work. Although 
Whicher may not specify the fascicles as those poems which 
focus primarily on love between poet-lover and absent 
beloved, his comments seem to be directed to that part of 
Dickinson's work when he writes in This was a Poet; "Emily 
Dickinson was the only American poet of her century who 
treated the great lyric theme of love with entire candor 
and sincerity" (269). Dickinson is not the only American 
poet of her century who treats love. Walt Whitman 
certainly writes of love, but his tone of bravado and gusto 
is in sharp contrast to that which emerges from Dickinson's 
poetry.
Like Whitman, she speaks candidly of love. And like 
him, she maintains that it is the most powerful of 
emotions. But her words of love come from a voice of 
quiet, convincing certainty. Dickinson succinctly 
describes the ramifications of love in an 1878 letter to 
Mrs. Samuel Bowles: "Love makes us 'heavenly' without our
trying in the least." It is pervasive, encompassing every 
aspect of existence. It is, according to Farr, that which 
"allowed her to glimpse and record the relation between 
this world and the next. . . . Love was increasingly her
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subject, love as the essential element in all 
understanding" (PEP 319, 321). Not only is love that which 
allows her to approach "circumference" (at least partial, 
or slanted, understanding of this world and the next), it 
also is that which enables meaningful relationships—  
personal and textual. And love is the force that motivates 
her persona who is poet-lover to fashion an absent presence 
from a physically absent beloved.
As in the sonnet sequences of Sidney and Shakespeare,
a large grouping of poems in the fascicles reveals a
singular persona whose voice emanates from the text. It is
the voice of a female poet-lover writing to or about her
absent beloved. The addressed "You," at least in "about
150 of the 814 fascicle poems" (Shurr, MED 7), is the
persona's physically absent, yet vitally present, lover? he
is her "Bright Absentee!" Though absent from her by both
time and place, the beloved plays a significant role in her
artistic endeavor, as evidenced in Poem #339:
I tend my flowers for thee—
Bright Absentee!
My Fuchsia's Coral Seams 
Rip— while the Sower— dreams—
Geraniums— tint— and spot—
Low Daisies— dot—
My Cactus— splits her Beard 
To show her throat—
Carnations— tip their spice—
And Bees— pick up—
A Hyacinth— I hid—
Puts out a Ruffled Head—
And odors fall
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From flasks— so small—
You marvel how they held—
Globe Roses— break their satin flake—
Upon my Garden floor—
Yet— thou— not there—
I had as lief they bore 
No Crimson— more—
Thy flower— be gay—
Her lord— away!
It ill becometh me—
I'll dwell in Calyx— Gray—
How modestly— alway—
Thy Daisy—
Draped for thee!
What makes this poem so critical for my analysis is that it
artistically, in highly erotic terms, describes the
function of the persona's absent beloved. The "flowers"
that the poet-lover tends for her beloved are her life's
work, the words that she writes. The beloved is both the
purpose and the power behind the words; he is the intent of
and the inspiration for her words. Just as the rose cannot
remain static in its fragile beauty, neither can the poet's
words remain cloistered in her mind. Like the rose that
will "break" petals upon the "Garden floor" even when the
master gardener is "not there," the poet-lover's words must
find expression upon the printed page even though her
beloved is absent.
If we look at this poem ("I tend my flowers for 
thee— ") in conjunction with Dickinson's letters, we see 
that the references to flowers (fuchsia, geranium, cactus, 
carnations, hyacinth, and roses) clearly correlate to the
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words of the poet-lover. In an 1853 letter to Henry V.
Emmons, Dickinson writes:
Since receiving your beautiful writing I have 
often desired to thank you thro' a few of my 
flowers, and arranged the fairest for you a
little while ago, but heard you were away—
I have very few today, and they compare but 
slightly with the immortal blossoms you kindly 
gathered me.
This letter reveals a mutual correspondence between 
Dickinson and Emmons. His words are "immortal blossoms" 
for her; she reciprocates by sending him "a few of my 
flowers" artfully "arranged" so as to please him. The
image is of the artist at work, creating and then refining
an aesthetic text— a process of careful writing and 
revision.
In another 1854 letter to the same Henry V. Emmons, 
she again offers an arrangement of her words, apparently as 
an apology for some "little mishap" that occurred the 
evening before: "Will you please receive these blossoms— I
would love to make two garlands for certain friends of 
mine, if the summer were here, and till she comes, perhaps 
one little cluster, will express the wish to both." Then in 
a "Master" letter of 1858, she writes: "You ask me what my
flowers said— they then were disobedient— I gave them 
messages." If her "flowers" were "disobedient," they 
possess a willfulness separate from the one who tends them. 
Especially Poem 494 describes this independence of words:
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Going to Him! Happy letter!
Tell Him—
Tell Him the page I didn't write—
Tell Him— I only said the Syntax—
And left the Verb and pronoun out—
Tell Him just how the fingers hurried—
Then— how they waded— slow-slow—
And then you wished you had eyes in your pages—  
So you could see what moved them so—
This first stanza says much about Dickinson's attitude
concerning writer, reader, and text. Personifying all
three, she characterizes each aspect of the rhetorical
triangle: the writer, or poet-lover, is "I"; the reader is
"Him"; and the text is "You." In embodying the text, she
assigns power to the word that she recognizes as separate
from her power as poet. As a writer, her primary task is
to create the essential verbal framework from which the
reader might glean meaning. Thus, she claims to have "only
said the Syntax— /And left the Verb and pronoun out." It
is then necessary for the words in her syntactical
arrangement to continue the work initiated by the writer.
In her repetitive admonition to her created text to "Tell
Him," she suggests that the word can speak to the reader of
the text in a way that she, the writer, cannot.
Just as she creates a dialogue with the words that she 
writes, those same words subsequently create another 
dialogue with the reader of her text. In that later 
dialogue between text and reader, the words will in turn 
"say" something vital about the author and her creative 
process: "Tell Him just how the fingers hurried— /Then—
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how they waded— slow— slow.11 In a very real way, the words 
reflect the sincerity, the struggle, and the love of the 
poet for both her work and her audience. Words, then, as 
Dickinson describes here, serve as intermediaries between 
writer and reader. They are created by the writer, but 
they act independently of their creator each time a reader 
willingly enters into dialogue with them.
If words can act apart from the author's bidding, they 
are not static markers on a page. Rather, they are infused 
with a dynamic life of their own, a life that is evidenced 
when a reader visits a text and allows the words to produce 
meaning for her. The success of any textual dialogue is 
thus contingent upon the reader; her response to the words 
ultimately determines the outcome of the reading 
experience. Dickinson herself provides evidence of this 
rhetorical operation. In her first letter to Higginson, 
dated 15 April 1862, Dickinson seems anxious for his 
corroboration that her "Verse is alive." She wants his 
assurance that it "breathed" for him, that it spoke to him 
in a real and vital way. Her letters thus substantiate the 
assumption found in her poetry that words are living, 
dynamic entities which can affect a reader.
In another letter to Higginson, dated June 1869, 
Dickinson comments on this vibrant quality of the written 
word;
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A Letter always feels to me like immortality 
because it is the mind alone without corporeal 
friend. Indebted in our talk to attitude and 
accent, there seems a spectral power in thought 
that walks alone.
According to Dickinson, inherent in a letter, and
presumably in any text that is comprised of words, is a bit
of immortality, what she calls a "spectral power in thought
that walks alone." Once the words are written, they belong
no longer exclusively to the person who penned them.
Rather, they are a power unto themselves. While
independent of their creator when acting upon their reader,
they nevertheless maintain a vestige, a discernible
presence, albeit absent, of the originator of the text.
Although the one who wrote the words may not be 
corporeal, may not be physically present to the one who 
reads the words, the writer nevertheless imparts a part of 
herself; her thoughts, her ideas, her experiences, and her 
emotions are imbedded in the written words. A kind of 
immortality for the author results. As the reader engages 
in the writer's printed words, the two who are absent from 
the other communicate in a very real way. Words thus exude 
a power, which may be "spectral" but clearly discernible to 
the one who willingly participates in the act of reading, 
to the one who, in the words of Walter Ong, does not "read 
whimsically or with no reference to the writer's world" (QL 
162). The reader must partner herself with the writer, not 
in a "willing suspension of disbelief," but in a willing
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assumption of credulity. Then, and only then, can the word 
work its '*spell" with the reader.
Paul Ricoeur addresses this intellectually complex 
activity in The Conflict of Interpretations. He recognizes 
that numerous factors are implicated in any reading 
experience which leads to understanding. The language 
system, which is carefully and creatively employed by the 
writer, is certainly important, but it is only one of the 
elements in interpretation. The psychological profile of 
the reader, her past and present experiences, is a 
significant variable in any reading process. Because 
symbolic language is, by its very nature, subjectively 
interpretative, it allows for numerous personal 
applications. Such is the realm of hermeneutics. Ricoeur 
says that "there is no closed system of the universe of 
signs" (Cl 65). To further extrapolate, there is no closed 
system of hermeneutics, no closed system of interpretations 
of a particular text.
Dickinson's term for this open system of signs is
"spectral," and she writes a simple little poem about this
not-so-simple quality of words. Referring specifically in
#1212 to the spoken word, she says:
A word is dead 
When it is said,
Some say.
I say it just 
Begins to live 
That day.
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Whether spoken or written, a word does not achieve its 
potential until it is received either by hearer or reader. 
Thus engaging the rhetorical triangle, the hearer (or the 
reader) completes the communication process when she 
listens to or picks up a text, which is comprised of words.
These words, as they continue the work of their
"spectral1’ creator, assume a duality of power and process:
as they produce understanding in the mind of the reader,
they necessarily establish a relationship between reader
and writer, a relationship that was forged by the writer.
Near the conclusion of his discussion about the
responsibility of the writer to visualize, and thus
initiate, a rapport with a potential reader, Ong writes of
that which I view as the implicit dualism in effective
communication:
Human communication is never one-way. Always, it 
not only calls for response but is shaped in its 
very form and content by anticipated response.
This is not to say that I am sure how the
other will respond to what I say. But I have to
be able to conjecture a possible range of
responses at least in some vague way. I have to
be somehow inside the mind of the other in
advance in order to enter with my message, and he 
or she must be inside my mind. To formulate 
anything I must have another person or other 
persons already 'in mind.' This is the paradox 
of human communication. Communication is 
intersubjective.
(QL 176-77)
According to Ong's analysis, communication, by its very 
definition, is predicated on self and other: the writer
seeks to impart some kind of "message" to a receiver, who
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is either intended or imagined. As he outlines in another 
essay, "The Writer's Audience is Always a Fiction," a 
writer may assume either a general or a specific audience, 
but that fictionalized audience determines, in great part, 
the process of communication. Although the vehicle for 
communication may be composed subjectively by the writer in 
the privacy of her personal thoughts, the power of that 
communication is intersubjective, mutually dependent upon 
both writer and reader.
Dickinson's preceptor and correspondent Higginson was 
aware of this quality in Dickinson's words. In a letter 
dated June 1869, he writes that her letters and verses have 
a "strange power" that creatively inhibit and personally 
affect him. Apparently her words were so remarkably 
powerful, so successfully manipulative, that his paled in 
comparison when he first attempted to reply to her 
correspondence. As a result, he found it "hard to write" 
and "long months pass[ed]" before he answered her 
correspondence. We get the impression, though, that her 
words haunt him in the interim; they force him "never [to] 
relax my interest" in her and her work. Higginson thus 
inadvertently describes the creative power that enables the 
poet to make her absence become dynamically present to the 
reader. That presence lingers, even manipulates, long 
after the reading process ends. Such is the "magical" 
power of Dickinson. Her work suggests, however, that the
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power is latent until both writer and reader enter into a 
reciprocally loving relationship, which is achieved through 
participation in the created text.
The "strange power" to which Higginson refers is first
activated when the poet pens her words, which she fuels by
love. She and her love for her intended audience may
initiate the rhetorical process, but only when her words
are partnered with a reader does it reach completion. Poem
809 further explains this idea:
Unable are the Loved to die 
For Love is Immortality,
Nay, it is Deity—
Unable they that love— to die 
For Love reforms Vitality 
Into Divinity.
Ostensibly referring to the immortalizing love between a 
lover and her beloved, these words also describe the love 
between poet and reader. If a reader communes with a 
writer, who is the "Loved" creator of a text, then that 
writer achieves a kind of immortality. The words of the 
poet retain a vitality that perpetuates the being of their 
creator. She may be physically absent from the text, but 
the voice of her persona maintains her intimately personal 
link with her future reader.
Her poetry and prose repeatedly point to this element 
that circumscribes the process of communication. That 
emotional requisite is love: love of writer for her
reader, and love of reader for the message her writer can
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offer through words. Only when each of these elements is 
in play can the poet create a poetry that will contain 
"superior instants" (#306) of insight for her reader. 
Numerous poems support the idea that love is the compelling 
force behind Dickinson's work.
A cryptic one that sums up her business of love is 
#1438:
Behold this little Bane—
The Boon of all alive—
As common as it is unknown 
The name of it is Love—
To lack of it is Woe—
To own of it is Wound—
Not elsewhere— if in Paradise 
Its Tantamount be found—
Love is both "Bane" and "Boon," something that everyone
desires, even though pain and heartache frequently
accompany it. Although the "if in Paradise" may open a
slight window to doubt, I do not see that doubt as
contradicting Dickinson's claims in #917 that love exists
after death ("Love— is anterior to Life— /Posterior— to
Death— "). Rather, doubt applies to the quality of that
love which continues beyond mortality.
Unlike love on earth that sometimes pains and wounds 
both lover and beloved, love beyond the grave will be 
intrinsically different. No longer eros, cupiditas, or 
philia, all of which are subject to human selfishness and 
its consequent injury, love after death will be agape, 
perfect and selfless. An individual cannot attain love to
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that extent while on earth, but she can approximate it
through her relationship with her beloved. . That emotion
which exists between lover and beloved provides a brief
glimpse into what lies beyond the grave:
We learned the Whole of Love—
The Alphabet— the Words—
A Chapter— then the mighty Book—
Then— Revelation closed—
But in Each Other's eyes 
An Ignorance beheld—
Diviner than the Childhood's—
And each to each, a Child,
Attempted to expound 
What Neither— understood—
Alas, that Wisdom is so large—
And Truth— so Manifold!
(#568)
Apparently referring to a secular, rather than a spiritual 
love, the poet-lover admits to the impossibility of 
describing even this earthly scope of loving. Erotic love, 
like its spiritual counterpart, is so complex, so vast that 
it defies explanation. The best that one can do is to 
glimpse its power and begin to understand its 
ramifications.
For the poet-lover whose "business is to love," words 
are the means whereby she seeks to "expound" the "Wisdom" 
and "Truth" of that business. Dickinson's reference to her 
profession, the "business" of loving, echoes the Puritan 
idea of "calling," of one who is "called forth" by God to 
effect his work among mortals. Unfortunately, like those 
imperfect humans whom God selects for his work, her weapon
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in the expository process likewise falls short of its goal.
Poem 581 comments on her dilemma:
I found the words to every thought 
I ever had— but One—
And that— defies me—
As a Hand did try to chalk the sun
This poem echoes the thought in #276:
Many a phrase has the English language—
I have heard but one—
Low as the laughter of the Cricket,
Loud, as the Thunder's Tongue—
Whether or not Shurr is correct when he argues that the
phrase that Dickinson hears repetitively in her world is "I
love you" (MED 66), it would seem that the thought that
defies words, the concept that defies concrete explanation,
is love. A poet who is master of words might only
approximate the experience for her reader. Although she
cannot find words that will plumb the mystery of love, she
offers her poetry as a means to concretize that abstract
experience for her reader.
Nathan A. Scott, Jr., has recently commented on what
the poet-lover does in creating a poetic world for her
reader. He writes in the introduction to his text visions
of Presence in Modern American Poetry:
The poetic world is rooted in the concrete 
particularity of lived experience? and poetic 
art, in its deepest aspect, is a way of loving 
the concrete, the particular, the individual.
But, of course, to love is to enter the dimension 
of . . . presence.
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The poetic world can be "rooted in the concrete 
particularity of lived experience" without touching the 
"reservoir" of actual experience, as Dickinson suggests in 
Poem 1294. That is, the poet can recreate a semblance of 
reality, a form of transcendence, through her artistic 
medium that allows the reader to share in the loving-in- 
absence experience of the personae. Though the textual 
recreation may be "magical" for the reader, the process of 
textually simulating presence, of creating an absent 
presence to which a reader might respond, is the result of 
conscious artistry.
In a letter to Dr. and Mrs. J.G. Holland, dated 
Summer 1862, Dickinson explains part of her effort which 
produces mystery and "magic" for the reader. Commenting on 
love, the motivating purpose, of her poetry, she writes:
"My business is to love." She compares herself as poet to 
a bird whose business "is to sing," even when alone "on a 
little bush at the foot of the garden." Motivated by his 
very nature, he sings even when no one hears. Like the 
solitary bird, the poet is prompted by a force that is 
greater than she is. The solitude that necessarily 
accompanies this absence pervades especially her fascicle 
poetry.
In an earlier letter to Susan Gilbert, dated 1854, she 
writes about solitude as an integral part of her work:
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I would paint a portrait which would bring the 
tears, had I canvass for it, and the scene should 
be— solitude*, and the figures— solitude— and the 
lights and shades, each a solitude. I could fill 
a chamber with landscapes so lone, men should 
pause and weep there; then haste grateful home, 
for a loved one left.
Reminiscent again of one "called" for a specific task, she,
like the solitary bird who sings when no one hears, not
only writes in solitude, but she writes of solitude.
Dickinson may have written in solitude, and she may have
written of solitude, but hers is a self-imposed isolation
which she personally manipulates to create her art.
This letter about solitude significantly reveals her 
methodology as poet. Quite specifically, it describes 
Dickinson's purpose in writing poetry; to demand 
involvement and elicit emotional response from her readers. 
So stipulated, she effects her self-described aim primarily 
through the numerous and pervasive absences that dominate 
her work. Not only does she write of an absent beloved, 
she relies upon absences— textual, grammatical, and 
referential— to demand involvement from her reader.
Because of the nature of her business, she, too, must 
"sing" without an audience; she, too, must create without a 
reader in attendance. Conversely, the same is true for her 
reader. In our post-aural era in which communication no 
longer is a public event with a speaker and numerous 
listeners, public reading of texts is the exception; an
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individual most often reads in the privacy of her own 
thoughts.
Noting the similarities in both the reading and 
writing processes, Ong addresses this cultural advancement 
in his text Oralitv and Literacy: "Writing and reading are
solitary activities that throw the psyche back on itself"
' (QL 69). The inference is that as the writer and reader 
retreat into the communicative process, they enter into the 
abyss of self, which is the mind. Therein, through the 
printed text, both encounter the other. The psyche of the 
writer engages with that of the reader during the 
composition process, while the reader likewise moves into 
the mind of the writer during the interpretive process.
Ong particularly addresses the state of the reader in
his earlier work, The Presence of Word. As he plots a kind
of history of the development of language, he comments
specifically that
reading of any sort forces the individual 
into himself by confronting him with thought in 
isolation, alone. The book takes the reader out 
of the tribe. His thought still has minimal 
social guise: it is in a book, which comes from
another. But the other is not there. The reader
follows thought all alone.
(EW 135)
Though physically "all alone" while engaging a printed
text, the reader is not fully alone in thought. The
thoughts that she mentally digests and intellectually 
assimilates are the thoughts encoded by another. The
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determinations that the reader makes are indeed hers, but 
they are shaped in great part by the absent presence of the 
writer who initiated the thought process.
Underscoring this idea in her poetry, Dickinson
comments on the present-in-absence relationship between
writer and reader. Necessarily in physical solitude, the
poet receives her inspiration:
The Soul's Superior instants 
Occur to Her— alone—
When friend— and Earth's occasion 
Have infinite withdrawn—
(#306)
The means to work her poetic "magic" comes to the poet when 
she is alone, after the "occasion" of the poem has passed, 
after the beloved has withdrawn. Like the bird alone in 
the garden, the poet writes in solitude with no one present 
to applaud her endeavors. And like the bird whose nature, 
or "gift" is to make music, the poet's nature, or gift, is 
to write poetry.
And certainly Dickinson's poetry is her attempt to 
make "music" for her readers. Surely not incidentally, her 
poems are patterned after traditional musical forms. In 
"The Poet and the Muse: Poetry as Art," Johnson reminds us
that "Basically all her poems employ meters derived from 
English hymnology" (70). Just as seriously as a musician 
organizes tones to create a melodic tune to please a 
listener, Dickinson writes and rewrites her words to 
fashion a verbal text that will elicit an aesthetic
282
response in her reader. That response partially results 
from, as Joseph Allard writes in "Emily Dickinson: The
Regulation of Belief," the poet's compelling "ability to 
forge poems that succeed in their attempt to capture a 
moment in the experience of one" (23) who is other to the 
reader. The role of the writer is crucial as she applies 
her artistic and linguistic skills to the process of making 
meaning in the text. Hers, however, is not the only 
significant role in the making and processing of meaning. 
Without a reader, without one who shares, and thus 
completes, the aesthetic experience, the writer and her 
words fall short of making music.
Dickinson describes this responsibility of the reader
in poem #526:
To hear an Oriole sing 
May be a common thing—
Or only a divine.
It is not of the Bird
Who sings the same, unheard,
As unto Crowd—
The Fashion of the Ear 
Attireth that it hear 
In Dun, or fair—
So whether it be Rune,
Or whether it be none 
Is of within.
The 'Tune is in the Tree— '
The Skeptic— showeth me—
'No Sir! In Thee!'
The poet, as "Oriole," makes the music, be it "common" or
"divine." The interpretation of that music, however, does
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not come with the song; it comes through the hearing of the 
song. The reader's receptive "Ear," which feeds the mind, 
is that which determines the quality of meaning; it is that 
which assesses the musical message as "Dun, or fair." In 
like manner of the bird whose tune wafts from the tree 
where he sings to the hearer apart from him, the message of 
the poet is not confined to the mind of its creator. It, 
too, makes its meaningful music only "In Thee," only in the 
mind of the absent reader who will be on the opposite side 
of the text.
Dickinson thus ascribes great power to her reader, 
whom she engages in an intimate person-to-person exchange. 
If, as her writings suggest, solitude and absence of the 
other are prerequisites for dialogue through the printed 
word, the successful reader shares equally with the writer 
in eliciting meaning from a text, but also of critical 
importance in this rhetorical grid is the persona of the 
poet-lover.
As previously mentioned, something which immediately 
distinguishes Dickinson's poet-lover from Astrophil and 
Will is that she is female. As in the sonnet sequences of 
her Renaissance predecessors, Dickinson's fascicles also 
maintain a singular focus— love between a female poet-lover 
and her absent beloved. Since she did not destroy her 
carefully wrought fascicles, she certainly envisioned a 
reader somewhere in some place at some future time who
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would share these recorded experiences with her. As Shurr 
so persuasively argues, we tend to do Dickinson a 
tremendous disservice. When we do examine the fascicle 
poetry, which is placed intermittently throughout even the 
Johnson edition of Dickinson's poetry, we recognize that 
her persona as poet-lover is fairly well sustained. As she 
writes of her absent lover, we sense the strength of her 
feelings, the energy of her passion, and the power of her 
love. This strength, energy, and power are fused into a 
substantive poetry of absence.
We need to remember that, especially in Dickinson's 
poetry, absence does not congruently equate to loss. Loss 
connotes deprivation or depletion— of emotion, of conflict, 
or of love. A loss may have resulted in the absence, but 
the absence does not necessarily correspond to that loss. 
The poet-lover may have been deprived of the presence of 
her beloved, but she transforms his absence into the 
essential dynamic of the poetry. All of the emotion, the 
conflict, and the love that accompanied her relationship 
with him is captured in the words of her poetry.
And, as Suzanne Juhasz argues in The Undiscovered 
Continent, "Language, of course, turns out to be 
Dickinson's greatest power and best weapon" (6). Although 
Dickinson may not use the term "weapon" to describe the 
power of words, she writes several poems that correlate to 
that image of linguistic aggression. "There is a
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word/Which bears a sword" (#8) describes an armed word in 
repeated battle where "It hurls its barbed syllables/And is 
mute again." The implication is that words are "mute," or 
powerless in their inactive state. During the reading 
process, however, they resume their aggressive stance, 
inciting the reader to hermeneutic "victory."
The two poems that most clearly depict words as 
weapons are "My Life had stood— a Loaded Gun— " (#754) and 
"She dealt her pretty words like Blades— " (#479). "My 
Life" reflects back upon the life of poetic genius, a life 
which, like a loaded gun, discharges its powerful 
ammunition. That ammunition, for the poet,, is her 
language, her words that have "the power to kill" or 
noticeably affect her reader. Conversely, the words 
themselves assume a kind of immortality because they are 
"Without— the power to die— ." As long as the words appear 
on the printed page, they are not dead. They continue to 
live apart from their creator.
Poem #479 graphically addresses this autonomy of the
written word:
She dealt her pretty words like Blades—
How glittering they shone—
And every One unbared a Nerve 
Or wantoned with a Bone—
She never deemed— she hurt—
That— is not Steel's Affair—
A vulgar grimace in the Flesh—
How ill the Creatures bear—
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Radically separating language from the one who uses it to 
write the poem, Dickinson describes the poet as one who 
functions separately from the words. Weapon-like, the 
sharp-edged words can awaken a ,lNerve,, and can cut to the 
"Bone" of the one who reads them. Ideas may come into the 
reader's mind through the words of the writer, but this 
poem suggests that they assume textual autonomy, acting 
apart from the writer. Dickinson's image thus suggests 
that ideas indeed have a "spectral" power, a power that 
works beyond the physical reach of the poet.
Does such an image negate my premise that the absent 
presence of the poet is a dominant factor in the rhetorical 
triangle? Not at all. The words, as Dickinson writes in 
#479, are hers initially. She is the skillful master who 
makes them "pretty." She is the one who makes them 
"glitter" in style and syntax and "shine" with ideas and 
meaning. Like indestructible "Steel," the poet's absent 
presence emerges from the words which she writes.
A return to Juhasz and her discussion of Dickinson 
yields an explanation for the poet's metaphor of words as 
weapons: words are to quicken thought. Incisive,
sometimes even painful, words effect results when all 
rhetorical elements are successfully implemented: a loving
and responsible writer, a syntactically and aesthetically 
correct text, and a loving and responsive reader. When 
these conflate through a reading experience, the
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consequence is tangible— evidenced frequently in feelings. 
Though nebulous, feelings nevertheless signify a 
discernible awareness of something having happened: 
emotions tapped, thoughts engaged, or ideas shared.
Dickinson accomplishes each of these as she embodies a 
language of absence. For her, feelings are an integral 
part of both the writing and the reading of a text. Juhasz 
deduces that feelings, for Dickinson, are paramount: "Not
to feel is pointless,* it is not to be alive and, therefore, 
it is death. Thus Dickinson courts all feelings and finds 
value therein" (IJC 173). Juhasz goes on to say that 
especially the feeling of pain is important because of "its 
vitality and its pedagogical potential" and "is worthy of 
pursuit, even though it admittedly hurts" (U£ 173). Again, 
I stress that pain is not tantamount to unhappiness. 
Dickinsonian pain heightens awareness; it sharpens 
perception; it awakens insight. As Juhasz argues, her 
language of absence, although it may herald pain for both 
writer and reader, is a crucial part of the poet's 
strategy.
I would counter that Dickinson does not limit her 
experimentation with feelings to pain. She draws on the 
reservoir of all emotions: disappointment/ecstasy,
sorrow/joy, loss/gain, despair/anticipation, and 
doubt/confidence. And through each of these antinomian 
constructs, Dickinson departs significantly from the
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writings of her Renaissance predecessors as she not only 
relies on, but implements, what can be for her reader, 
painful textual absences and ambiguous references. These 
purposeful absences, as I will discuss later, are 
Dickinson's means whereby she seeks to engage her reader 
fully as a rhetorical partner.
Certainly other startling differences separate 
Dickinson's poet-lover from those of Sidney and 
Shakespeare. Admittedly, her persona is female while 
theirs are male, but the differences in gender, as I 
interpret the majority of her poems, are not relevant to 
the operations of the dominant absent presence. I 
recognize that some critics, such as Martha Nell Smith in 
Rowing in Eden: Rereading Emilv Dickinson, argue that we
misread Dickinson's work if we ignore what she identifies 
as the lesbian overtones in the text. But I would counter 
that her canon (and consequently her audience) suffers if 
it is forced into Smith's equation: poet (Emily Dickinson)
+ beloved (Susan Gilbert Dickinson) = poetry. In her 
rereading of Dickinson, Smith strives to superimpose her 
theory of the poet's personal life onto the poetry, a 
potential quagmire for critical analysis. The primary 
error in Smith's assessment is her assumption that 
Dickinson's poetry is narrowly autobiographical, 
representing a verbal reflection of Smith's own, and 
personally particular, interpretation of Dickinson's life.
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Farr reminds us that Dickinson's expressions of love
for her sister-in-law conform to accepted social customs of
Victorian New England.4 Dispelling the notion that they
were "'carnal' lovers," she recognizes the
tradition of romantic friendship and love among 
nineteenth-century women.
There was, indeed a cult of fond 
sentimentality among Victorian girls. By 
including encomiums to cheeks, hair, and bosoms, 
it [the tradition] acquired an ambiguous 
eroticism.
(PEP 101)
A problem for modern readers of Dickinson is that we tend 
to assess overt verbal eroticism between two women (such as 
that found in Dickinson's letters) as physical in nature. 
Products of a society with social mores different from 
those of the Victorian era, our hermeneutic mandate is to 
refrain from imposing judgmental twentieth-century 
interpretations on nineteenth-century customs.
However, I recognize that part of Dickinson's genius 
is that a critic can hermeneutically construe one, or some, 
of her texts as lesbian in nature, since all of 
Dickinson's texts 'resonate with absences, both male and 
female, they can subsequently allow crossings of the lines 
of gender— heterosexual, lesbian, or other. Because of her 
treatment of absences, a variety of readers can (and do) 
respond in radically different ways to her poetry. In 
making such a statement, however, I do not accept Smith's 
homosexually biographical basis for Dickinson's poetry.
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Conversely/ neither am I convinced of Shurr's argument 
that many of the fascicle poems depict Dickinson's 
"anomalous marriage" fMED 14) to the Reverend Charles 
Wadsworth. . Especially when Shurr explains Wadsworth's 
seemingly abrupt departure to San Francisco, the 
credibility of his thesis breaks down. Devoting several 
pages to his hypothetical assumption, Shurr argues that, in 
order to avoid certain scandal, Wadsworth left his pastoral 
post in Philadelphia after Dickinson told him that she was 
pregnant with his child. Shurr further deduces that this 
fetus was aborted, perhaps with the assistance of Susan 
Gilbert Dickinson (Shurr, MED 177). Although much of 
Shurr's book is informative and entertaining, I cannot help 
but balk at his reliance on conjecture, sometimes reaching 
unsubstantiated supposition, which he offers as a means of 
understanding Dickinson's poetry.
Although I cannot accept Shurr's theory of an 
"anomalous marriage" to Wadsworth, I agree that the 
preponderance of evidence points to a heterosexual 
relationship emerging from the text. This determination 
does not preclude the validity of other interpretations. 
Quite the contrary, I recognize that those like Smith who 
interpret Dickinson's work as homosexually biased, perhaps 
inadvertently, offer an accolade to the poet and her work. 
The multiple interpretations of gender and of relationship 
between poet-lover and beloved attest to a poet and a
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poetry that can speak meaningfully to both the heterosexual 
and the homosexual reader.
Regardless of personal bias, any reader can
successfully find meaning, and certainly pure pleasure,
from Dickinson's poems, all containing purposeful absences,
presumably to titillate and involve the reader. Some, like
#211, even pulsate with eroticism. Borrowing from nature,
Dickinson describes the consummation of love between
persona and her beloved as heterosexual, between a bee
(male symbol) who penetrates a flower (female symbol):
Come slowly— Eden!
Lips unused to Thee—
Bashful— sip thy Jessamines—
As the fainting Bee—
Reaching late his flower,
Round her chamber hums—
Counts his nectars—
Enters— and is lost in Balms.
Unmistakably seductive, this poem describes prolonged
pleasure in the sexual act, moving from foreplay ("Come
slowly— Eden!") to anticipation of ecstasy ("As the
fainting Bee— ") to loss of individuality for the female as
the male enters her and releases part of himself ("Enters—
and is lost in Balms"). This idea of loss, with an implied
reduction of self, is something that distinguishes
Dickinson's poet-lover from Astrophil and Will. For the
purpose of this study, then, which is to plot and analyze
an absent presence that fuels the artist's creativity while
it empowers the writing process, I will refer to
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Dickinson's relationship of poet-lover and beloved as one 
between an assumed female persona and her male beloved.
Dickinson's view of love, as described in #190, is 
highly idealized: "He was weak, and I was strong—
then— /So He let me lead him in— ." Especially for a 
nineteenth-century single female, this heterosexual 
perspective may be considered radical as it allows for the 
reversal of roles in sexual dominance and emotional 
control. But it is a view that plays itself out in much of 
her poetry. Dickinson's tendency to minimize the self in 
order to maximize the power of her persona pervades 
especially her fascicle poetry. Jane Donahue Eberwein, in 
Strategies of Limitation, advises the reader of Dickinson's 
ploy:
Dickinson's readers must be alert to her tendency 
to exploit whatever limitations she encountered—  
often to intensify those limitations in order to 
exploit them more. . . . To be tiny was not 
necessarily to be negligible, or lacking in vital 
power.
( S L  1 0 )
To be tiny, to seem insignificant, and to function in 
absence inversely represent Dickinson's strengths. The 
lack often enables what the poet refers to as 
"circumference11— the bursting through of all limitations, 
be they life into death, mortality into immortality, 
presence into absence, eros into agape, or male into female 
as described in #190.
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Much has been written about Dickinson's idea of 
"circumference." Critics who undertake an explanation of 
this complex Dickinsonian term agree only that it suggests 
manifold meanings. In her text devoted to an understanding 
of Dickinson's eccentric use of the word, Eberwein 
concludes that "Circumference, for Emily Dickinson, is 
death— the transitional point between the familiar circuit 
world and either immortality or nothingness" (£L 164-65). 
According to Eberwein, the "familiar circuit world" is the 
"circuit of personal space," the knowable world of 
"consciousness, identity, the senses and matter," while 
circumference is "whatever might be outside" the boundary 
of finitude (SL 161).
Kher, on the other hand, argues that "Circumference is 
Dickinson's metaphor for resurrection. Circumference, 
which is the earth's outer limit, offers her a simultaneous 
experience of life and death or life in death" (J±A 124). 
Eberwein and Kher link circumference to that which occurs 
after death. Eberwein says Dickinson recognizes two 
options: immortality or nothingness. Kher, quite
specifically, says circumference is resurrection into 
another state of being.
I prefer the explanation of Judith Farr. Farr takes 
up the discussion of "circumference" in two separate 
chapters of The Passion of Emilv Dickinson. Initially, she 
states that the unique term is "one of [Dickinson's]
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metaphors for poetry" (PEP 29). Later, Farr expounds more 
fully, linking "circumference" to love. Analyzing 
"circumference" as a reference to "artistic inspiration," 
Farr concludes that "'circumference' generally means either 
poetry itself or the significance of all that exists, on
g
earth and in heaven" (PEP 319). "Circumference" (the 
poetic program) thus becomes the means through which 
Pickinson and her reader might begin to approach 
understanding of all that seems to defy understanding.
Laura Briggen develops a similar argument. In "Emily 
Pickinson's Circumference: Figuring a Blind Spot in the
Romantic Tradition," Gribben says that the poet's 
perceptive ability, the talent that defines her as a 
professional poet, "provides her with a much needed 
foothold" (3). She concludes that "circumference," for 
Pickinson, thus becomes "the domain of all that is and can 
be known or experienced. It is enriched from within by 
emotions, experience, language, and poetry, and it is 
limited from without by death, eternity, and the sublime—  
all that is unknowable" ("EPC" 17). Lovingly molding that 
which is present (emotions, experience, language) into 
poetry, the poet comments on that which is absent, but that 
which can be aesthetically actualized through words (death, 
eternity, and the sublime).
It is this struggling for presence in the midst of 
absence that fuels virtually all of Pickinson's poetry.
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And at the heart of the struggle is the poet-lover who 
claims and then textually recreates presence from her 
absent lover. As she endeavors to glean understanding from 
and add meaning to her sphere of life, she empowers her 
reader to share the experience with her and, subsequently, 
to translate that meaning into her personal life.
Like Astrophil and Will before her, Dickinson's
persona undertakes a metaphorical journey, but hers is
toward circumference:
Each Life Converges to some Centre—
Expressed— or still—
Exists in every Human Nature 
A Goal—
Embodied scarcely to itself— it may be—
Too fair
For Credibility's presumption 
To mar—
Adored with caution— as a Brittle Heaven—
To reach
Were hopeless, as the Rainbow's Raiment 
To touch—
Yet persevered toward— sure— for the Distance—  
How high—
Unto the Saints' slow diligence—
The Sky—
Ungained— it may be— by a Life's low Venture—
But then—
Eternity enable the endeavoring 
Again.
(#680)
This poem suggests that human existence is in a continuous 
movement toward the raising of consciousness, what Eberwein 
calls "a process of stripping away extraneous details to 
reveal the essential elements of her life metaphor— the
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pilgrimage from limitation to circumference” (Sk 47). This 
consciousness is of self in relation to world and Other, 
but it also includes a heightened awareness of the totality 
of being— life/death, mortality/immortality, and 
impermanence/permanence.
Although we observe Dickinson's poet-lover in a 
journey, her movement toward knowledge differs 
significantly from those found in the texts of the Greek 
philosophers (Plato and Aristotle), the Biblical writers 
(especially the New Testament), and the Renaissance writers 
(Sidney and Shakespeare) mentioned in previous chapters. 
Whereas each of them, or their personae, sought to 
understand themselves in the realm of self, world, and 
creator, Dickinson's writing suggests an alternative 
pilgrimage. She does not overtly question and seek to 
understand the existence of an omnipotent Creator.
Spiritual tenets from Dickinson's strict nineteenth- 
century Puritan upbringing can be found in her poetry. 
Frequently affirming these traditional beliefs, she 
compares the role of her poet-lover to that of the 
suffering saint— but one without a savior. Her persona 
prays to God to relieve her of her "Misery" in love, but 
her anguished pleas go unanswered. Prayer, a seemingly 
irrevocable aspect of Dickinson's heritage and upbringing, 
suggests part of the poet's homage to the one whom she 
recognizes as the Creator and sustainer of life. Her
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persona prays to God, but He neither acknowledges nor acts 
upon her pleas. He is disinterested and uncaring (#376). 
Ultimately, she comes to realize that the power resides 
within herself as poet to redeem herself from the misery 
that is hers.
As maker of meaning, she manipulates words to raise 
herself, and consequently her readers, from the abyss of 
misery:
I reckon— when I count at all—
First— Poets— Then the Sun—
Then Summer— Then the Heaven of God—
And then— the List is done—
But, looking back— the First so seems 
To Comprehend the Whole—
The Others look a needless Show—
So I write— Poets— All—
(#569)
God and his heaven are a part of her existence, but they 
rank fourth in a list of importance in her realm of 
reality. That which is all important is the poet.
Like Sidney, Dickinson ranks the poet highest in her 
hierarchy: she is above the sun, the summer, and the
heaven of God. From atop her perch, she therefore, "dealt 
her pretty words like Blades— " (#479) as the means to 
begin "To Comprehend the Whole" of life. Words are her 
only weapon (Juhasz, UC 6). Through them, she gains access 
to understanding, which, in turn, empowers her to control 
that life which has been given her.
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And Dickinson's world basically is limited to that 
which she can, and for the most part does, control. 
Primarily reclusive in her adult years, she personally 
interacts with her immediate family and only a few friends. 
She creates, however, an extended network of association, 
corresponding with friends, old and new. And it is 
primarily through this correspondence that we witness her 
efforts to control that world, to present herself to her 
correspondents as she wants them to see her. Thus, she 
creates her own version of reality for her readers.
One encounters that "reality" through the
subconscious, the inner self. World and creator are
relevant only insofar as they impinge upon this journey of
self in search of its central being. Dickinson poetically
details a quest that plunges the conscious individual into
the abyss of the sublimated self to flounder for some
modicum of truth that might emerge from the deep. Poem 642
describes this modernist quest that demands self-alienation
as a means of discovering truth:
Me from Myself— to banish—
Had I Art-
Impregnable my Fortress 
Unto All Heart—
But since Myself— assault Me- 
How have I peace 
Except by subjugating 
Consciousness?
And since We're mutual Monarch 
How this be
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Except by Abdication—
Me— of Me?
The poet suggests that by a repetitive banishing of the 
conscious self, by regularly retreating into the inner 
self, an individual might achieve some monarchy of that 
self ("Heart" and "Consciousness"), some validation that 
she influences the exterior and controls the interior 
spheres of her own existence. "Abdication," as Dickinson 
uses it here, is a conscious handing over of the mind to 
that unconscious, almost subliminal, state of being.
And Dickinson's poetry records that psychic journey 
for her reader. The movement is necessarily erratic, 
vacillating between the various antinomies that define 
existence: life/death, mortality/immortality, joy/despair,
self/other, and presence/absence. But the act of writing 
(and the consequent act of reading), as Ong argues, allows 
at least partial understanding of this complex human 
experience:
The highly interiorized stages of consciousness 
in which the individual is not so immersed 
unconsciously in communal structures are stages 
which, it appears, consciousness would never 
reach without writing. The interaction between 
the orality that all human beings are born into 
and the technology of writing, which no one is 
born into, touches the depths of the psyche. 
Ontogenetically and phylogenetically, it is the 
oral word that first illuminates consciousness 
with articulate language, that first divides 
subject and predicate and then relates them to 
one another, and that ties human beings to one 
another in society. Writing introduces division 
and alienation, but a higher unity as well. It 
intensifies the sense of self and fosters more
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conscious interaction between persons. Writing 
is consciousness-raising.
(QL 178-79)
Paradoxically, writing, which is produced from the "highly 
interiorized stages of consciousness" (the subjugated 
conscious), is "consciousness-raising." It becomes 
intimately confrontational, forcing the reader likewise to 
retreat into herself, the mind of her being where she 
communicates with the writer. Although it may create 
"alienation" (disagreement), the text fosters "interaction" 
each time a reader partners herself with it.
A poet like Dickinson who seems to understand this 
literary complexity can manipulate the language to increase 
the reader's capacity to understand. By leaving "the Verb 
and pronoun out" (#494) and incorporating numerous other 
absences, she forces her reader into active participation 
in the poetic process. Then by going into her own abyss, 
the recesses of her subjugated conscious, the reader fills 
in the blanks with her own interpretation, thus elevating 
her own consciousness and propelling her into an outward- 
reaching, ever-widening circular path from which she can 
come to greater knowledge of the self that transcends self. 
That transcendent state allows one, at least temporarily, 
to experience "otherness"— of "other" and of "Other." It 
is this ontological movement which Dickinson calls 
"Circumference."
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I realize that the terms "outward-reaching" and "ever-
widening" seem to contradict the idea of circumference,
which suggests a confining outer perimeter, but I counter
that these terms reflect the inherently paradoxical nature
of Dickinson's quest. As Elisa New has put it:
The quest is becoming distinctly oxymoronic, for 
the poet who would spread wide her narrow hands 
to apprehend God, must search for the limit—  
which is God— by finding first her own limit, 
knowing both limits, insofar as they are genuine, 
to be unknown, unrecognizable.
("DWDG" 12)
Spreading "wide" her "narrow" hands to "apprehend" an 
unapprehendable God, in order to "know" that which is 
"unknown" typify the frequent confusion and certain 
complexity that attends any study of Dickinson's poetry. 
Unlike Whitman who, claiming to be the center of his 
universe, opens wide his arms to embrace all of humanity 
throughout all time, Dickinson, placing herself on the 
periphery, embraces the self to the self in an attempt to 
move outside the boundaries of consciousness. Where we, 
her readers, may tend to be confused, she simply invokes 
"circumference" to signify her musings of being in the 
here-and-now and beyond. The term is used repeatedly in 
both her letters and her poetry.
In a July 1862 letter to Higginson, she writes, "My 
Business is Circumference." This letter does not 
contradict her claim that "My business is to love." On the 
contrary, each supports the other. The two letters were
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composed about the same time, and in each Dickinson seeks 
to explain her professional integrity to Higginson.
Although Dickinson may have posed, may have exaggerated, 
and may have lied in some of her correspondence to her 
preceptor, she seems sincere in both of these letters. Her 
business, indeed, seems to have been "Circumference." She 
contends, however, that "Circumference" can be approached 
only through love.
Dickinson's poetry time and again attests to the poet-
lover attempting to burst through the multifarious
boundaries that inhibit understanding, that confound wisdom
and truth both for herself and for her potential reader.
As she strives to achieve some semblance of affirmation for
who she is and what she is about in a world that offers
little plenitude, she creates a poetry of absence that
conversely is mind-boggling in its potential for plenitude
for her reader. A quintessential Dickinson poem (#816)
describes this process:
A Death blow is a Life blow to Some
Who till they died, did not alive become—
Who had they lived, had died but when 
They died, Vitality begun.
Resounding with the strain of present-though-absent, this
short poem affirms that which occurs between poet and
reader. The Dickinsonian idea of life as death and death
as life refers both to the death of the writer who comes to
life when her words are read by the reader and death of the
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printed words which are renewed in that ••Undiscovered 
Continent*' (#832) which is the mind of the reader.
Ong comments on this paradox inherent in a written
text:
The paradox lies in the fact that the deadness of 
the text, its removal from the living human 
lifeworld, its rigid visual fixity, assures its 
endurance and its potential for being resurrected 
into limitless living contexts by a potentially 
infinite number of living readers.
(QL 81)
Although a reader may not be conscious of her part in the
resurrection of words, she nevertheless experiences it each
time she gleans meaning from a text. She becomes
"affected" by both text and writer of text. Especially for
the reader of Dickinson, this is true. As she engages with
the poet and her poet-lover in the printed text, she
actively participates in the highly affective quality of
that carefully wrought work.
In a letter to his wife, dated 16 August 1870,
Higginson quotes from an interview that he had with
Dickinson at her home in Amherst that attests to this, in
Dickinson's words, "aftermath" of the reading experience.
In that interview, Dickinson describes her criteria for
determining good writing, what she refers to as "poetry":
If I read a book [and] it makes my whole body 
so cold no fire ever can warm me I know that is
poetry. If I feel physically as if the top of my
head were taken off, I know that is poetry.
These are the only way I know it. Is there any 
other way.
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Good writing, then, is writing that is affective? it is 
writing that can be judged in great part by the emotional 
effects that it produces in its reader. For Dickinson, 
feelings are paramount; they become the means by which one 
might determine the value of a work of poetry. Her 
"critical" determination for good poetry is thus contrary 
to the argument set forth by W.K. Wimsatt and Monroe C. 
Beardsley in "The Affective Fallacy." Whereas they argue 
that the (at least somewhat) objective critic is to 
differentiate "between the poem and its results (what it is 
and what it does)" ("AF" 21), Dickinson refuses to separate 
the poem from its effects.
Without denying the affective quality of poetry, 
Wimsatt and Beardsley maintain that emotions are not the 
business of the critic, while Dickinson concludes that 
emotions are the business of the intimate reader, her only 
critic. We have to remember that Dickinson sets forth a 
highly subjective agenda: a sensitive poet presumably
writing for an equally sensitive and implicitly personal 
audience. She writes intimately, suggesting a one-to-one 
correspondence between herself and a familiar other. The 
only "critic" that she envisions is her willing and 
emotionally responsive reader.
If a poem, or indeed any printed text, succeeds in 
creating an affective response which results in a 
reciprocal relationship between writer and reader, the
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reader clearly stands to benefit from the reading process. 
In Poem 919, Dickinson describes what seems to be an 
overriding purpose in her poetry, to relieve her reader 
from a similar pain of absence from which her poet-lover 
suffers:
If I can stop one Heart, from breaking 
I shall not live in vain 
If I can ease one Life the Aching 
Or cool one Pain
Her poetry, then, becomes a poetic prescription that will
enable her readers to work through absence, to distill
absence into positive presence. Essential in that formula
for circumference, for understanding, is emotional pain.
If "A Wounded Deer— leaps highest" (#165), Dickinson
suggests that the poet-lover, who is the assumed persona,
likewise must be emotionally wounded in order to relate the
means whereby a textually productive absent presence can be
achieved from absence.
Unlike Borges, I differentiate between the poet and 
the poet-lover; the poet-lover, not necessarily Dickinson, 
the poet, "needs misfortune" ("BDED" 10), usually in the 
form of the absent beloved, in order to reproduce textual 
presence. After full, and fulfilling, presence with her 
beloved, the poet-lover must necessarily plumb the depths 
of absence so that she might write the whole of the story. 
If the experience is aesthetically translated, the poet-
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lover's journey from presence into absence may culminate in 
an absent presence that inhabits the text.
In This was a Poetf Whicher quite convincingly
compares the journey of Dickinson's poet-lover to that of
Dante's protagonist in Vita Nuova;
The individuality of her contribution lies in the 
fact that these poems are not merely reiterated 
expressions of passionate longing and regret, but 
successive moments in the intricate progress of a 
soul through the deepest of human experiences. 
They record with minute veracity the subtle 
changes in a woman's nature as she becomes 
conscious of her heart's unalterable commitment, 
passes through self-sustained illusion and 
painful disillusionment to an agony of 
frustration, and emerges at last impregnably 
fortified on a new plane of being. Not many 
poets have traced the stages of a like psychic 
journey to the very edge of doom and back. But 
somewhat the same pattern of spiritual growth 
through deprivation we may recognize in the grave 
symbolic pageant of Dante's Vita Nuova.
(269-70)
If Dickinson's fascicles outline the poet-lover's psychic 
journey into the treacherous experience of love, then we 
might more readily view them, as Shurr would have us do, as 
a poetic sequence that is comparable to Sidney's Astrophil 
and Stella and Shakespeare's Sonnets. But more than either 
of theirs, hers is an experience ambivalently triumphant in 
its return from doom. Without the painful experience, she 
would not have had the knowledge; without the deprivation, 
she would not have had the emotional growth; without the 
loss, she would not have had the poetic gain; without the
absence of her beloved, she would not have had his absent
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presence to inhabit her poetry. Utilizing her skills as 
poet, she redeems each of these negative elements. As she 
transforms the negative into positive emotional resources, 
the poet invites her reader to share the textual 
experiences of her persona.
In order to achieve desired participation from her
reader, Dickinson must convincingly, as from personal
experience, write about the movement from absence into a
paradoxical fullness of absent presence. Without drawing
from the "reservoir" of her own life, she is to create a
convincing life-like experience, or a multitude of
experiences. The role of the poet is crucial:
The Poets light but Lamps—
Themselves— go out—
The Wicks they stimulate—
If vital Light
Inhere as do the Suns—
Each Age a Lens 
Disseminating their 
Circumference—
(#883)
The key elements in this poem (Poets, Lamps, and Wicks), 
correspond to the rhetorical triangle of writer, text, and 
reader. The suggestion is that the poet merely 
"stimulates" circumference, that paradoxically ever- 
widening movement toward understanding.
For her readers, who are the "Wicks" that enable the 
light, she simply provides the poetic text, the "Lamps" to 
light the way toward understanding. Determining that
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Dickinson employs synecdoche and metonymy in this passage,
Laura Gribben broadens my analogy:
'Lamps' have wicks (synecdoche) that produce 
'Light'— as do 'Suns' (metonymy). . . .
Though poets light lamps, or create poems, the 
light, vitality, and meaning of their poems are 
determined by each individual age.
("EDC" 5)
The wicks (the readers) are part of the whole of poetry 
(the lamps). The readers, through vicarious experience, 
are the ones who determine the "light" of understanding.
The real incendiary power, Dickinson seems to 
indicate, results from the dynamic action that occurs 
between the reader and the words that continue to 
disseminate knowledge long after the poet puts those words 
to paper. She describes this action in Poem 1261: "A Word
dropped careless on a Page/May stimulate an eye/When folded 
in perpetual seam." A reader may find understanding about 
herself from a word or phrase that the writer "dropped" 
carelessly, without much serious thought, on the page. The 
suggestion is that inspiration for the reader comes 
arbitrarily, at different times and places, long after the 
writer completes her task of empowering the word.
Indeed, one can hardly read a Dickinson poem without 
sensing this power and responding viscerally to the words 
therein. From "Wild Nights— Wild Nights 1" (#249) to "He 
fumbles at your Soul/As Players at the Keys" (#315) to "I 
heard a Fly buzz— when I died— " (#465) to "There is a
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pain— so utter— /It swallows substance up— " (#599), the 
willing reader simply cannot read impassively. She wants 
to know the source of the wild nights; she wants to learn 
who fumbles with her soul; she wants to understand how the 
deceased can hear a buzzing fly; and she wants to 
comprehend a pain that can overpower substance. Perhaps 
this is one reason that some critics pursue the 
biographical explanation: it "answers" some of the
unanswerable questions of Dickinson's poetry. Possibly one 
reason that she does not provide irrefutable answers that 
suggest singular interpretations is that hers would then be 
a poetry of closure. And if hers were a poetry of closure, 
it would inhibit total immersion of her reader. But since 
her poetry denies closure, it demands full participation 
from her reader. Since hers is a poetry that allows one 
absence to give way to other absences, it opens the 
floodgate to hermeneutic possibilities. Certainly this is 
effected by creative design, and not merely by authorial 
accident. Also certainly by design is Dickinson's 
experimentation with language, especially with absences 
therein.
Unlike the sequences of Sidney and Shakespeare, 
something pervasive immediately complicates the reader's 
understanding of the experience of Dickinson's persona.
Not only does she write of the absence of her beloved, but 
essentially all of her poetic language suggests absence.
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Indeed, hers is a poetry of absences. As David Porter
writes in Dickinson: The Modern Idiom, absence is
the primary condition of her art. The absence 
was the sacred poverty out of which her verbal 
imagination leaped. The poverty made the poetry 
possible, even justified it. For she heaped 
words in the void as her kind of consolation.
What power was left to her lay in her restless
160)
Like Astrophil and Will before her, Dickinson's persona, 
who is poet-lover, reformulates absence of her beloved into 
presence through her poetry. But more than either of them, 
she embraces absence as a means of achieving presence, as 
the medium for approaching circumference. Earlier in his 
text, Porter aptly recognizes, "There is absence at every 
level: morpheme, word, phrase, poem, text, corpus, and the
life as its matrix" (D:MI 5). As Dickinson herself admits 
in Poem 494, she not only "left the Verb and pronoun out," 
but she also omitted references to particulars that would 
allow definitive readings of her work.
These absences necessarily invoke her reader, 
compelling her to become involved in the Dickinson text.
The reader's responsibility in the process is tantamount to 
that of the writer? she must submit herself to an intimate 
interchange with the text in order to reach some meaningful 
determination of that which is omitted or altered. Indeed, 
Dickinson's aversion to standard punctuation (suggested by 
her signature dash), her lack of specific reference
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(confounded by their numerous possibilities), and her 
avoidance of plenitude (evidenced by conflicting elements) 
dominate much of her poetry; and all demand the reader's 
close scrutiny and intellectual engagement. Any number of 
Dickinson's poems reveal these absences, these aversions to 
standard linguistic practices, and these seemingly blatant 
contradictions to fact that pervade her work.
However, one poem in particular emphasizes these 
absences, aversions, and antinomies as it cpmments on her 
poetic reasoning for incorporating opposites to entice her 
readers;
'Tis Opposites— entice—
Deformed Men— ponder Grace—
Bright fires— the blanketless—
The Lost— Day's face—
The Blind— esteem it be 
Enough Estate— to see—
The Captive— strangles new—
For deeming— Beggars— play—
To lack— enamor Thee—
Tho' the Divinity—
Be only—
Me—
(#355)
This poem startles the reader with its cataloging of 
opposites that "entice" (and are enticed by) the other: 
grace/deformed men, bright fires/blanketless, Day/the lost, 
sight/the blind, Thee/Me. Establishing a causal 
relationship, the persona posits that lack, or absence, 
yearns for, even demands, that which it does not have; the 
deformed yearn for a grace that will make them whole; the
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blanketless desire fires to keep them warm; the lost await 
the dawn of day to show them the way; the blind pray for 
sight; and the Me, who is poet-lover, yearns for Thee, who 
is the absent beloved. Specifically, that which is without 
seeks presence of the other.
Another short poem describes how presence is achieved 
from absence:
To fill a Gap
Insert the Thing that caused it—
Block it up
With Other— and 'twill yawn the more—
You cannot solder an Abyss 
With Air.
(#546)
Dickinson argues that one cannot fill a gap, an absence, 
with a substitute; if one tries, the gap simply widens as 
it yearns for that which caused the fissure. The only hope 
for filling the chasm is to "Insert the Thing that caused 
it." Since it is impossible to fill a void with something 
that is physically not there, one must transmute that which 
was formerly present into its absent presence. As the poet 
undertakes this metaphorical transformation through her 
words, she can retain those properties of the beloved that 
provide comfort, security, and love to her.
A poem, which is really an analogue to the absent
presence, explains what happens:
I see thee better— in the Dark—
I do not need a Light—
The Love of Thee— a Prism be—
Excelling Violet—
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I see thee better for the Years 
That hunch themselves between—
(#611)
Here the poet-lover claims that through the intervening 
years of separation from her beloved, she sees him 
"better— in the Dark." She sees him better in his absent 
presence than she did in physical presence. She can make 
this claim because she has successfully, through her 
continued love for him, redefined his presence in her 
poetry. Like a prism that refracts multi-colored shades 
from a single light, her love can refract various 
constructs of his absent presence through her poetry. His 
parting, his absence, is that which stimulates his absent 
presence.
Poem #1714 explains:
By a departing light 
We see acuter, quite,
Than by a wick that stays.
There's something in the flight 
That clarifies the sight 
And decks the rays.
Parting is the pain that quickens; it is the catalyst that
makes the feelings for the departed one more acute. The
pain, then, "clarifies the (poetic] sight" and "decks"
(adorns or enhances) the absence into an absent presence.
And that absent presence can become whatever the poet needs
him to become in a particular moment, as expressed in her
many poems to the beloved.
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Shurr refers to this process as "presence-through- 
absence":
Though absent, he is a permanent resident in her 
mental universe.
These two themes— Dickinson's sense of her 
status now as a professional poet (to match the 
professional status of her beloved), and her 
realization of the beloved's presence-through- 
absence— merge at times to a new realization: 
that is precisely his presence-through-absence 
and the experiences they have shared which 
furnish the best subject matter and motivation 
for her as a professional poet.
fMED 85)
Although Shurr's term "presence-through-absence11 may be 
phrased differently from my term "absent presence," he and 
I refer to similar states of textual being. The absences 
of life, whether experienced by the author or created for 
her persona, provide the drama for the poetry. Those 
absences comprise the "stuff of life" that force personal 
growth upon the individual. The poet "takes the stuff of 
life, molds it, and projects it as art" (Kimbrough 52). 
Without the antinomies of life/death, mortal/immortal, 
finite/infinite, certitude/illusion, and absence/presence, 
existence would be stagnant. Poetry, which necessarily is 
drawn from that life, then, too would be lifeless and 
inert, unable to draw a potential reader into 
participation. But because Dickinson was so fully aware of 
the absences that inhabit life, she was able to incorporate 
them especially into her fascicles, which focus on "that 
after Horror" (#286), with its accompanying "great pain"
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(#341). Because these emotions are, to varying degrees, 
shared by all, her work "invites the reader to dive into 
his or her own abyss in order to find the existential truth 
concretely yet perpetually" (Kher, M  44).
Dickinson does not guarantee that her readers will 
glean immediate understanding. Quite the contrary, she 
forewarns of certain difficulty because she tells the truth 
"slant":
Tell all the Truth but tell it slant—
Success in Circuit lies 
Too bright for our infirm Delight 
• • • • •
The Truth must dazzle gradually 
Or every man be blind—
(#1129)
If "Circuit" is that personal, mortal space which 
determines the individual, and if "Circumference" 
represents, as Eberwein writes, the "boundary itself 
between the circuit of personal space and whatever might be 
outside" (SL 161), then poem 1129 speaks of the processing 
and accessing of "Truth" on this finite side of 
"Circumference." The implication here is that blatant 
truth is too powerful for the reader to grasp; indeed, it 
may "blind" in its intensity. The task of the poet, then, 
is to slant the truth in an artistic (metaphoric, 
metonymic, and synecdochic) way so that the reader be 
"dazzled" into truth, so that she might gradually discern 
some kernel of truth about the nature of human existence; 
she then can apply that distilled truth to her own life.
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This ability is that which most distinguishes a great poet 
from a mediocre one. Through the slanted truth, the poet 
achieves a double aim: to stop her reader's "Heart from 
breaking" (#919) and to ensure perpetuity for herself.
For Dickinson, a truth that might stop a "Heart from 
breaking" is variously described: it is "Bald, and Cold"
(#281); it is equivalent to Beauty (#449); it is "stirless" 
(#780); it is "as old as God" (#836); it is "slant"
(#1129); it is "good Health" (#1453); and, ultimately, it 
"outlasts the Sun" (#1455). The combined images suggest 
the pervasive goodness of truth: although it may be cold
and harsh, hence painful, it is implicitly beautiful 
because it frees one from harmful intellectual conceptions 
and hurtful emotional relationships. Dickinson thus 
reformulates the biblical promise "the truth shall make you 
free" (John 8:32) into a rhetorical gamble: if a reader is
willing to chance the temporarily uncomfortable recognition 
of truth, which is the reading of it through the 
aesthetically rendered words of the poet, she chances to 
gain far greater perceptual knowledge.
What results for the writer who disseminates these 
poetic bits of slanted truth is perpetuity. Through 
transforming absence into an absent presence in her poetry, 
Dickinson gambled her talent and indeed gained immortality 
through her words as they effect meaning for her readers:
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She staked her Feathers— Gained an Arc—
Debated— Rose again—
This time— beyond the estimate 
Of Envy, or of Men—
And now, among Circumference—
Her steady Boat be seen—
At home— among the Billows— As 
The Bough where she was born—
(#798)
In death, finally having achieved ultimate "Circumference,1' 
she offers her poetry to her readers as the aesthetic means 
whereby they might approach their own "Circumference.1 
Through her poetry that remains and houses her absent 
presence, she continues to speak across the centuries to 
those who willingly enter into dialogue with her.
Dickinson and her poetry of absence provide a fitting 
conclusion to this critical exploration of rhetorical and 
literary absent presences that come into play in the 
reading of a text. Her work, in many ways, typifies the 
struggle of the poet who seeks to overcome differance, when 
the resultant effect is that writing tends to multiply 
differance. To quote Mills-Courts as she explains this 
Derridean paradox, "Instead of gathering, differance 
institutes 'dissemination'; instead of permitting arrival, 
it produces a 'detour, a delay'; instead of granting 
appropriation, it generates 'dispossession'" (PE 11-12).
Through this study of selected works of Plato, 
Aristotle, New Testament writers, Sidney, Shakespeare and 
Dickinson, I have sought to show that "dissemination,"
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"detour," "delay," and "dispossession" do not preclude 
meaning. Meaning may be deferred, and it may be abridged. 
But it can be, and is, effected whenever a willing, a 
responsible, and a responsive reader partners herself with 
the absent presence of a writer whose text represents an 
equally willing, responsible, and responsive effort. Ideal 
plenitude between writer/reader/text may be impossible, but 
very real communication can be achieved as multiple 
rhetorical (writer/reader) and literary (personae and 
characters) absent presences are engaged in the process of 
reading.
Notes
Chapter 2
1. Note the masculine reference to person, who ultimately 
represents the assumed reader. This reference will change 
in subsequent chapters. During the process of writing, I 
automatically, and rather naturally, responded according 
to the audience presumed by each of the writers. Since the 
original readers of Plato, Aristotle, and the New 
Testament, were a predominantly male audience, the 
masculine pronoun seemed most relevant.
Conversely, since Astrophil's sonnets were directed to 
Stella, reference to a female reader appeared to be more 
appropriate, especially when I considered that Sidney's 
sonnets would have been read to gatherings of the court, 
gatherings which certainly would have included women.
When I began writing the chapters on Shakespeare and 
Dickinson, I again used the feminine pronoun "she" in 
referring to the reader of the text. In a subsequent 
reading of what I had written, I was admittedly puzzled by 
what I had done. In fact, this reference to reader as 
female became something of a paradox to me, especially 
since I argue that the beloveds, to whom both Shakespeare 
and Dickinson direct their poetry, are male.
After analyzing why I assumed a female reader, I 
reached a rather startling conclusion. Much like Gorgias 
suggests in his Encomium and Ross Chambers further develops 
in Story and Situation: Narrative Seduction and the Power
of Fiction. I realized that I, as reader of my own text, 
was analyzing the word/reader (logos/listener) relationship 
similarly. The word, as male "seducer,11 was successfully 
eliciting a response from me, the female reader.
Mine is not a unique reaction. Indeed, current 
reader-response criticism envisions the audience as female. 
Jacques Lacan (Feminine Sexualityf Juliet Mitchell and 
Jacqueline Rose, eds., trans. J. Rose, Norton Pub., Co.,
New York, 1982) and a number of studies made by Sigmund 
Freud support such a premise.
I ask that you recognize these shifts in person, not 
as erratic shifts, but as controlled determinations of the 
writer of the text.
2. Charles P. Segal ("Gorgias and the Psychology of the 
Logos," Harvard Studies in Classical Philology. 66 (1962): 
99-155) provides an extensive and informative discussion of 
the erotic logos as Gorgias perceived it. Focusing on the
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sophist's "rhetorical works and their psychological 
implications" (100), Segal develops his essay from the 
premise that Gorgias's views reflect those of his society. 
As such, "The Helen in particular is based largely upon an 
analysis of human actions in terms of emotional causality" 
(104).
Segal's essay is well worth the reading because it 
situates Gorgias's discussion of eros in the milieu that 
produced it.
3. Mark Wigley (The Architecture of Deconstruction; 
Derrida's Haunt. The MIT Press, Cambridge, 1993) develops 
his thesis from an interesting, but nontraditional, 
premise: "to translate deconstruction in architectural
discourse" (1). As he identifies Derrida with Heidegger's 
view of "Being" (Sein), he recognizes that "Metaphysics is 
the identification of the ground as 'supporting presence' 
for whatever stands like an edifice" (8).
In noting the correlation between discourse and a 
physical edifice, a building, Wigley overlooks a seemingly 
obvious link to Aristotle's triangular view of discourse: 
logos/ethos/pathos. For the builder, triangular support is 
essential; it makes the edifice rigid, preventing its 
collapse.
The triadic structure in discourse likewise is that 
which maintains the dynamism of the word? it is that which 
forestalls the collapse of written communication.
4. A recently published collection of essays (Aristotle's 
Rhetoric: Philosophical Essays, ed. David J. Furley and
Alexander Nehamas, Princeton University Press, Princeton, 
1994) provides critical commentary on current rhetorical 
issues that are rooted in classical Aristotelian thought.
Chapter 3
1. In his forward to Essentials of Bible History (The 
Ronald Press Co., New York, 1947), Elmer W.K. Mould 
establishes the Bible as "the most important book in the 
English language" (v-vi).
Although some may question his claim, few can 
objectively ignore the impact that the Bible made on both 
the spiritual and the literary worlds: its content 
permanently impacted humanity in the ways that it perceived 
and expressed "otherness."
2. In his introduction to The Bible as History, Abingdon 
Press, Nashville, 1968, William Barclay espouses three
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views of history: the "circular and repetitive," the
"haphazard" and purposeless, and the "purposeful" and 
Christian (11-13).
Seeking "to present Bible history within the setting 
of contemporary world events" (17), Barclay joins other 
writers in a textual effort that points to "God's 
revelation in history" (18).
Though written from a decidedly Christian perspective, 
the book is valuable to my study in that it quite 
successfully objectifies the Christ, placing him in the 
context of history.
Chapter 4
1. Paula H. Payne, "The Poet Orator's Praise: Epideictic 
Discourse in Sidney's Astrophil and Stella" fThe Sidney 
Newsletter, 9, 1988, pp. 11-21), argues that Sidney 
fashions Astrophil's "unspoken monologue out of three 
distinct and different types of Aristotelian discourse: 
forensic, epideictic, and deliberative rhetoric" (11). 
Focusing on epeideictic oratory (praise or blame), Payne 
provides specific evidence that many, if not all, of 
Sidney's sonnets fit the mode of Aristotelian discourse.
2. Robert M. Coogan, "The Triumph of Reason: Sidney's 
Defense and Aristotle's Rhetoric (Papers on Language & 
Literature, 17, 1981, pp. 255-270) details the correlation 
between Sidney's literary treatise and Aristotle's 
rhetorical treatise.
3. Eva Schaper (Prelude to Aesthetics. George Allen & 
Unwin, Ltd., London, 1968) develops the thesis that Plato 
and Aristotle originated aesthetics, the "living debate of 
issues concerning the concepts involved in speaking about 
the arts and the appreciation and creation of art works" 
(11). Crediting Aristotle with inaugurating "aesthetics as 
a theoretical study" (13), she contends that the "presence" 
(134) of these philosophers invades and shapes any critical 
enterprise.
4. Ovid Renewed: Ovidian Influences on Literature and Art
from the Middle Ages to the Twentieth Century (edited by 
Charles Martindale, Cambridge Univ. Press, Cambridge, 1988) 
is an informative collection of essays that traces some of 
Ovid's influences on Western literature. Sidney's 
rendering of Astrophil's plight from poetic despair to 
artistic hope at least faintly echoes the Metamorphoses.
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Chapter 5
1. M.M. Bakhtin (Art and Answerabi1itv; Earlv 
Philosophical Essavs. Ed. Michael Holquist and Vadim 
Liapunov, University of Texas Press, Austin, 1990) 
discusses this dynamic textual relationship between poet 
and persona. Translated as "architectonics,11 this activity 
suggests a triangular relationship between author, text, 
and hero (persona).
2. Joseph Pequigney (Such Is Mv Love: A Study of
Shakespeare's Sonnets. University of Chicago Press,
Chicago, 1985) clouds the relationship between Will and his 
Fair Friend with a literal reading. Forcing the modern 
homosexual interpretation upon an Elizabethan fact of life, 
male friends who genuinely but not necessarily physically 
loved one another, Pequigney unnecessarily problematizes 
Shakespeare's sonnets.
I cannot be as generous as Michael Field (Shakespeare 
Quarterly. 38, 1987, 375-77) who reviews Pequigney's book:
It ought to be clear that Such Is My Love is a 
major reinterpretation of Shakespeare's sonnets. 
While the tone of certainty, the attack on the 
major traditions of criticism of the sonnets, the 
stress on very explicit erotic references in the 
poems, and the effort to show that the received 
order is demonstrably correct may annoy some 
readers, annoyance will have to yield to respect. 
For even if not all of his claims prove valid, 
Pequigney is so rigorous and sensible in 
substantiating them that no casual dismissal is 
possible.
(377)
I do not casually dismiss Pequigney's reading. I simply 
suggest that he fails to factor in the Elizabethan view of 
male-to-male relationships which allowed for overt 
expressions of love.
Chapter 6
1. Mary Arensberg's "Introduction: The American Sublime"
(The American Sublime. State University of New York Press, 
New York, 1986) carefully defines sublimity. Beginning 
with Longinus, whose text On Great Writing initiates the 
idea, she says that the "Longinian sublime is essentially 
rhetorical and identified as the reader's response to great
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utterance.” In such an analysis, Arensberg comments that 
"the moment of sublimity is always a language scene which 
produces an uncanny metaphorical effect" (3).
After delineating five Longinian "rhetorical and 
psychological structures which inform the problematic of 
the sublime, ancient or modern" (3), Arensberg suggests 
that the American sublime bridges the ancient sublime 
through "the Kantian drama of the imagination," where the 
sublime is subdivided into "mathematical" and "dynamical" 
(4, 5). Providing a cursory overview of the essays in the 
text, Arensberg says that Emerson, Whitman, Dickinson, 
Marianne Moore, Adrienne Rich, and Elizabeth Bishop draw on 
"various models of the sublime" to create their own 
distinctly American version of sublimity.
2. Jorge Luis Borges's interview at Dickinson College 
(Boraes the Poet, University of Arkansas Press, 
Fayetteville, 1986) was conducted in the Socratic method. 
Professor James Hughes, the interviewer, served as 
interlocutor to "Socrates," Luis Borges. At the conclusion 
of the interview, members of the audience were given an 
opportunity to question the guest speaker (8).
The interview is thus representative of metarhetoric. 
As Borges and his interlocutor discuss the poetic rhetoric 
of Dickinson, they subsequently call attention to their own 
language as rhetoric.
3. The thesis put forth by Helen Regueiro Elam ("Dickinson 
and the Haunting of the Self," 83-99, The American Sublime. 
Ed. Mary Arensberg, State University of New York Press, New 
York, 1986) is that this lingering and powerful authorial 
presence results from the writer's "abysmal experience of 
self-loss" (83). As "Dickinson's poems uncover this abyss 
within the self" (96), her reader shares in the struggle 
"which poetry tries to heal and which it reveals" (84).
4. Peter Gay (The Bourgeois Experience: Victoria to 
Freud, Vol 1, Education of the Senses. Oxford University 
Press, New York, 1984) ambitiously seeks, through several 
volumes, to give "symphonic treatment" to "the bourgeois 
experience" (3). Proceeding from a historical perspective,
his first volume is an "inquiry with bourgeois sexuality 
and with its mature form, love" (4).
Like Farr, he concludes that modern readers have 
grossly inaccurate conceptions of Victorian relationships, 
both male to female, and female to female. Although he 
recognizes that he may "complicate" our preconceived 
notions, Gay aims to "correct those tenacious 
misconceptions that have dogged our reading of Victorian 
culture" (3).
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Gay's text is highly informative and deserves at least 
a referential glance in any study of Emily Dickinson. His 
carefully compiled index is especially helpful in locating 
specific passages that comment on particular misconceptions 
of the Victorian era.
5. Judith Farr (The..Passion of _Emilv Dickinson. Harvard
University Press, Cambridge, 1992) builds an argument that 
Samuel Bowles, rather than Charles Wadsworth, is the 
referent for Dickinson's "Master.11 For the most part, she 
ignores Wadsworth as an integral player in the creative 
life of Dickinson, the poet.
Farr suggests that not one but two "beloveds" emerge 
from the fascicles. One is female (Sue Gilbert Dickinson), 
and the other is male (Samuel Bowles). The poet-lover's 
feelings toward the first are innocent in their affection; 
her feelings toward the second are passionate in their 
admiration (182-83).
6. In her book Dickinson: Strategies of Limitation (The 
University of Massachusetts Press, Amherst, 1985), Jane 
Donahue Eberwein provides a thorough discussion of 
Dickinson's differentiation between "Circuit" and 
"Circumference." Arguing that Dickinson's quest was 
implicitly religious, Eberwein assesses that "Circuit" and 
"Circumference" are a part of the poet's willful strategies 
which she incorporates to express the
dilemma of human limitation . . . with 
powerlessness paired with omnipotence, finitude 
with infinity, mortality with immortality, 
deprivation with plenitude, misery with 
blessedness, man with God.
(73)
"Circuit" and "Circumference" are the antinomical states of 
existence, the conscious (the finite) and the unconscious 
(the potentially infinite).
The "business" of the poet allows those who are not 
poets to venture into that abyss of "Circumference."
Through her aesthetic slanting of "Truth," the poet offers 
a momentary glimpse into that which might lie beyond 
mortality.
7. In "Tropes of Presence, Tropes of Absence," a chapter
in The Languagefs^ of Poetry: Walt Whitman. Emilv
Dickinson. Gerard Manlev Hopkins (The University of Georgia
Press, Athens, 1993), James Olney analyzes the absent 
presence somewhat differently from the way that I approach
it in this study. Like Olney, I recognize the metaphorical
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significance of the term, but I apply that metaphor as an 
ontological construct. As such, the term "absent presence" 
metaphorically describes various rhetorical and literary 
states of being— writer to reader, reader to writer, writer 
to personae, and reader to personae. These separate 
entities, working in unison, determine the outcome of any 
reading experience.
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